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Introduction
In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,1 the United States
Supreme Court, sua sponte, denounced the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," a doctrine that, in some circumstances, allowed courts to assume, arguendo, the existence ofjurisdiction and to address the merit questions presented
by cases. Several of the Justices distanced themselves from the denunciation,
however, and despite the vociferousness ofthe position taken by the majority,
even it found that there were exceptional circumstances in which the Court
had acted properly (and presumably in which other courts would act appropriately) in assuming jurisdiction arguendo and addressing merits questions. The
opinion left open a number of questions with which the federal courts and
commentators have begun to grapple. In this Article, I focus on matters left
unclear by Steel Co. and, in particular, on the effects ofthe Court's denunciation of the work of the federal appellate courts.
1.

523 U.S. 83 (1998).

APPELLATE USE OFHYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION
The first Part describes the Steel Co. opinion and highlights several ofthe
questions it raised. Part II considers how the Court's denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction has changed the appellate courts' approach to cases in
which they find issues concerning the districtcourts' jurisdiction. It does not
attempt to answer all the interpretive issues left open by Steel Co., as that case
applies to district court jurisdiction, nor does it tackle the myriad issues that
courts will face in determining whether particular matters go to the district
courts' "jurisdiction," for Steel Co.'s purposes. Part II does, however, focus,
by way of example, on the primary area of controversy that arose in the wake
of Steel Co. as it applies to district court jurisdiction: whether the Eleventh
Amendment defense is jurisdictional in the sense that courts may no longer
assume it to be inapplicable or unavailable, and may decide cases on their
merits.
Part Ell initially provides a transition from appellate handling of issues
of district court jurisdiction to issues of appellate jurisdiction. It begins by
addressing the apparent tensionbetween the Court's denunciation ofhypothetical jurisdiction and its restriction of the scope of appellate jurisdiction when
hearing interlocutory appeals, and stakes out a position on which matters of
district court jurisdiction appellate courts may entertain upon interlocutory
appeals. Part III then examines how appellate courts had employed hypothetical appellatejurisdiction and how the Court's seeming prohibition on hypothetical jurisdiction applies to matters ofappellate jurisdiction. This undertaking re4aires consideration of the constitutional provisions, statutes, rules and
doctrines that govern appellate jurisdiction and an evaluation of which requirements no longer may be assumed to be satisfied, to allow an appellate
court to reach merits issues.
Finally, Part IV looks at the effect ofSteel Co. on the kinds of issues that
the courts of appeals are deciding. It then comments on the value of this
effect.
I. The Many Questions Left Unanswered by Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment
A. The Court's Opinion and an Initial Critique
An environmental protection organization, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), had sued, alleging that the defendant had violated the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) by failing
to timely file certain reports. CBE sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPCRA authorizes suits for
purely past violations.2 The Court decided instead that it had no jurisdiction
2.

Id. at 86-88.
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to resolve this merits issue because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue

A

diatribe against "hypothetical jurisdiction" was not necessary to its decision,
and the parties had neither briefed nor argued the subject.' Nonetheless, en

route to its conclusion as to plaintiffs' standing, the Court attacked the practice of many district courts and several federal courts of appeals to decide
merits questions that are more readily resolved than jurisdictional objections,
when "the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing

party were jurisdiction denied."5

In an opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, and Kennedy, the Court stated, "We decline to endorse
such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of
powers."6 Adverting to courts' lack of power to declare the law in the absence
of jurisdiction, the Court added that, when jurisdiction ceases to exist, a

court's only function is to announce that fact and dismiss the case. Moreover,
"'[o]n every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that
ofjurisdiction, first; of this court, and then ofthe court from which the record
comes.' 7 "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold
matter 'spring[s] from the nature and limits ofthe judicial power ofthe United
States' and is 'inflexible and without exception."'"
The Court conceded that some of its own decisions had "diluted the

absolute purity ofthe rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent
3. Id. at 109-10.
4. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J.,concurring in judgment) (commenting on Court's
discussion of hypothetical jurisdiction not having been informed by adversary submissions of
parties); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52
VAND. L. REV. 235, 271-72 (1999) (stating that neither party raised hypothetical jurisdiction
at district court, court of appeals, or Supreme Court level; rather, Supreme Court decided issue
sua sponte, without notice to parties) (citations omitted); id. at 274-80 (commenting on
jurisprudential and institutional significance, as well as irony, of Court's reaching out, in these
circumstances, to address hypothetical jurisdiction inter alia prior to verifying subject-matter
jurisdiction over case).
5. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93. Foradescription ofthe variationsinthedoctrineasadopted
by various courts of appeals, see Idleman, supra note 4, at 245 (noting that "standard" formulation provides that courts may rule on merits without reaching jurisdictional contention "[w]hen
the merits of the case are clearly against the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the
jurisdictional question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record
make the case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question"). Idleman found that some
courts had looked only to whether the difficulty of resolving the jurisdictional question was far
greater than that entailed in resolving the merits of a suit. Id. at 246-47.
6. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94.
7. Id. (quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,453 (1900)).
8. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
379,382 (1884)).
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question,"9 but insisted that all of the decisions that the lower federal courts
or other Justices relied upon as precedent legitimating hypothetical jurisdiction were distinguishable from and did not "even approach[ ] approval of a
doctrine... that enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when
[the court's] jurisdiction is in doubt.""l None of those cases "pretermi[tted]
the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that
otherwise would have gone unaddressed."'" The Court thus excoriated hypothetical jurisdiction as "produc[ing] nothing more than a hypothetical judgmentL] ... an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning. 1 2 It concluded that
[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements ofjurisdiction are an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining
the courts from acting at certain times, and even resraining them from
actingpermanentlyregarding certain subjects.... For acourttopronounce
upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it
has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra
vires.13
Foreshadowing an army of issues that lower federal courts have to resolve in
the wake of Steel Co., the Court rejected Justice Stevens's view that the
question whether EPCRA authorized the cause of action that plaintiffs sought
to assert was 'jurisdictional" and so had equal claim to being resolved first.14
Focusing on the Supreme Court cases that the lower federal courts had
relied upon as legitimating hypothetical jurisdiction, the Court portrayed
several cases as having characterized as jurisdictional issues or requirements
that had been assumed arguendo, when that characterization was in error.1 5
When one looks at the cases in question, particularly Secretary of Navy v.
Avrech and United States v. Augenblick, one sees that the Court explicitly
9.
10.
11.

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 15-23 and notes 29-31.
Id. at 98.

12.

Id. at 101.

13. Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 90-93; see id. at 112-31 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens opined that
actionability of past violations of EPCRA was statutory jurisdictional question that could be
addressed before Article Ell
standing issues, and normally should be addressed before constitu-

tional questions. Id.
15.

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 98-100 (1998) (describing

issue in both Sec y of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), and United States v. Augenblick,

393 U.S. 348 (1969), as whether court-martial judgment could be collaterally attacked by suit

for back pay, among other relief, alleging constitutional defect in military decision); Schlesinger
v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 744-53 (1975) (squarely holding this issue not to be jurisdictonal).
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stated that it was assuming arguendo the jurisdiction of the federal court. 6
Even if the Court later changes its mind about the jurisdictional nature of an
issue, the cases that assumed arguendo matters that the Court then regarded
as jurisdictional continue to exemplify the Court's earlier approbation ofhypothetical jurisdiction.
The Court sought to destroy the value of additional decisions as precedents for hypothetical jurisdiction by now characterizing as jurisdictional the
issue that the Court had reached prior to other jurisdictional issues." In
Chandlerv. JudicialCouncilof Tenth Circuit," for example, a federal district
judge had challenged the authority of a Judicial Council to strip him of cases
that had been assigned to him and to impose conditions on the exercise of his
20
constitutional powers as ajudge. 9 The Court declared that the "very knotty
"threshold question in this case is whether we have jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for extraordinary relief."21 However, the court declined to decide
whether it had appellate jurisdiction, and concluded that, because other
avenues of relief remained open, the complaining judge had not made a case
for extraordinary relief.' There is no indication that the ChandlerCourt itself
regarded the issue of exhaustion of alternatives as jurisdictional, although the
Steel Co. Court viewed the issue that way. Despite the Court's later change
of mind about the jurisdictional nature of an issue, cases in which the Court
decided what it then regarded as non-jurisdictional matters before the Court
decided issues that it then regarded as jurisdictional may again exemplify the
Court's earlier approbation of hypothetical jurisdiction.'
B. Questions Left Unanswered
Beyond this questionable handling of precedent, the Steel Co. majority
opinion raises a number of questions. For example, a great deal of language
in the opinion suggests that the Court sought to ensure that lower federal
16. Avrech,418 U.S. at 677-78;Augenblick,393 U.S. at350-52.
17. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 (describing Chandler v. JudicialCouncil of Tenth
Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), as having permissibly addressed whether petitioner for writ of
prohibition or mandamus had exhausted all alternative avenues of relict while reserving
question of Court's jurisdiction to issue such writ in that case, because exhaustion question
itself was "at least arguably jurisdictional, and was clearly treated as such").
18. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
19. Chandler,398 U.S. at 82.
20. Id.at 88.
21. Id. at 86.
22. Id. at 86-89.
23. See infra text at notes 48-59, however, concerning the decision of procedural issues
before merits issues.
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courts will not reach merits questions24 without first determining that an
Article Ell case or controversy is present.2 Insofar as only constitutional
limitations on judicial jurisdiction are the Court's concern, lower federal
courts may be free to resolve merits questions before jurisdictional questions
that are of a merely statutory, prudential or common law nature. 26 But this is
not entirely clear. Other language in the opinion, in particular that in which
the Court stated that "[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements
24. These would include whether the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be
granted.
25. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92, 95 (arguing that Justice Stevens had failed to cite any
case in which Supreme Court had decided whether complaint stated claim before resolving "the
existence of an Article III case or controversy," and stating that arguments asserting that court
may decide cause of action question before resolving Article Ill jurisdiction are readily refuted).
In Steel Co., the Court conceded that some of its cases had "diluted the absolute purity of the
rule that Article Illjurisdictionis always an antecedent question." Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
26. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'lAss'n ofR.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,45556,464-65 & n.13 (1974) (determining merits question-whether private right of action existed
to enforce particular statutory duties, thereby pretermitting issues of plaintiff's statutory
standing to bring such suit and whether district court had statutory jurisdiction to entertain such
suit); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E. ex rel. Nancy E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
prudential standing requirements to be forfeited when not raised in timely manner because such
requirements are nonjurisdictional); Hodgers-Durgin v. Do La V'ma, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 n.3
(9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, in assuming Article Iff standing and resolving case based on
plaintiffs' failure to establish prerequisite for equitable relief, court did not violate Steel Co.'s
denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction because it affirmed summary judgment for defendants
based on scope of its equitable power to grant injunctive relief, not based on merits of plaintiff's
claims); Cablevision, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 100 n.9 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that "whatever the scope of Steel Co.'s recommended order of analysis, .. . [it] does
command that initial consideration be given to the existence of Article III standing, where
such.., is in doubt"); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 53-54
(1st Cir. 1999) (describing Steel Co. as having "declared that courts should generally determine
jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits," and as having distinguished
whether Article M11
between Article III and statutory jurisdiction, "holding that the former should ordinarily be
decided before the merits, but the latter need not be"); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg, 149
F.3d 659,663 n.4, 669 n.13 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because complaint alleged Article IlI
case or controversy and Article III standing, court had jurisdiction to address questions of
statutory standing and merits issues; but, it addressed only merit issues, concluding that it could
"elide" issue of prudential standing); Idleman, supra note 4, at 318-20 (noting that insofar as
Steel Co. holds that Article If court cannot decide merits of dispute without first verifying that
Article IIIs case or controversy requirements have been satisfied, it does not necessarily
prohibit decision of merits issues without prior verification of merely statutory or judge-made
jurisdictional requirements). Professor Freer has noted that a "case in which the plaintiff lacks
only statutory standing nonetheless falls within Article M11.Determining the merits of such a
case without addressing the statutory standing issue does not implicate the constitutional
separation of powers problem at the center of Steel Company." Richard D. Freer, Observations
on the Scope of the Supreme Court'sRejection of "HypotheticalJurisdiction,"8 FED. LIT.
GUIDE RPT. 247,250 (Oct. 1999) (emphasis added).
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of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects," suggests that
the Court's denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction extends to arguendo
assumptions of jurisdiction that, while unquestionably constitutional, are
doubtful as a statutory matterY Thus, the Court has laid the groundwork for
playing Steel Co. either way.
The majority opinion also raises questions about the scope of the denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction by its embrace, rather than disavowal, of
cases in which the Court itself "diluted the absolute purity of the rule"' that
jurisdiction always is athreshold question. If Norton v. Mathews,29 Philbrook
v. Glodgett,3 ° Secretary ofNavy v. Avrech,31 Chandlerv. JudicialCouncil of
27. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 1016.
28. Id.
29. 427 U.S. 524 (1976). In Norton, the Court declined to decide the jurisdictional
question whether the action had properly been brought in a three-judge district court and hence
was properly before the Supreme Court on a direct appeal. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524,
527-31 (1976). The Court justified its bypass of the jurisdictional question on the grounds that,
because the merits question was decided in a companion case, resolution of the jurisdictional
question would have had no effect on the outcome: ifjurisdiction had been invoked correctly,
the Court would have affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. If jurisdiction were
lacking, the Court would have dismissed the appeal, vacated the judgment and remanded, but
the identical outcome would have been foreordained in subsequent proceedings before a single
federal judge. Id. at 531-32. Thus, avoidance of the jurisdictional question did not allow the
Court to decide a question that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. In Steel Co., the Court
also indicated that Norton could be read not to have avoided the jurisdictional question at all,
but to have concluded that,in light of the companion case, Norton should be dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98; see Norton, 427 U.S. at 530-31
(stating that disposition of companion case rendered "the merits in the present case a decided
issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense"). For commentary on
Norton, see Idleman, supra note 4, at 301-02 (observing that second reading "legitimates the
power of an appellate court to issue a prejudicial judgment (an affirmance on the merits)" and
commenting on how the two readings of Norton differ in how they undermine the Court's effort
to repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction, but asserting that both do so).
Judge O'Scannlain, dissenting in Clow v. US. Dep 'toff-ousing & UrbanDev., 948 F.2d
614 (9th Cir. 1991), argues that Norton is in no way precedent for hypothetical jurisdiction
because
the knotty jurisdictional question that the Norton Court abstained from deciding
was not a question ofjurisdiction vel non, but a question of which of two jurisdictional schemes... properly applied. ...
[it implicitly acknowledged that the
district court's jurisdiction - in one form or another - was certain and that nothing
depended upon a resolution of the precise nature of that jurisdiction because the
same party would prevail on the merits in either event.
Id. at 627 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
30. 421 U.S. 707 (1975). Philbrook presented an issue of pendent party jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) that the parties had not adequately briefed and that the Court
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Tenth Circuit,2 and United States v. Augenblic 3' - all cases that lower federal courts had relied upon as legitimating hypothetical jurisdiction - remain
good law, the line separating assumptions of jurisdiction that are forbidden
regarded as a "subtle and complex question with far-reaching implications." Id. at 721. Despite
or perhaps because of this, the Court concluded that the "unusual context" of the appeal
permitted an exception to the general rule that the Court has a duty to inquire into the jurisdiction of the district court. Id. The unusual context apparently consisted of the foregoing
circumstances and the additional facts that (1) the substantive issue decided by the district court
would have been decided in regard to a co-defendant even if the Secretary of HEW were not a
proper party and (2) the pendent party Secretary had announced his intent to comply with the
judgment if the Court's decision on the merits was adverse. Concluding that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the claim against the Secretary had resulted in no adjudication on the merits
that could not have been properly made without him, and had resulted in no issuance of process
against him which he properly contended to be wrongful, the Court bypassed the question of
statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against the Secretary (and perhaps even the

question of the constitutionality under Article I of pendent party subject-matter jurisdiction),
and simply dismissed the Secretary's appeal from the judgment below. Id. at 721-22; see also

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 n.16 (1978) (declining
to resolve whether Duke Power was proper party because jurisdiction over claims against
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established, and Duke's presence or absence made no
material difference either to Court's consideration of merits or to its authority to award requested relief).
In later cases, the Court assumed arguendo that Article III would permit the exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction (so long as the claim against the pendent party arose out of a common
nucleus of operative fact with a substantial federal question claim and was such that, disregarding the claims' federal and state natures, respectively, the plaintiff would normally be expected
to try them together), but the Court disapproved such exercises of jurisdiction as inconsistent
with the statutory bases of jurisdiction on which the courts had to rely. See Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (disapproving pendent party jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346, having assumed, without deciding, that constitutional criteria for pendent party jurisdiction are analogous to those for pendent claim jurisdiction); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 15-18 (1976) (disapproving pendent party jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), after
stating that extension of UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), to pendent party
jurisdiction "presents rather different statutoryjurisdictional considerations") (emphasis added);
see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978) (assuming,
without deciding, that common nucleus of operative fact test also determines outer boundaries
of constitutionally permissible federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship).
31. 418 U.S. 676 (1974). Avrech also presented a situation in which a Supreme Court
decision, Parkerv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), decided after certiorari had been granted in
Avrech but a few weeks before Avrech was decided, definitively answered the question presented on the merits byAvrech. Id. at 678. Thus, Avrech too could be viewed as exemplifying
the notion that hypothetical jurisdiction may be permissible when the merits determination
would not constitute a holding with precedential significance. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98-99
(noting that Avrech should not be cited for proposition that courts may decide "easy" merits
questions based on assumption ofjurisdiction).
32. 398 U.S. 74 (1970); see supratext accompanying notes 18-22.
33. 393 U.S. 348 (1969); see supratext accompanying note 16.
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from those that are permissible is blurry.3 4 By way of example, as Professor
Freer has noted, Norton could be read "to permit hypothetical jurisdiction
35
whenever the merits determination does not require aprecedentialholding."
The same could be said ofAvrech and Philbrook 6 The pre-Steel Co. under-

standing that hypothetical assumptions of jurisdiction are proper only when

the merits are easy to decide3 7 is consistent with this principle, for it is precisely when precedent clearly dictates the outcome of a case (so that its
decision will not be of significant precedential value) that decision ofthe case
on the merits is easiest.
Even on the Court's own reading of Chandler,that case can be read to
permit one jurisdictional question to be avoided or assumed in favor of
deciding another such question." As so interpreted, Chandleris a precursor
34. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98-100 (purporting to distinguish these cases); see also
Cross-Sound Ferry Seres., Inc. v. I.C.C., 934 F.2d 327, 342-45 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review) (arguing that none of four
cases sometimes cited in support of hypothetical jurisdiction does so; in particular, arguing that
"[i]n Augenblick ... the ground passed over was at least arguably non-jurisdictional, and in
Chandler,Avrech, and Norton, the ground rested upon was at least arguably jurisdictional").
The view of then-Judge Thomas seemed to be, however, that, given the "woolliness" and
elusiveness of the concept ofjurisdiction and the fact that some provisions can be jurisdictional
in some contexts and not in others, the rule that federal courts must satisfy themselves of their
jurisdiction and not decide cases when they lack jurisdiction to do so may not apply if the ground
passed over sufficiently partakes of the nature of a merits ground or if the ground rested upon
sufficiently partakes of the nature of ajurisdictional bar. Cross-SoundFerry,934 F.2d at 341.
Extensive discussion of the Supreme Court cases that lower federal courts relied on as
authority for the assumption of jurisdiction arguendo can be found in Idleman, supra note 4;
Comment,AssumingJurisdictionArguendo: The Rationaleand Limits ofHypotheticalJurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712,746 (1979).
Another Supreme Court opinion that may be viewed as employing hypothetical jurisdiction, but only as to one aspect of the case, is New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-85
(1992). There, in considering plaintiffs' contention that certain provisions of a congressional
act were inconsistent with the Constitution's Guarantee Clause (guaranteeing to every state a
republican form of government), the Court avoided deciding whether the claim was a nonjusticiable political question. Id. The court stated, "Even if we assume that petitioners' claim
is justiciable, [the challenged provisions did not] deny any State a republican form of government." Id. at 185. But see Comment, supra, at 746 (arguing that deciding a case on its merits
while assuming arguendo the nonexistence of a political question creates a logical conflict). In
doing so, "[tihe issue purportedly reserved - whether the controversy is a proper subject for
judicial resolution - has in fact been decided in the affirmative .... [D]eciding the issue on the
merits necessarily implies a decision that no political question exists." Id.
35. Freer, supranote 26, at 250 (emphasis added).
36. See supra notes 30-31.
37. See supratext accompanying note 5.
38. Professor Idleman has written that, in addition to the doctrines discussed above that
Steel Co. apparently preserved despite its denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction generally, the
Court also appears to have left intact some other doctrines that relate to hypothetical jurisdiction.
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of the Court's decision in RuhrgasAG v. MarathonOil Co.,39 where the Court
held that there is "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy" requiring a federal
court to decide that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed case
before deciding whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant."
If issues concerning a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be postponed, and perhaps permanently avoided, while the court addresses personal

jurisdiction issues and other jurisdictional requirements, one may well ask
what other issues are "jurisdictional" so that courts may give them sequencing priority over issues that bear upon subject-matter jurisdiction and so that
It left intact the doctrine that federal courts may dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the ostensibly federal claim asserted is wholly "insubstantial" and frivolous.
Idleman, supra note 4, at 290-91; see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (stating that district courts have
jurisdiction unless purportedly federal claims fit this description). The Court also left intact the
converse doctrine that whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction. In
Professor Idleman's view, there are a number of tensions between the insubstantiality doctrine
and Steel Co.'sposition on hypothetical jurisdiction. See Idleman, supranote 4, at 293-97.
39. 526 U.S. 574 (1999); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
66-67 (1997) (deciding case on basis of mootness, without first determining whether appellants
had standing to appeal, explaining that both questions affect Article III jurisdiction).
40. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999). Marathon Oil and
others had sued Ruhrgas in state court, and Ruhrgas had removed to district court, asserting
three bases of federal jurisdiction: diversity of citizenship, federal question, and 9 U.S.C. § 205
(1999), which authorizes removal of cases that relate to international arbitration agreements.
Id. at 579. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and
Marathon moved to remand for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 580. The
district court granted the former motion, finding that Ruhrgas lacked the minimum contacts with
Texas that were required by Fourteenth Amendment due process and hence by the Texas longarm statute. Id. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, vacated and remanded, holding that the district court ought to have reached the question of personal jurisdiction only after concluding that
it had subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 582. By so sequencing the issues, the district court
would have reduced the threat of usurping the state court's authority to decide the sweep of its
power to exercise personajurisdiction. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211,21819 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
The Supreme Court declined to conclude that the nature and unwaivability ofthe subjectmatter jurisdiction requirement made it necessarily more fundamental than the requirement of
personal jurisdiction, observing that, in this case, the objection to the former was merely statutory whereas the objection to the latter was constitutionally based. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 58485. It found that, in a dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction, there was no assumption of
power that violated the jurisdiction-before-merits principle emphasized in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a BetterEnvironment,523 U.S. 83 (1998). Id.
The Court opined generally that the federal design permitted federal courts to consider
such matters as judicial economy, the relative difficulty and novelty of the two jurisdictional
questions, and federalism, that is, sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature, in deciding whether
to address first a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 587-88. Thus, although subject-matter jurisdiction
ordinarily should be decided first, "where... a district court has before it a straightforward
personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect
in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its
discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction." Id. at 588.
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courts must address them before reaching issues on the merits." The candidates include a defendant's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit,42
the argument that a federal court should abstain from deciding a case under
43 or other abstention doctrines," and many
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris
41. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) (concluding that
Congress's preclusion ofjudicial review of Secretary ofAgriculture's market orders when sought
by consumers was "in effect jurisdictional, and therefore that Court did not need to address
challenge to consumers' standing to challenge those orders); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S.
693, 711-17 (1973) (approving discretionary declination of pendent jurisdiction without deciding
non-discretionary jurisdictional question whether pendent jurisdiction could extend to state law
claims against new party); Fla. Ass'n ofRehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d ,1208,1227 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that question ofmootness
ought to be resolved before Eleventh Amendment issues because former is an "even more basic
question ofjurisdiction that cannot be waived and goes to the very heart of the 'cast or controversy' requirement ofArticle I,); United States v. Hurd, No. 98-7129,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
8715, at *6 (10th Cir. May 7, 1999) (finding serious question as to whether appellant had filed
timely notice of appeal of denial of post-judgment motion to dismiss, but vacating district court's
ruling on basis of latter's lack of jurisdiction to consider merits of motion); La. Envtl. Action
Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing for lack of ripeness
where plaintiffs also may have lacked standing); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160,162 (2d Cir.
1994) (affirming on political question grounds district court's judgment dismissing claim for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that justiciability also is threshold question and, where
it poses a less knotty question, may be addressed first). But see In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247,
256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (advising that, because Supreme Court has classified "act of state" doctrine
as substantive rule of law, resolution of this case on that ground, without addressing jurisdiction
under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), would exceed district court's power).
42. CompareParella v. Ret Bd. ofthe RI Employees' Ret Sys., 173 F.3d 46,53-56 (1at
Cir. 1999) (holding that Steel Co. does not require courts to address arguments of entitlement to
Eleventh Amendment immunity before addressing merits of claim, reading Steel Co.to hold that
only Article M jurisdictional questions ordinarily should be decided before merits; and concluding that Eleventh Amendment issues do not fall into category of Article MIquestions that Steel
Co. would define as necessarily antecedent given, interalia,ways in which EleventhAmendment
differs from ordinary restrictions on subject-matter jurisdiction and fact that decision of merits
before consideration of Eleventh Amendment arguments does not threaten court's underlying
power to decide law) with Seabom v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment issues must be addressed before merits, having characterized
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity as challenge to federal subject-matter jurisdiction)
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)). For further discussion of the
Eleventh Amendment issue, see infratext at notes 81-142.
43. 401 U.S. 37(1971). The Court in Younger held that federal courts may not enjoin
pending state criminal proceedings except where the threat to federally-protected rights cannot
be adequately addressed by plaintiff's defense of that prosecution. Id. at 54. CompareWeekly
v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 614-16 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Younger abstention is not
based on lack of jurisdiction but reflects prudential decision not to exercise equity jurisdiction
that court possesses, and dismissing suit without reaching Younger issue where district court
lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and Falanga v. State Bar of Ga., 150 F.3d
1333, 1335 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that appeals court could assume that lower court's
refusal to abstain was proper and address merits because Younger abstention issues are not
jurisdictional), with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 100-01 n.3 (1998)
(purporting to distinguish its decision in Ellis v. Dyaon, 421 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1975), from
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others.4" Insofar as these issues are not jurisdictional in the relevant sense,
courts will have to address "truly"jurisdictional issues before reaching them,
but courts may continue to assume arguendo against them46 and address the
situations of hypothetical jurisdiction). In Ellis, the Court reversed and remanded a case, to be
reconsidered in light ofrecent Court precedent in the Younger line of cases, despite having grave
doubts as to whether a case or controversy existed. According to the Steel Co. Court, this was
permissible because the Court has treated Younger as jurisdictional. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 10001 n.3. The Court however instructed the district court, on remand, to decide the Article Til
issues before reaching the Younger issues. Ellis, 421 U.S. at 435; see also Kendall-Jackson
Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 212 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Younger abstention
from subject-matter jurisdiction, relying upon waivability of former, which court found to be
incompatible with subject-matter jurisdiction); Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825,829 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that trial court had jurisdiction to permit or deny intervention after having dismissed
plaintiffs' case on Younger grounds because Younger abstention is not jurisdictional but reflects
prudential decision not to exercise jurisdiction that court does possess).
44. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 212 F.3d at 997 (distinguishing Pullmanabstention
from matters of subject-matter jurisdiction); Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204
F.3d 647, 650-52 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing whether abstention doctrines announced in
ColoradoRiverWaterConservationDistv. UnitedStates, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and inBrillhart
v. Excess InsuranceCo. ofAmerica, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), are jurisdictional). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the ColoradoRiver abstention doctrine is not jurisdictional, and that the Brillhart
abstention doctrine "speaks to the propriety of assuming federal jurisdiction over the instant case"
and, in part for that reason, was properly addressed upon review of a ColoradoRiver stay of
proceedings, although the issue was raised for the firast time on appeal. Id. at 652. See Southmark
Corp. v. Coopers &Lybrand (Inre Southmark Corp.), 163 F.3 d 925, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (opining
that, before reaching preclusion issues, bankruptcy court should have decided issues concerning
its jurisdiction and its obligation under bankruptcy laws, to abstain from hearing case).
45. Idleman asserts that there are "countless issues the status of which - especially their
bypassability- remains uncertain in the wake ofSteel Co." Idleman, supra note 4, at 328. Those
issues include the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, supplemental
jurisdiction, the reviewability of detention decisions related to deportations, the procedural
requirements of Rules 3(c) and 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, certain
exhaustion of remedies requirements, and certificate ofappealability requirements. Id. at 328-29.
A sample of additional issues that courts recently have had to categorize as jurisdictional or not
includes the following: Hillv. City ofSeven Points,230 F.3d 167,168 (5th Cir. 2000) (whether
absence ofjudge's signature from order of reference to magistrate judge is jurisdictional defect);
UnitedStatesv. Gama-Bastidas,222 F.3d 779,784-85 (10th Cir. 2000) (whether law ofthe case
or mandate rule, which generally requires trial courts to conform with articulated appellate
remands, is jurisdictional); Lemonds v. St Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000)
(whether Rooker-Feldman doctrine isjurisdictional, so that it may be addressed for first time on
appeal and raised sua sponte); Hurley v. Motor Coach Indust, Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 379 (7th Cir.
2000) (whether "forum defendant rule," which prohibits removal of non-federal question case
only if no properly joined and served defendant is citizen of state in which action was brought,
is jurisdictional, so that its violation is non-waivable defect).
46. For example, courts might assume arguendo that no Eleventh Amendment immunity
requires dismissal, and might assume arguendo that abstention would be inappropriate. See
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116,1129-30 (10th Cir. 1999) (having concluded thatwhether Title
II of ADA applies to employment discrimination does not raise jurisdictional question; court
assumed that it applied and turned to issues on appeal).
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merits first.47
On the other hand, ifthere is a category ofmatters that may be addressed
before (and even instead of) statute-based or even Article rn-based subjectmatter jurisdictional issues (the latter issues sometimes being entirely bypassed), the questions arise whether that category encompasses matters that
are not jurisdictional in any sense and how broad that category is. It appears
that Article rI issues may be bypassed in favor of procedural issues,4" although theoretically not in favor of merits issues. As Professor Freer has
noted, there is some evidence that this is the Supreme Court's view of the law.
49 the Court
In Ortiz v. FibreboardCorporation,
concluded that it could avoid
the members of a "limited fund" class,5 °
of
some
that
addressing the argument
47. For further discussion of EleventhAmendment immunity issues, see infra text at notes
81-142.
48. As Professor Idleman has noted, some issues are neither jurisdictional nor meritsbased. Idleman, supra note 4, at 321. Being something other than merits-based, these issues
can be reached by the courts without the courts first having satisfied themselves of their jurisdiction, or, at least, so Steel Co. seems to imply. Id. at 321-23. The issues in this category often
would be categorized as proceduraL, remedial or evidentiary. Id. at 322 & n.364.
Both Eleventh Amendment immunity and Younger abstention have a procedural cast
because they speak to whether the federal court may or ought to hear a dispute, not to who
should win "on the merits." Eleventh Amendment immunity always would be raised by a
defendant, and requests for abstention typically come from defendants as well, because plaintiffs
would not have sued in federal court if they did not want that court to decide the dispute.
49. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). The Court decided Ortiz about five weeks after deciding
Ruhrgas.
50. Rule 23(bXl)(B), FED. R. CIV. P., provides that
[a]n action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition: the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
Situations in which "claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy
all claims" fall within this description. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(bX1)(B) Advisory Committee
Note.
In Ortiz, the Court examined the varieties of suits traditionally encompassed by Rule
23(bX1)B) and discerned three characteristics that typify "limited fund" class actions and whose
presence suffices to justify (bXl)B) certification. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838. The traits are:
- a fund with an ascertained limit which, at its maximum, is demonstrated to
be exeeded by aggregate liquidated claims, set at their maxima;
- all of which fund is to be distributed to those with liquidated claims that are
based on a common theory ofliability; and
- all claimants sharing a common theory of recovery to be treated equitably,
typically by a pro rata distribution ofthe fund.
Id. at 838-41.
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certified by the district court, had not suffered a cognizable injury in fact and
thus lacked standing to sue, and could instead (first) address the propriety of
the class certification, although the Court remained "'mindful that [the Rule's]
requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article IR constraints'. 51
The Court rationalized this result in part on the ground that the certification
issues themselves "pertain[ed] to statutory standing [an assertion that the
Court did not explain], 52 which may properly be treated before Article III
standing,15 3 and in part on the theory that the propriety of class certification
was "logically antecedent" to standing because, absent proper certification of
a class including these individuals, no issue as to their standing would arise.'
The Court concluded that these characteristics are presumptively necessary for limited
fund (bXl)B) certification and that a proponent of any departure from those norms would have
the burden ofjustifying that departure. Id at 841-42.
51. Orfiz, 527 U.S. at 831 (quoting Amchcm Prods., Inc. v. Wimdsor, 521 U.S. 591, 61213 (1997)). The sentence inAmchem quoted in Ortiz continued, "(and mindful that Rule 23's
requirements must be interpreted in keeping with] the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that
rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right'." Amchem, 521
U.S. at 612-13.
In Oriz the Court overturned a global agreement settling the personal injury claims of a
large class of persons who had sued Fibreboard for asbestos exposure, finding that the requirements of Rule 23 were not satisfied. The class members alluded to in the text were those who
had been exposed to asbestos but had, as yet,manifested no physical injury.
52. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831. The assertion is by no means self-evident FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) recites that
(o]ne or more members of a class may sue... as representative parties on behalf
of all only if(l) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims ...of
the representative parties are typical of the claims... of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
See supranote 50 (reciting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(bX1)(B)). The only aspects of these requirements
that seem to be remotely redolent of standing requirements are the references to parties and
claims.
53. The power of the courts to bypass the Article 1I standing question apparently was
thought to fall within the scope of NationalRailroadPassenger Corp v. NationalAss'n of
RailroadPassengers,414 U.S. 453 (1974), supra note 26. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96-97
(noting that NationalRailroadPassenger
Corp. decided issue of statutory standing, not whether
there was Article Em case or controversy); accord Grand Council of the Crees v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that, under Steel Co., court
properly could consider prudential standing while leaving constitutional standing in doubt
because there was no required sequencing ofjurisdictional issues).
54. Ortiz, 527 U.S. Ct. at 831; see alsoAmchem, 521 U.S. at 612 (approving opinion of
Court of Appeals for Third Circuit in this case, in which it had bypassed challenges to justici-

ability and subject-matter jurisdiction on grounds that issues of'jurisdiction in this case "would
not exist but for the [class action] certification" (quoting Georgene v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d
610,632 (3d Cir. 1996))).
It is not entirely clear why the jurisdictional or standing issues in eitherAmchem or Ortiz
would not have existed without the class certification. If one or more of the purported class
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In the Court's view, these circumstances made it proper to address the propri-

ety of the class certification without first addressing the standing of all those
in the plaintiff class. 5
Still another recent example of the Court's view that Article III issues

may be bypassed in favor ofprocedural issues is Lambrix v. Singletary.5" The
Court indicated there that, when a state court rejects a convicted person's
representatives, suing individually as well as on behalf of a class, were exposure-only plaintiffs,
their standing to sue would be before the court regardless of whether class certification was
proper.
55. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858,866 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2000) (purporting
to follow Ortiz, concluding that it would address jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness,
state sovereign immunity, and class certification "in no particular order," and noting that class
certification issues that were not outcome determinative (unlike in Ortiz andAmchem Products;
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)), did not need to be treated first, although court did
discuss them first).
The Ortiz Court's avoidance ofthe standing issues is questionable on a number ofgrounds.
In addition to those suggested in notes 52, 54, supra, I would add these: Although the Court
often has allowed non-class suits to go forward so long as some plaintiff had standing, typically
in those instances injunctive relief was sought that would benefit those whose standing was left
unresolved even if they did not remain formal parties. See, e.g., Waters Corp. v. Millipore
Corp., 140 F.3d 324, 325-26 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that court did not need to decide
whether Waters plan and its fiduciaries were proper plaintiffs because individual plaintiffs had
standing as participants in Milipore plan, which enabled court to address substantive issues
posed by appeal); Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297, 302-05 (1983) (holding that Court did not have to consider standing to appeal of
Director because injured worker had standing to seek review of court of appeal's decision
concerning whether he was covered by Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act); Viii. ofArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,263-64 & n.9 (1977)
(holding that Court did not need to address standing of Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation to assert rights of potential inhabitants of proposed housing because plaintiff who
sought and qualified for proposed housing had standing). Byontrast, in Ortiz money damages
were sought that would individually benefit those whose standing was in question.
In addition, past case law had indicated that a court can properly decline to address
whether a plaintiff has standing, and whether his claim is ripe and not moot, only if all the issues
on the merits that the plaintiff raises also are raised by another plaintiff who has standing, and
the ripeness, and "liveness" of whose claims have been recognized by the court. See, e.g., Sec'y
of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 319 n.3 (1984) (noting that Court need not address
standing of respondents "whose position here is identical to the State's" because State of
California had standing); Blue Cross Ass'n v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 1047,1060-65 (W.D. Mo.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 622 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1980)
(investigating separately standing of plaintiffs in each of two consolidated actions, in part
because plaintiffs in one had asserted some claims not asserted by plaintiffs in other). In Ortiz,
the issues on the merits raised by absent plaintiff class members whose standing was challenged
may well have differed in some particulars from those posed by other absent class members.
For example, only the former would have presented the question whether persons who had not
yet manifested any physical injury resulting from their exposure to asbestos had stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
56.
520 U.S. 518 (1997).
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federal law contention as procedurally barred, without considering its merits,
a federal court hearing a challenge to that rejection ordinarily should consider
it before determining whether the rule that the criminal defendant seeks to
have applied to him is applicable retroactively on federal habeas under Teague

v. Lane. 7 This "ordinary" sequence is consistent with the view that the courts

should consider their appellate jurisdiction before reaching issues on the
merits or even unrelated procedural issues because, if the federal law contention was properly procedurally barred in the State courts, that bar constitutes
an adequate and independent state law ground which the federal courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to review." The question
whether an argument is available under Teague is not jurisdictional, despite
the Court's instruction that Teague retroactivity decisions should be made
before courts consider the merits of a case.59
What is remarkable about Lambrix is that, having said all this, the Court
cautioned that it did not "mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must
invariably be resolved first .... Judicial economy might counsel giving the
Teague question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the

habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated

issues of state law."' The Court thus again recognized that judicial economy
in general, and ease of resolution of issues in particular, have a rightful place
in the courts' decisions as to the sequence in which they should address
issues. Moreover, faced with several contentions as to why Lambrix's claim

was not procedurally barred, the Court chose not to prolong the litigation by
57. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that habeas petitions cannot seek recognition of new
constitutional rights unless those rights would apply retroactively).
58. InLambrix,the Court noted that
It]he "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine is not technically jurisdictional when a federal court considers a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, since the federal court is not formally reviewing a
judgment, but is determining whether the prisoner is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." [To further federalism and
comity,] [w]e have nonetheless held that the doctrine applies to bar consideration
on federal habeas of federal claims that have been defaulted under state law.
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997) (citations omitted). When neither the challenge to the procedural bar nor the Teague issue is jurisdictional, the sequence in which the
issues are addressed is unimportant for purposes of this Article.
59. Id.at 524; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41 (1990) (holding rule of Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting retroactive application of new rules to cases on
collateral review, not to be jurisdictional in that Court must raise and decide issue sua sponte).
The Court thus addressed the merits of a criminal defendant's expostfato claim, without first
deciding the Teague retroactivity issue that the State had not argued. Collins,497 U.S. at 41;
see Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 524 (noting that postponing Teague inquiry also is consistent with
general principle that constitutional issues are generally to be avoided).
60. Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525.
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remanding for the lower federal courts to address those contentions, but
instead decided the case on the Teague grounds. This appears to me to be an
exercise of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction (or something very like it),'
with the Court assuming, without deciding, that its jurisdiction was not lacking by virtue of an adequate and independent state ground for the decision (in
the form of a procedural bar), and proceeding to decide the case against the
petitioner on non-jurisdictional grounds that the Court apparently views as
procedural, or at least as other than "on the merits."
If federal courts sometimes may bypass Article m issues in favor of procedural issues, which procedural issues may be given such sequential preference, and under what circumstances, remain to be elucidated. More fundamentally, why federal courts should have authority to address such procedural
issues without having first satisfied themselves of their subject-matter jurisdiction and of compliance with related Article Ell requirements (including the
standing of all plaintiffs seeking individual relief), when it would be ultra
vires for them to resolve merits issues, has not been well-explained by the
Court, although the Court repeatedly has asserted courts' authority to decide
procedural issues before they address their jurisdiction.62 Intuitively, the
notion that, if a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in a case, it ought not
to resolve any issues, procedural or on the merits, has some appeal. Perhaps
the answer lies in practicalities: A court may need to enter orders regarding
pleadings and discovery before it can make a well-grounded determination as
to whether subject-matter (or personal) jurisdiction exists. It may appropriately impose sanctions if such discovery orders are disobeyed. In light of the
propriety ofthe courts' ruling upon procedural matters to enable the courts to
determine their subject-matter (or personal) jurisdiction, the Court may implicitly have concluded that, as a matter of power, there are no limits on the
procedural issues that a federal court can decide before determining its jurisdiction. I would suggest, however, that deciding procedural issues that have
no bearing on the court's jurisdiction before determining that the court has
jurisdiction might, in many circumstances, constitute an abuse of discretion.63
61. See supra note 4.
62. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20-22
(1994) (concluding that no statute could authorize federal court to decide legal question posed
in absence of Article 11 case or controversy. . . "[b]ut reason and authority refute the quite
different notion that a federal appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of
litigation once it has been determined that the requirements of Article III no longer are (or
indeed never were) met"; noting that, in cases that have become moot, courts nonetheless have
power to award costs and enter dismissal, and holding that they have power to vacate judgments
entered by lower courts).
63. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923,927(7th Cir.2000) (noting
that "courts possess no more authority to issue advisory opinions (or otherwise exceed their
jurisdiction) in 'procedural matters' than in other matters").
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The distinction between procedural issues and merits issues, even if
theoretically justifiable, is difficult to implement in light of the overlap that
often exists between procedural questions and the merits. The Court itself has
held that the propriety of class certification is not sufficiently separate from
the merits issues presented by a proposed class action to permit the grant or
denial of class certification to be immediately appealed under the collateral
order doctrine.' Other courts have observed overlaps between the merits and
Eleventh Amendment immunity claims6' and other procedural issues.'e
64. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (finding that "the class
determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action'" (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,
371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963))). Immediate appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine
only when an order is conclusive on the matter it addresses, resolves questions that are too
independent of the merits to need to be deferred, is too important to be denied review, and
involves important rights that will be lost if immediate review is not afforded. Id. at 468; see
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867-68 (1994) (reiterating requirement of collateral order doctrine); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (for first time, articulating collateral order doctrine); see also Blair v. Equifax Check
Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that "[d]isputes about class certification cannot be divorced from the merits").
65. See United States exrel Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst, Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 895-966
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (positing that analysis ofwhether states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity had been abrogated would entail analysis similar to that for
determining whether statute allowed states to be liable); Parella v. Ret Bd. of the RI. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 56 n.6 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that to address whether state
retirement board was protected from suit by Eleventh Amendment would require court to first
consider merits of plaintiffs Takings Clause and Contract Clause claims). But cf.Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,145 (1993) (upholding appeal,
under collateral order doctrine, from order denying claim of state sovereign immunity pursuant
to Eleventh Amendment, and finding, inter alia, that motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment
grounds involves issue, resolution of which "generally will have no bearing on the merits of the
underlying action").
66. The Court has held immediate appeal unavailable under the collateral order doctrine
when such appeal was sought of the following: an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel,
see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (assuming, without deciding, that disqualification question was completely separate from merits); an order granting
a motion to disqualify counsel, see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1984)
(noting that requirement of complete separation from merits is not satisfied if violation of
petitioner's right requires prejudice to defense); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 437-40 (1985) (observing that, if prejudice is prerequisite to reversal, disqualification
orders are not sufficiently separate from merits to qualify for immediate appeal); an order denying intervention as of right and allowing permissive intervention, subject to limits on participation, see Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375 (1987) (assuming,
arguendo, that intervention issue was completely separate from merits); an order denying a stay
of federal court proceedings pursuant to ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrictv. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), pending completion of parallel state court proceedings, see Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988) (finding that order
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Given the absence of hard and fast separation between procedural and
jurisdictional issues, on the one hand, which the Court has held or implied
may be addressed before subject-matter jurisdiction, and merits issues, on the
other hand, the absoluteness of the prohibition against addressing merits
issues before subject-matter jurisdiction seems untenable in some applications. indeed, the Steel Co. Court itself recognized that the merits question
whether a particular plaintiff has stated a cause of action under a statute, and
the standing question whether any plaintiff has such a cause of action, are
closely connected, and may even be identical.' This makes it artificial at best
to say that the courts may decide the latter, but not the former, in advance of
reaching other aspects of subject-matterjurisdiction.
failed to meet requirement of conclusive determination of disputed question); an order denying
a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds or because the defendant claims immunity from service of process, see Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527-29 (1988)
(holding that convenience of forum is not distinct from merits); an order refusing to give effect
to a forum selection clause, see Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-501 (1989)
(denying interlocutory appeal because order was adequately vindicable after final judgment);
and an order vacating a settlement agreement and a dismissal, thereby subjecting the parties to
trial, see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 & 869 n.2 (1994)
(resting decision on same grounds as Lauro Lines, commenting that court of appeals' conclusion that separability condition was satisfied was not beyond question). See generally 15A
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3911-12 (1992 &
Supp. 2001). In Flanagan,Richardson-Merrell,and Van Cauwenberghe the reasoning was,
at least in part, that the merits and procedural issues were not sufficiently independent to make
an interlocutory appeal appropriate.
Courts generally have regarded decisions to abstain as immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714-15
(1996) (holding abstention based on Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), appealable
under collateral order doctrine, and noting that order determines whether federal court should
decline to exercise its jurisdiction in interest of comity and federalism, which is issue separate
from merits); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)
(holding ColoradoRiver abstention appealable under collateral order doctrine, having found
that "[ain order that amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits"); Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding abstention based on Younger to present important issue separate from merits,
although order here failed to satisfy requirement that review after final judgment would be
inadequate); Mazanc v. N. Judson-San Pierre Sch. Corp., 750 F.2d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding abstention underRailroadCommission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), immediately appealable). Immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine implies that the
order is separate from the merits, at least sufficiently so that there is no need to postpone appeal
until after finaljudgment
67. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,97 n.2 (1998).
68. See Grand Council of the Crees v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 198 F.3d 950,
959-60 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Steel Co. permits decision of merits questions, such as
whether plaintiff has stated claim, before statutory standing questions, because they may overlap).
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There also is an irony that federal courts (1) may decide merits issues
before determining whether to certify a class69 and other procedural issues and
Consider also the doctrine that when a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction overlaps with the merits of a dispute, the proper course is for the district court to find that jurisdiction exists and treat the objection as going to the merits. See, e.g., United States v. North
Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 580-81 (4th Cir. 1999) (because merits of action [alleging pattern or
practice of discrimination] related closely to issue that court characterized as jurisdictional,
latter issue was not suited for resolution by motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction); Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.'s, 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that proper course is to treat such jurisdictional question as going to merits);
Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1986) (interpreting law to be that
"[w]here the challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal
cause of action, and assuming that the plaintiff's federal claim is neither insubstantial [or]
frivolous, ... the district court should find that it has jurisdiction over the case and deal with
the defendant's challenge as an attack on the merits"); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
415-16 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that when defendant's challenge to jurisdiction is also
challenge to existence of federal cause of action, it is proper to deal with jurisdictional objection
as attack on merits because no purpose is served by indirectly arguing merits in context of
federal jurisdiction, and because judicial economy is better served by dismissal of claim on
merits). Williamson sees such jurisdictional attacks as indirect attacks on the merits, from which
plaintiffs can be better protected if defendants are forced to proceed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or by moving for summary judgment. Id. The court finds the scope of the
district court's power in each of these contexts to provide greater protection than a court can
provide when operating under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bXl). Id. at 416.
Steel Co. seems implicitly to disallow this approach. But see United States ex rel.Long
v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst, Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (arguing that Court's
explanation in Steel Co. that merits questions can be decided before statutory or prudential
standing questions because they overlap to such extent that it would be artificial to distinguish
between them indicates that merits questions can be decided before at least quasi-jurisdictional
matters, such as Eleventh Amendment issues, when they overlap). Even without regard to Steel
Co. issues, courts may determine subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching the merits. See,
e.g., Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (in context of
FTCA claim, merits of which overlapped with jurisdictional issues, asserting that court may
determine subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching merits so long as court demands less in
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at trial of merits).
69. Indeed, an empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center found that merits decisions
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment frequently precede certification, see Thomas
E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An EipircalAnalysisofRule 23 toAddress
the RulermakingChallenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 105-08 (1996) (discussing conclusion of
studies on whether courts believe that ruling on motion to dismiss may precede ruling on class
certification), although that is not the preferred course. See 2 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7.15 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that, for reasons of
judicial efficiency, to guide litigation strategy, and to avoid one-way intervention, class certification issues generally should be addressed before dispositive motions); MANUALFOR COMPLEX
LIIGATION § 30.11 at 214 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that precertification merits ruling raises
concerns: "[w]hile it binds only the individual parties, it may have precedential effect on the
putative class members. When it is clear that the action lacks merit, dismissal will avoid unnecessary expense ... and burdens ... , but the court should consider whether the interests of
putative class members may be prejudiced." (citations omitted)).
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(2) under Ortiz, may decide class certification issues before reaching standing
and other jurisdictional issues, but (3) under Steel Co., may not decide merits
issues before reaching standing issues - at least those that arise under Article
Il. The response ofthe Steel Co. majority to an analogous argument made by
Justice Stevens was that such a combination of results is "no more illogical
than many other 'broken circles' that appear in life and the law."7" Adapting
the rest of its answer to the particular irony noted above, the Court presumably
would say that the reasons to allow merits questions to be decided before
certification questions do not support allowing merits questions to be decided
before Article I questions. Deciding such questions as whether any cause of
action exists before-or-rather-than the questions implied by Rule 23's certification requirements "does not take the court into vast, uncharted realms of
judicial opinion-giving, whereas the proposition that the court can reach a
merits question when there is no Article Imjurisdiction opens the door to all
sorts of 'generalized grievances,'.., that the Constitution leaves for.., the
political process."7
C. The ConcurringandDissenting Opinions in Steel Co.
Still additional questions concerning the scope of Steel Co.'s repudiation
of hypothetical jurisdiction are raised by the concurring and dissenting opinions in the case. Only five of the Justices joined in the repudiation by joining
Part Ill of Justice Scalia's opinion. 2 Two of them (Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy) expressed a significantly less hard-line stance in a concurring opinion authored by Justice O'Connor. The two urged that the Court's opinion not
be read exhaustively to catalog the circumstances in which federal courts may
exercise judgment in reserving difficult questions of jurisdiction, in order to
resolve a case on the merits in favor of the party challenging jurisdiction."
This concurrence raises the question whether Justice Scalia's position is due
even the respect ordinarily
commanded by the dicta in majority opinions of
74
the Supreme Court.
70. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 n.2. This is not a very satisfying response.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. The other signatories were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas. Id. at 85.
73. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. See Hardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24,26 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that various
opinions in Steel Co., read as whole, do not make clear whether, or to what extent, that case
undermined Circuit's earlier practice of bypassing jurisdictional issues when party challenging
jurisdiction would easily prevail on merits); see Idleman, supra note 4, at 286-88 (discussing
alignment of Justices and its effect on strength of repudiation). Several, if not all, circuits take
the position that they should follow the carefully considered dicta of the Court. See, e.g., Stone
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Justice Breyer agreed only that courts often andtypically should decide
standing and other jurisdictional questions in advance of the merits. He rejected the notion that the Constitution requires them always to do so, opining
that the doctrine that courts may reserve difficult questions of jurisdiction
when a case may more easily be resolved on the merits in favor of the jurisdiction-challenging party makes both theoretical and practical sense, especially in a world ofheavy caseloads. Rigid rules that make the judicial system
unnecessarily cumbersome may increase the risk that justice will be denied."'
Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's views of hypothetical jurisdiction were not revealed in Steel Co.; the former proclaimed the doctrine irrelevant to the case at hand,76 while the latter concurred in the judgment but
offered no comment on the hypothetical jurisdiction controversy." At a later
date, either or both of them might embrace the denunciation in Steel Co. or
explicitly disagree with it.
**

*

As the different views of the courts of appeals and particular judges in
the district and appellate courts, of commentators, and of the Supreme Court
Justices illustrate, the cases that generated the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction are subject to varying interpretations. In light of the cases' malleability, the views that the courts, especiallythe Supreme Court, take of these cases
and of cases since and yet to be decided will determine the degree of flexibility that the federal courts will have in reaching and deciding the issues that
cases potentially raise. The courts have ample "ammunition" for interpreting
the cases to either stringently limit, or to facilitate flexibility in selecting, the
issues that they may decide. Thus, I proceed to an examination of the possibilities for hypothetical jurisdiction in the federal courts whose decisions have
weight as precedent and whose decisions usually constitute the last judicial
word, the courts of appeals. In that context, I further elaborate my views on
how past cases are best understood.
Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (giving respect to
Supreme Court statements that were explicit and carefully considered), cert denied, SmurfitStone Container Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct 1601 (2001); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. NRC, 216 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that carefully considered language of
Supreme Court, even if dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative); Gaylor v. United
States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that court considers itself bound by Supreme
Court dicta, almost as firmly as by Court's outright holdings, particularly when dicta is recent
and not enfeebled by later statements).
75. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 134 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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I. The HandlingofDistrict CourtJurisdictionby the Courts ofAppeals
The ambiguities in Steel Co., elaborated earlier, leave it unclear whether
district courts are completely forbidden to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction.
Part of Steel Co.'s legacy is that it compels not only the district courts, but
also the courts of appeals, to sort out just how far Steel Co. goes in limiting
district court exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction." Among the tasks both
tiers of the courts face is that of deciding what issues are jurisdictional for
purposes of the prohibition against arguendo assumption and for purposes of
the mandate that jurisdictional issues be decided before merits issues.
This Article does not tackle the myriad issues that courts will face in
determining whether particular matters go to the district courts' 'jurisdiction,"
for Steel Co.'s purposes, nor does it attempt to answer all the other interpretive issues left open by Steel Co. as it applies to district court subject-matter
jurisdiction. It does however focus, by way of example, on the primary area
of controversy that arose in the wake of Steel Co. as it applies to district court
jurisdiction: whether the Eleventh Amendment defense is jurisdictional in the
sense that courts may no longer assume it to be inapplicable or unavailable,
and may decide cases on their merits issues. Although the Supreme Court
resolved this particular issue in the year 2000, the lower courts' prior struggle
with it illustrates the kinds of challenges courts face. Moreover, I believe that
the Court's decision of this issue further muddies the sequence in which issues
must be addressed.
Example: Eleventh Amendment Issues after Steel Co.
There generally is no sequence or hierarchy in which courts inevitably
must address jurisdictional issues, among themselves, or merits issues, among
78. But see Prayze FM v. FCC, 214 F.3d 245,250-51 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that
assuming jurisdiction of district court to decide constitutional contentions did not violate Steel
Co. because Steel Co. prohibited courts from assuming only their own jurisdiction to reach case
on merits). Where it was unclear whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of FCC regulations in an FCC enforcement proceeding, and it was necessary
for Prayze to establish its jurisdiction to successfilly defend, the courts of appeals nonetheless
concluded that it did not need to resolve the jurisdictional question because, even assuming that
such jurisdiction existed, Prayze would lose its appeal of a preliminary injunction entered
against it because the FCC had sufficiently demonstrated that it was likely to prevail. Id. at 25051. The appeals court concluded that this assumption ofjurisdiction did not violate Steel Co.'s
proscription of hypothetical jurisdiction which it found prohibited courts from assuming their
own jurisdiction. Id. at 251 n.3. Here, the appeals court's jurisdiction was clear, "as was the
district court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction." Id. For purposes of deciding whether the
FCC sufficiently established a likelihood of prevailing on the constitutional challenge, the
Second Circuit concluded that it could assume, arguendo, that the constitutional contentions
could be brought properly before the district court. Id.
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themselves.79 In addition, it appears that courts often can decide issues that fall
into neither category (jurisdictional or merits), such as procedural issues, in
advance of, as well as interspersed among, jurisdictional issues and merits
issues. Steel Co. indicates, however, that the federal courts must address and
confirm their subject-matter jurisdiction before deciding the merits issues that
cases present. This scheme makes it essential for courts to be able to distinguish jurisdictional issues from merits issues.
One of the most challenging tasks of issue categorization concerns Eleventh Amendment defenses and sovereign immunity defenses more generally.
Distinguishing jurisdictional issues often is difficult because the meaning of
the term 'Jurisdiction" is protean and elusive.80 The Eleventh Amendment
area is extraordinarily challenging because the Court has given many contradictory signals concerning the nature of this defense.

A. A BriefBackgroundDiscussionof the Nature of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment, as construed by the Court over the years, is
an exceedingly complex matter, and the scholarly literature concerning its
correct interpretation is mammoth." I will, for the most part, confine my
79. Sometimes logic, policy or precedent suggests a sequence, however. See Kalka v.
Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that courts should address nonconstitutional grounds before addressing constitutional questions); id. at 99-102 (Tatel, J., concurring
in part and in judgment) (discussing at length whether, in evaluating claim of qualified immunity, court must first determine whether plaintiff alleged deprivation of actual constitutional
right before examining whether such right was clearly established at time of alleged violation).
80. See Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37,45 (Ist Cir. 1999) (referring to "chameleonlike quality" of term "jurisdiction"); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30,40 (1st
Cir. 1999) (observing that word "jurisdiction" is "protean" with meanings varying depending
on context); United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that jurisdiction is protean concept); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. .C.C., 934 F.2d 327, 341-45
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review)
(commenting upon elusiveness of concept of jurisdiction and noting that some provisions can
be jurisdictional in some contexts and not in others); see also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel
Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that courts may have jurisdiction to decide
some issues but not others). The court of appeals held here that the court had jurisdiction to
award costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, although it lacked jurisdiction to resolve
the merits of plaintiff's claim. Id. at 926-27. In his concurrence, Justice Ripple explained that
"lack of jurisdiction" has different meanings including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; loss
of power to proceed although a case is within federal judicial power - as when a court has
entered a final judgment; and a lack of power to proceed that rests on the case or controversy
requirement of Article I, as when a plaintiff "packs up... and goes home." Id. at 932-33.
81. See generally Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.817 (2000); Symposium, FederalismAfter Alden, 31 RUTGERs L.J.
631 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Sovereign Immunity, DueProcess,and theAlden Trilogy,
109 YAtE L.J. 1927 (2000); F. Ryan Keith, Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amendment Sua
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attention here to the Court's pronouncements on the nature ofthe Amendment
and the effects of that nature, and to the federal courts of appeals' attempts to
respect Steel Co. as applied to the Eleventh Amendment and other sovereign

immunities.
The initial language of the Amendment ("The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to..."82) appears to impose a
constitutional limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction,'3 although, in the
view of several commentators and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the Amend84
ment, correctly construed, limits only diversity subject-matter jurisdiction.
A majority of the current Justices on the Court does not regard the bar of the

Amendment as so limited, but instead takes the broad view that this prohibition of suits against a State applies regardless ofthe basis of federal subjectmatter jurisdiction, and hence applies to suits against a State by its own
citizens.85 This position is particularly difficult tojustify because the Eleventh

Amendment does not, by its literal terms, address such suits. It speaks only
of the judicial power of the United States not extending to suits in law or
equity "commenced or prosecuted against one ofthe United States 8by
6 Citizens
of anotherState, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The Court has suggested that the Eleventh Amendment may not even be
a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, pointing out, as recently as
Sponte?: The JurisdictionalDifflcultyof State Sovereign Immuni, 56 WASML & LEE. L. REV.
1037 (1999).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
83. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,98 (1984) (noting that
principle of sovereign immunity limits federal judicial power established by Constitution in
Article M); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) (noting that Eleventh Amendment
explicitly limits judicial power of United States).
84. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (arguing that if federal jurisdiction is based
on federal question, Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant). See generally David L. Shapiro,
WrongTurns: TheEleventhAmendmentandthePennhurstCase,98 HARV. L. REV. 61(1984);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment andState Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COIXM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); William A. FletcherA HistoricalInterpretationofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of anAfflrmative Grant ofJurisdictionRather than
a ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983).
85. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (indicating that
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas subscribe to view
that Eleventh Amendment bars suits founded on either diversity or federal question subjectmatter jurisdiction); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing view of some Justices that Eleventh Amendment
reflects broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, applicable regardless of subjectmatter jurisdictional basis for suit); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
98 (1984) (same).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
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1998, that it has not decided that question.' Citing the importance of state
law in analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and the ability of States to
waive this defense, the Court had earlier declined to reach Eleventh Amendment issues that had not been briefed to the Court, stating, "[W]e have never
held that [the Eleventh Amendment] is jurisdictional in the sense that it must
be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion.""8 On the other hand,
the Court still earlier had approved a court of appeals' resolution of an Eleventh Amendment defense that had not been raised in the district court because
"the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised inthe trial court."8 9 The Court's
statement, in its 1998 decision in Wisconsin Department of Correctionsv.
Schacht,°that "a court" need not raise the Eleventh Amendment on its own9 '
may alter the weight of authority in the appellate courts as to whether they (as
distinguished from the Supreme Court) have a duty to raise Eleventh Amend-

ment issues sua sponte.
In another noteworthy aspect of Schacht, the Court held that the presence, in an otherwise removable case, of a claim that the Eleventh Amend-

ment may bar does not destroy jurisdiction, upon removal of the case from
State court.92 Emphasizing that the Eleventh Amendment does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction because the defense it provides is waivable,

87. Wis. Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht,524 U. S. 381,391 (1998).
88. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,515 n.19 (1982); see Schacht, 524
U.S. at 389 (citingAtascaderoState Hosp. 473 U.S. at 241, as well as Patsy).
89. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974). The courts of appeals have been
divided on the issue, although it appears that, at least up until a few years ago, more regarded
it as appropriate to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, because of itsjurisdictional
nature, than took the opposing view. Compare Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179-80 (3d
Cir. 1998) (raising issue sua sponte), V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d
1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (same), Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th
Cir. 1997) (same), andAtlantie Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993)
(same), with Boochard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448
(11th Cir. 1996) (stating that Eleventh Amendment is notjurisdictional in sense that courts must
raise it sua sponte). See also Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732-33 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
it unclear whether Supreme Court would consider Eleventh Amendment affirmative defense or
waivable jurisdictional bar for purposes of removal statute); Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d
1359, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (Baldock, J., dissenting) (stating that assumption that Eleventh
Amendment is limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than waivable affirmative
defense, is debatable at best); Texas Hosp. Ass'n v. Nat'l Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1507,
1517 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (concluding that because Eleventh Amendment immunity appears to
be hybrid of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and general prudential concerns,
it does not defeat federal court's original jurisdiction and therefore does not bar removal of
action containing claims barred by Amendment).
90. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
91. Id.at389.
92. Id.
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the Court concluded that post-removal invocation of the Amendment places
particular claims beyond the power of the federal court to decide, but does not
destroy jurisdiction over the entire case that was removed.' In so holding, the
Court again distinguished the effects of the Eleventh Amendment from ordinary aspects of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Normally, ifthe sole claim
ostensibly to "arise under" federal law (and hence to fall within federal
subject-matter jurisdiction) is held not to do so, the entire case (that claim and
any claims asserted as supplemental thereto) must be dismissed or, if it was
removed, remanded, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction - assuming, of
course, that no other basis ofjurisdiction, such as diversity, empowers federal
courts to hear the case or controversy.94 By contrast, under Schacht, if a
plaintiff were to assert a federal question claim against a state and supplemen-

tal claims against non-state parties, successful post-removal invocation ofthe
Eleventh Amendment would not require remand of the supplemental claims
jurisdiction, although a court might chose to remand
for lack of subject-matter
95
them, in its discretion.
Thus, the Amendment is unlike limits on federal subject-matter jurisdiction in that states may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity while other
limits on subject-matter jurisdiction are not waivable. Furthermore, courts
appear not to have the same duty to raise and determine Eleventh Amendment
objections sua sponte as they have with respect to other defects in subjectmatter jurisdiction.96 Alternative theories of the Eleventh Amendment view
it as a common law immunity from suit, rather than as a limit on subjectmatter jurisdiction. 9
93. Id.at 390-91.
at any time before final judgment if appears
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that "[i]f
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (1994) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d
660,665 (7th Cir. 1976) (remanding case to state court in absence of federal question); see also

Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 557-59 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that where suit
against federal and state defendants was properly removed but claim against United States was
barred by sovereign immunity and claim against state was barred by Eleventh Amendment
immunity, court was required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand suit to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
95. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,357 (1988) (upholding remand
to state court of pendent claims after plaintiff dismissed all federal claims).
96. See supra text accompanying note 89. Whether lower courts, as opposed to the Supreme Court, are free of the obligation to raise Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte has been
somewhat controversial. See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.,
dissenting) (noting cases taking differing
136 F.3d 430, 442 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J.,
positions on question and observing that most academicians seemed to have concluded that ban
on sua sponte review is prudential and discretionary, rather than mandatory).
97.

See generallyERWIN CIHEM

SKY, FEDEAL JURISDICTION §7.3 (3d ed. 1999) (do-

scribing different theories ofEleventh Amendment).
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B. The Lower FederalCourts' CategorizationofEleventh Amendment
Issuesfor Purposesof Steel Co.
When one examines the cases that had to categorize the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity as jurisdictional or not, for purposes of Steel
Co., one finds (not surprisingly) that they were as inconsistent, and sometimes
as ambiguous, as the Court's signals have been. On the one hand, several
cases held that the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity generally,
are jurisdictional for Steel Co. purposes.'
They relied upon the Court's
references to a state's consent-to-suit as defining the courts' jurisdiction," the
Court's characterizations of the sovereign immunity defense as jurisdictional
and as restricting the judicial power under Article H1",10 ° and the Court's
98. See Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., 199 F3d 461,463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that
court could properly address sovereign immunity before deciding whether suit presented case
or controversy or was nonjusticiable, and stating that "[s]overeign immunity questions clearly
belong among the non-merits decisions that courts may address even where subject matter jurisdiction is uncertain"); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389,397 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
court had to address Eleventh Amendment immunity issue because it is jurisdictional, and
choosing to raise issue of lack of jurisdiction sua sponte); United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex.
Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d279,285-87 (Sth Cir. 1999),cert denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (declaring
that because Eleventh Amendment isjurisdictional and supplements restraints on judicial power
provided in Article II, court must resolve Eleventh Amendment issues before deciding statutory
issues going to merits); Filetech SA v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 929-32 (2d Cir.
1998) (addressing whether defendant was immune from suit under FSIA before addressing other
issues, viewing that sequence as consistent with Steel Co., and advising lower court that it need
not address issue of international comity unless it resolved question of subject-matter jurisdiction
in favor of plaintiff); United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74,79-80 (2d Cir. 1998) (addressing
sovereign immunity, among other issues, before reaching merits); Seaborn v. Dep't of Corr., 143
F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "an assertion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity must be resolved before a court may address the merits of the underlying claims(s)");
East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dept of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (viewing "claim" to federal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional, and broadly construing
Supreme Court opinions to require decision of scope of waiver of immunity before addressing
merits, even when there was no question that court had jurisdiction over some aspects of suit);
In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (opining that it would exceed district
court's power to resolve case under "act of state" doctrine, substantive rule of law, before
addressing jurisdiction under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see also Calderon v. Ashmus,
523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (deciding whether inmate's declaratory judgment action challenging
limitations period applied in habeas corpus proceedings presented Article III case or controversy
before reaching Eleventh Amendment issue). Calderon'ssequencing is not inconsistent with
the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional for Steel Co. purposes and must
be decided against the party claiming immunity before the court may address merits issues.
99. See EastBay, 142 F.3d at 482 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941)).
100. See Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994));
Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285 (citing AtascaderoState Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst
for proposition that "[tihe significance of [the Eleventh Amendment] lies in its affirmation
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willingness to consider Eleventh Amendment issues urged for the first time
on appeal to the Court.10' On the other hand, a number of cases resolved
merits questions without reaching disputed issues of a defendant's entitlement
to an Eleventh Amendment or other sovereign immunity, concluding that,
because these immunities are not jurisdictional, proceeding to the merits did
not violate Steel Co.' 2 While acknowledging similarities between the Eleventh Amendment and a jurisdictional bar, these courts emphasized that the
Eleventh Amendment and other sovereign immunities are waivable,' ' that the
that... sovereign immunity limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Article I')).
The court
also cited Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, and Blatchfordv. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 US.
775, 779 (1991), for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment restricts judicial power and
authority under Article Ill Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285 n.9. The court also referenced PuertoRico
Aqueduct andSewer Auth. v. Metcalf&Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,144 (1993), forthe proposition that "[the Eleventh Amendment's] withdrawal ofjurisdiction effectively confers immunity
from suit" Id. at 285.
101. Mixon, 193 F.3d at 397 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
467 (1954)); see also Parella v. Ret Bd. ofthe R.I. Employees' Ret Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54 (1st
Cir. 1999) (citing courts of appeals decisions that Eleventh Amendment questions can be introduced sua sponte).
102. See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that court did not have to decide quasi-jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity before
merits, and would not do so where disposing of case on merits had virtues of avoiding constitutional issue of first impression and providing needed clarification); Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile
Det Ass'n, 187 F3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000) (affirming
dismissal of complaint for failure to state claim, and deciding that court would decide case on
non-constitutional grounds because Eleventh Amendment immunity is not jurisdictional);
Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 498 n.15 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing Sherman Act claim for failure to state claim as against certain defendants without resolving
whether those defendants were entitled to assert sovereign immunity, viewing latter as basis for
dismissal on merits); see also Lorubbio v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 98-3578,1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10916, *3-4 (6th Cir. May 21,1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant without reaching question whether Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment in enacting Americans
with Disabilities Act because plaintiff could not state ADA claim); Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d
190, 196 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that court had to decide Eleventh Amendment
issues before reaching justiciability questions); Whitehead v. The Grand Duchy of Lux., No. 972703, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22307, *10-12 (4th Cir. Sept 11, 1998) (concluding that Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's limitation on federal jurisdiction flowed from respect for other
nations' sovereignty rather than from inherent inability of federal courts to hear cases against
those nations, and so long as court did not affront nation's sovereignty, it could resolve case on
grounds other than claimed immunity).
Whether a decision grounded upon a forum selection clause is procedural or on the merits
is not entirely clear. See Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(exploring whether disposition of case on forum-selection grounds was non-merits dismissal and
permissible under Steel Co. before consideration of FSIA defense, but ultimately concluding
that reliance on forum selection clause was waiver of FSIA defense with respect to that clause,
giving district court jurisdiction to address forum-selection defense first).
103. See Kennedy, 198 F.3d at 696 (concluding that because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived, it is not jurisdictional); In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d at 1000 (concluding
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Court has distinguished Eleventh Amendment immunity from subject-matter
jurisdiction, 1 4 and that the Court has held that it is not obligedto raise Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte. °
Some courts noted that the Steel Co. prohibition on the exercise ofhypothetical jurisdiction does not appear to be absolute, and viewed Steel Co. as
indicating that the jurisdiction that ordinarily must be decided before merits
issues is Article mHjurisdiction.1°6 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the Rhode IslandEmployees' Retirement
System 7 framed the question as "whether Eleventh Amendment questions
should be treated as Article IIjurisdiction questions for the purposes of Steel
Co.""'° After surveying the reasons for treating Eleventh Amendment questions in that fashion, the court cited all ofthe previously mentioned reasons not
to view Eleventh Amendment questions as Article H jurisdiction questions for
purposes ofSteel Co." It addedthatthe latter reasons suggestthatthe Amendment is as much a defense as it is a limitation on courts' jurisdiction, which, in
turn, implies that Eleventh Amendment issues are not in the category that Steel
Co. requires be given priority.1 Most notably, the court explained that, as
compared with exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where a court's Article Ill
jurisdiction is in doubt, deciding the merits before reaching an Eleventh
Amendment argument does not present the same risks of acting without power
to declare the law, offending separation of powers principles:
[B]ecause Eleventh Amendment immunity canbe waived, the presence of
an Eleventh Amendment issue does not threaten the court's underlying
power to declare the law. If this were not the case, sua sponte consideration of a possible Eleventh Amendment bar would have to be obligatory,
not discretionary - but the Supreme Court has now clearly stated that
that because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived it is less than purely jurisdictional);
Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 498 n.15 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267

(1997) (stating that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment... enacts a sovereign immunity from suit,
rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction.")).
104.

See, e.g., Gordon, 153 F.3d at 196 n.4 (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267,

which states that Amendment enacts sovereign immunity from suit, rather than non-waivable
limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
105. See, e.g., United States ex rel.Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890,
892 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Wis. Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998)).
106. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 53 (1st
Cir. 1999) (noting that "Supreme Court recently declared that courts should generally determine
whether Article III jurisdiction exists before reaching the meritsW).
107. 173 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1999).
108. Id.at54.
109. Id. at 54-55.
110. Id. at 55.
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courts are free to ignore possible Eleventh Amendment concerns ff a
defendant chooses not to press them.11'
So viewing the situation, the most relevant maxim became that which admonishes courts to avoid constitutional questions when reaching them is not necessary. Abiding bythis principle allowed the court to save the resources that
otherwise would have had to be devoted to Eleventh Amendment issues, and
avoided forcing the defendants to expend their resources on Eleventh Amendment issues that they preferred to avoid, without waiving the immunity."'
Probably the most carefully reasoned intermediate court of appeals opinion on this subject was that of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in UnitedStates ex rel.Long i,. SCSBusiness & TechnicalInstitute,Inc. 3
Acknowledging the conflicting signals that the Court has given concerning the

nature ofthe Eleventh Amendment bar, and also acknowledging that the Court
recently had stated that whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter
of subject-matter jurisdiction is an open question," 4 the court elaborated
several reasons for deciding whether the False Claims Act provides for a qui
tam action against a state before or, depending on the answer to that question,
instead of, addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment bars such a suit in
federal court. First, it argued that the state's request that the court initially
decide the statutory question amounted to a consent-to-suit on the statutory
question which permitted, if not required, the court to proceed in that order,
in light ofthe court's probable lack of obligation to raise the Eleventh Amendment issue sua sponte: 5s"
Steel Co.'s rule is premised on a court's lack ofpower to reach the merits
without establishing itsjurisdiction IntheEleventhAmendmentcontext,
where a court lacks power only if a state claims that it does, it is arguable
that we have no obligation to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue first
if the state does not demand that we do so." 6
Second, the court focused upon the Supreme Court's decision in Calderon v. Ashmus,"' as indicating that the Eleventh Amendment is not sufficiently
111. Id.
112. Id.at 56-57 &n.7; see also U.S.I. Prop. Corp. v. MD. Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489,495
(1st Cir. 2000) (purporting to follow Parellain concluding that it could forego difficult Eleventh Amendment issue in favor of more readily disposing of case in favor of state on basis of
lack of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction).
113. 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert denied,530 S. Ct. 1202 (2000).
114. Id. at 892 (citing Schacht, 524 U.S. at 391).
115.
116.

Id. at892-93.
Id. at 893.

117.

523 U.S. 740 (1998).
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jurisdictional to require a federal court to decide a state's claim of Eleventh
Amendment immunity before turning to the merits. As described in Long, in
Calderon,
the Supreme Court decidedthatit "mustfirst address" whether aparticular
action for a declaratory judgment was an Article HI case or controversy
before decidingthe EleventhAmendment question onwhichcertiorari had
been granted, observingthatthe EleventhAmendment is "notco-extensive
with the limitations ofjudicial power in Article IlI."... That the Court in
Calderonthought itself obligedto decide the case or controversy question
first suggests that the Eleventh Amendment, a less thanpurejurisdictional
question, need not be decided before a merits question."8
Third, the court argued, as the U.S. Supreme Court later did in Vermont
Agency ofNaturalResourcesv. UnitedStates ex rel.Stevens," 9 that the determuination that a particular action is properly asserted against a state is a logical
prerequisite to the jurisdictional inquiry, and that the "merits" question is
inextricably related to the "jurisdiction" question. 2 ' The Eleventh Amendment
"bars a federal court from hearing only a 'suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States,' and so it would seem perfectly
appropriate - perhaps even necessary - for courts to determine whether there
even is such a suit before the court."' Elaborating, the court continued,
[We have not chosen to decide a pure (and relatively easier) merits
question onthe assumptionthatwe havejurisdiction-the paradigm ofthe
hypothetical jurisdiction model. When a court decides, as we do, that a
statute does not provide for a suit against the states, there is no risk at all
that the court is issuing a hypothetical judgment- an advisory opinion by
a court whose very power to act is in doubt ....Rather, the conclusion
that the statute does not provide for suits against the states in federal court
is, in effect, a resolution ofthejurisdictional question, inthat the Eleventh
Amendment can no longer be said to apply (which is quite different from
saying, as courts do under the hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine, that
jurisdiction does not matter because the same party arguing a lack of
jurisdiction prevails on the merits) ....The Fifth Circuit's view instead
is that a court must assume that states are defendants under the Act and
address the EleventhAmendment question at the outset, lestthe court give
an interpretation of the statute that it has no power to give.... But such
an approach ostensibly avoids the evils of 'hypothetical jurisdiction' (not
118. Long, 173 F.3d at 893-94 (citations omitted).
119. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
120. Long, 173 F.3d at 894.
121. Id. For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, the court referred to this inquiry as
falling within the category of"jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." Id.
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really at issue) in favor of deciding a purely hypothetical jurisdictional
issue- that is, ajurisdictional issue that arises solely by virtue ofthe statutory question assumed. Since the Eleventh Amendment issue in this case
"would not exist but for" that assumption,... we think it is appropriate for
us to decide the logically prior issue first.1'

In explicating how the court viewed the merits and the jurisdictional questions
as intertwined, the court said,
[Elven if we were to assume that states are defendant persons, and then
actually to decide that the Eleventh Amendment applied, we would then
have to ask whether, for abrogation purposes, the statute contains a clear
statement that states are to be defendants- which is more-or-less the same
statutory analysis that we previously undertook."
It believed that these logical and factual relationships between the questions
provided an independent ground on which to distinguish Steel Co. 24
Finally, the Court found the conclusion to which all of the foregoing
reasoning leads (that the statutory interpretation question of application to the
states can be addressed before Eleventh Amendment issues) to be confirmed
by pre-Steel Co. cases in which the Court had addressed "cause of action"
questions before turning to Eleventh Amendment issues, and not to be prohibited by any Supreme Court decisions."z Given that history, and the preference
for avoiding difficult constitutional issues, it adhered to its decision to decide
the case on statutory grounds." 6
In VermontAgencyofNaturalResourcesv. UnitedStatesexrel. Stevens"2
the Supreme Court answered the question that had tested the federal appeals
122. Id.at 896 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 895. This is apparently the way in which the court viewed the merits and the
jurisdictional questions to be inextricably related.
124. Id. at 895.
125. Id. at 896-98.
126. The opinion discussed here was a supplemental opinion which complemented the
earlier decision on the merits in United States ex rel.Long v. SCS Business & TechnicalInstitute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196
F.3d 514, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that Article Ill standing is more basic jurisdictional
requirement than Eleventh Amendment, that it therefore has to be addressed before court may
consider latter, and that discussion of standing in Foulds, see supra note 98, was not dictum,
despite case's additional conclusion that Eleventh Amendment barred suit). But see id. at 53738 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (disapproving court's interpretation of Foulds case and
of Supreme Court's opinion in Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998), concluding that
Ruhrgas "abolishes any inference from Calderon,that the Fouldspanel must have necessarily
decided the Article TI issue to reach its determination that the Eleventh Amendment posed
jurisdictional barriers").
127. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
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courts. Like Long, this was a qui tam action brought against a state agency
under the False Claims Act. The defendant had moved to dismiss, arguing
both that a state agency is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA
and that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment."2 Consistent
with Steel Co., the Court first addressed whether the plaintiff had Article m1
standing to maintain the suit.Y9 Having found that a qui tam relator under the
1 30
FCA has Article I standing, the Court 'turn[ed], then, to the merits.
Recognizing that questions of jurisdiction should be addressed first and that
courts of appeals had disagreed as to the order in which statutory and Eleventh
Amendment questions should be resolved, the Court observed that it had
routinely addressed the question whether a statute permitted a cause of action
to be asserted against states before addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment forbade the particular cause to be so asserted.3 The Court justified this
sequencing by finding the statutory question "logically antecedent" to the
immunity issue, and by reference to the lack of possibility that, in addressing
the statutory question, the Court would expand its power beyond the limits
that thejurisdictional restriction imposed.'32 That is, as a practical matter, the
Court would not "pronounce upon any issue, or upon the rights of any person,
beyond the issues and persons that would be reached under the Eleventh
Amendment inquiry anyway.' 3 3 It concluded thatthe "combination of logical
priority and virtual coincidence
of scope" made it appropriate to decide the
134
statutory question firSt.

Aspects of the reasoning inLong and VermontAgency can be challenged.
For example, the Long court concedes that one could argue that whether a
cause of action has been pleaded is logically antecedent to whether a court has
jurisdiction over that cause, but the Court in Steel Co. nonetheless held that the
jurisdictional issue has to be decided first. 35 The argument that the inquiry
into whether a particular civil action is properly asserted against a state logically precedes any inquiry into whether the Eleventh Amendment nonetheless
bars the suit should not be persuasive if,
as Steel Co. suggests, logical antecedence is not a compelling reason to put a merits question before a jurisdictional
128.

Vt. Agency ofNatural Res. v. United States exrel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,770 (2000).

129.

Id. at 771.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 778.
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997)).
Id.

134.

Id. at 779-80. VermontAgency was followed and extended in Floydv. Thompson,

227 F.3d 1029,1035 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that appeals court could bypass Eleventh Amendment issue in favor of more readily made determination, based on settlement agreement suggesting that there was no possible basis for suit against state).
135. Long, 173 F3d at 896 n.4.
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one. One also could question the Long court's and the Supreme Court's reliance on their conclusion, on the merits, that states are not persons suable under
the FCA, in support of their position that it is permissible to reach that merits
issue before Eleventh Amendment issues. That reasoning allows the outcome
of the merits question to determine whether it may be addressed first, which
seems inappropriate. Had the courts decided that states are suable under the
FCA, they would not have been able to say that resolution of the statutory
question in effect resolved the jurisdictional question; the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment would have remained in issue.
It seems to me that Vermont Agency, at least arguably, represents yet
another instance of the Court diluting the purity of the principle that jurisdictional issues should be resolved before merits issues. 136 While one can address
whether states can be sued under a statute before addressing whether unconsenting states can be so sued, one could address the latter question, while
assuming arguendo an affirmative answer to the former." Since the statutory
interpretation question is non-jurisdictional, there is no prohibition against
making an arguendo assumption about its answer. The "logical priority" ofthe
statutory question,138 therefore, is not a compelling reason to depart from the
usual sequence of decision, which the Court supports with weighty invocations
that, "ifthere is no jurisdictionL,] there is no authority to sit in judgment of
anything else."'139 Inthe VermontAgency opinion itself,the Court characterizes
the Eleventh Amendment as jurisdictional and yet addresses first what is
clearly a merits question, whether the FCA provides for suits against states.
The second purported justification offered for addressing the statutory
question first, that as a practical matter the Court would not "pronounce upon
any issue, or upon the rights of any person, beyond the issues and persons that
would be reached under the Eleventh Amendment inquiry anyway,' 40 seems
to me similarly assailable. In addressing the statutory question whether the
FCA provides for suits against states, the Court is pronouncing upon an issue
that it would not have to reach under the Eleventh Amendment (as suggested
136. This is true, so long as the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as jurisdictional. Insofar
as the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as inextricably bound-up with Article III limits on federal
court jurisdiction, the case arguably represents another instance of the Court diluting the purity
of the principle that Article M11
jurisdictional issues must be resolved before merits issues.
137. See, e.g., United States ex rel.Foulds v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279,288 (5th Cir.
1999) (addressing Eleventh Amendment question, having assumed that states are defendants
under act of Congress in order to avoid interpreting statute that court had no power to interpret).
138. I do concede that the question whether particular entities can be sued under a statutory
scheme is, or can be viewed as, logically antecedent to the question whether those entities are
entitled to an immunity from the suits.
139. Vt. Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778

(2000).
140.

Id. at 779.
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above, the Court could assume arguendo an affirmative answerto this question)
and, because ofthe precedential authority ofthe Court's opinions, the Court is,
as a practical matter, potentially affecting the rights of persons beyond the
current parties. Had the Court decided, for example, that the states were
persons suable under the FCA, 4 1 then qui tam relators could have sued various
states under the statute and succeeded in their suits where the facts supported
their claims and where the pertinent states had waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or where the states' immunity had effectively been abrogated.
Had the VermontAgency Court not addressed the statutory question, that question would have remained open, to be reached only if and when an immunitywaiving state were sued under the FCA, or if the Court held the immunity to
have been abrogated. At the very least, we now have yet another qualification
to the Steel Co. rule: a court may reach merits issues before Eleventh Amendmentissues (and perhaps other quasi-jurisdictional or evenpurelyjurisdictional
issues) when the "combination of logical priority and virtual coincidence of
scope" makes it appropriate to decide a statutory merits question first. 4 2
The lower courts' struggle with the Eleventh Amendment illustrates the
kinds of challenges courts face in determining what issues are jurisdictional
for Steel Co. purposes. I believe that the Court's decision of that particular
issue has, if anything, further muddied the sequence in which issues must be
addressed. But whatever the "right answer" to the Eleventh Amendment question, and whatever effects Vermont Agency will have on the analysis of other
sequencing dilemmas, the judicial debate concerning the status of the Eleventh Amendment for Steel Co. purposes illustrates how the Steel Co. opinion
has invigorated and compelled appellate (as well as district court) attention to
questions that those courts otherwise might not have addressed. At the same
time, Steel Co. requires district and appellate courts to eschew merits questions that they might prefer to address, when they find that the district court
lacked jurisdiction.
1. HypotheticalAppellate JurisdictionBefore andAfter Steel Co.
A. The Determinantsof FederalAppellate Jurisdiction
Article I, Section 1, of the United States Constitution provides that
"[t]hejudicial Power ofthe United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."' 43 Section 2 then states the categories of cases and controversies to
141.
In fact,it held to the contrary. See id. at 783-84 (finding that while certain provisions
of FCA define "person" to include states, particular provisions relating to qui tam liability do
not, thereby indicating that states are not persons under that provision).
142. Vt Agency, 529 U.S. at 779-80.
143. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
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which the judicial power shall extend and declares which ofthose cases shall
be within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and which shall be within
its appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make. '' "M
Pursuant to the powers alluded to in Article I1, Congress has passed
legislation detailing the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.'4 5 Although the Supreme Court has promulgated rules to govern the
practice before it, 45 and some of those rules could be read to impose additional jurisdictional requirements, 47 these restrictions are not truly "jurisdic144. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 2. It also provides in pertinent part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority, - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies
between two or more States: - between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
Id.
145. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-59 (1999). These sections are set forth in the Appendix
to this Article.
Just how much power Congress has to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a
controversial matter, but one beyond the scope of this article. See generally The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term, CongressionalPower to Restrictthe Supreme Court'sAppellate Jurisdiction, 110 HARV. L. REV. 277 (1996); Barry Friedman,A DifferentDialogue: The Supreme
Cour4 Congress,andFederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. L. REV. 1 (1990); Eugene Gressman & Eric
Gressman,Necessary and ProperRoots ofExceptions to FederalJurisdiction,51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 495 (1983); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, andthe Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WK. &
MARYL. Rzv. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Cour4 1980 Term -Foreword:
ConstitutionalLimitationson Congress'Authorilyto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 19-20 (1981). Additional writings are cited in Louise Weinberg,
TheArticle IHBox: The Powerof"Congress"toAttack the "Jurisdiction"of"FederalCourts,"
78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1406 n.2 (2000).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) provides in part that "[t]he Supreme Court... may from time to
time prescribe rules for the conduct of [its] business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts
of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title." 28
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994).
147. See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (stating in part that "[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"); see also Quilloin v. Walcott,
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tional or absolute. They have been created by the Court, and are subject to
modification by the Court when it believes that the reasonable procedures
148
embodied in the general rules are outweighed by other considerations.'
Thus, the rules do not limit the Court's power.
Pursuant to the power conferred in Article I, section 8, "to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,' 149 Congress also has created federal
appellate courts150 and conferred a defined appellate jurisdiction upon them.'
434 U.S. 246, 253 n.13 (1977) (finding that, where contention that adoption statutes created
gender-based distinctions which violated Equal Protection Clause of Constitution was not
presented in appellant's jurisdictional statement, although it was raised in final paragraph of
appellant's brief, Court would not consider that claim); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376,386 n.12 (1960) (commenting that Court considers only issues raised
by jurisdictional statement in appellate brief or petition for certiorari).
In a number of cases, the Court has specifically held that Supreme Court Rules governing
times for filing and docketing and governing service are not jurisdictional. See Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 742-43 n.10 (1974) (holding that technical noncompliance with rule requiring
persons not admitted to bar of Supreme Court to prove service by affidavit does not deprive
Court ofjurisdiction over appeal from grant of habeas corpus where court-martialed serviceman
had actual notice of filing of notice of appeal with Court); Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,445-46 & n.4 (1974) (holding timely docketing ofjurisdictional statement
not to be jurisdictional requisite, where notice of appeal to Court was timely); Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1970) (holding that rule requiring petition for certiorari to review
judgment in criminal case to be filed within 30 days after court of appeals' judgment is not
jurisdictional and can be waived by Court, and stating generally that procedural rules adopted
by Court to govern its own judicial business are not jurisdictional, and can be relaxed in Court's
discretion when ends ofjustice so require); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 316 n.1
(1969) (per curiam) (holding time limitation for filing petition for certiorari not jurisdictional,
and that failure to timely file petition did not bar Court's exercise of discretion to consider
case); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 42 (1966) (holding that petitioner's failure to
comply with Supreme Court rule requirements as to service did not defeat jurisdiction because
requirements were not jurisdictional, no prejudice resulted, and failure was inadvertent).
148. ROBERT L. STER ET AL., SuPRE E COURT PRACTICE § 6.26, at 345 (7th ed. 1993)
(citing cases in which Court addressed questions not raised in petition for certiorari, and sometimes not raised by parties at all, with Court sometimes bolstering its authority to decide such
questions with option reserved by Court in Supreme Court Rule 24.1(a), to "consider a plain
error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its
jurisdiction to decide").
149. U.S. CONST. art. L,§ 8.
150. These include the circuit courts of appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit In the past it had created others such as the Temporary Emergency Court
ofAppeals (created by section 211 (b) of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, and abolished
by section 102(d),(e) of Pub. L. 102-572 (Oct. 29,1992)).
151. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,1292,1295 (1999). These sections are set forth in the
Appendix to this Article.
Just how much power Congress has to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is
a controversial matter, too, but also is beyond the scope of this article. For recent writing on
the subject, see generallyAkhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure ofthe JudiciaryAct of
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The intermediate courts of appeals have statutorily-conferred jurisdiction
over appeals from final decisions of the federal district courts152 and over
specified interlocutory decisions. 5 Through the collateral order doctrine, an
interpretation of the final judgment rule,' the intermediate appellate courts
also have jurisdiction to hear appeals from particular orders: those that are
conclusive on the matter they address, resolve questions that are too independent of the merits to need to be deferred until final judgment and too important
to be denied review, and involve important rights that will be lost if the order
is not immediately reviewed. 55 In addition to this and other less well-known
common law refinements of the notion of finality,"' the Rules Enabling Act
allows the Court to prescribe rules defining when a district court ruling is
"final" for purposes of the final judgment rule codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291."s7
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the
JurisdictionofFederalCourtsandthe Text ofArticle111,64 U. CHL L. REV. 203 (1997); Vicki
C. Jackson, Introduction: CongressionalControlofJurisdictionand the Futureof the Federal
Courts- Opposition,Agreement and Hierarchy,86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998); Daniel 3. Meltzer,
The HistoryandStructure ofArticle HI, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990); Weinberg, supranote
145. For a listing of additional distinguished writings on the subject, see Weinberg, supra note
145, at 1405 n.1.
152. This generalization is subject to an exception for those situations in which a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1999), Appendix; see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1999) (providing for direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district
courts).
153. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1999); see also CarrPark, Inc. v. Tesfaye, 229 F.3d 1192,
1194 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)'s ten-day filing period is jurisdictional).
154. In earlier times, the collateral order doctrine was (more frequently than nowadays)
characterized as an exception to the final judgment rule. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 314-15 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that collateral order doctrine is, in effect,
judge-made exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.
794, 798-800 (1989) (referring to collateral order "exception" to final judgment rule); Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (same); see also Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing
InterlocutoryAppealsin the FederalCourts,58 GEo. WAsI L. REV. 1165,1167 n.10, 1168-71
(1990) (referring to collateral order doctrine as exception to finality requirement).
155. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (articulating requirements for order to be immediately appealable as collateral order); see Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,867 (1994) (same). For a thoughtful exegesis ofthe prongs
of Cohen, see generally In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir. 1997).
156. Regarding other common law refinements of the notion offinality, see generally 15AB WRIGHTET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D §§ 3095-3939.10
(1992 & Supp. 2001).

157.

The Rules Enabling Act provides:

Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
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Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Court also
promulgated under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act, further determines
the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts by permitting district
courts to direct the entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims
or parties in a civil action, in prescribed circumstances.158 Congress also has
allowed the Court to authorize by rules immediate appeal of interlocutory

decisions not provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a),(b), (c), or (d)."5 9 The
sole exercise of this power thus far is the 1998 addition of Rule 23(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a court of appeals, in its
discretion, to permit appeal from a district court order granting or denying
class action certification, if application is made to the appeals court within ten
days after entry of the order."eo The courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 1291 ofthis title.
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
Note in particular section (c). Thus far, no rules have been promulgated under this seclion. The Seventh Circuit has opined that this grant has gone unused at least in part because "it
invites the question whether a particular rule truly 'defines' or instead expands appellate jurisdiction." Blair v. Equifax Check Sews., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
158. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). It provides in pertinent part
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action. .. or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
Id. If an order is erroneously certified under Rule 54(b) and no other basis for immediate appeal
exists, the appellate court must dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Eldredge v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740, 742 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Rule requirement that court have disposed of one or more claims or parties is jurisdictional, although requirement that court have made express determination that there is no just reason for delay is
not, and dismissing appeal of partial summary judgment, for want ofjurisdiction, where former
requirement was not met given strong factual overlap between appealed claim and matters still
pending in trial court).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994).
160. FED.R. CIV. P. 23(f). InBlairv.EquifaxCheekServices., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7thCir.
1999), the Seventh Circuit became the first court to apply the new Rule. Blair,181 F.3d at 833.
It took the occasion to review the reasons Rule 23(f) came into being. Id. at 834-35. In its
view, the Rule is intended to provide the opportunity for immediate appellate review of an order
granting or denying class certification when denial of class status seems likely to be fatal and
the plaintiff has a solid argument that the district court's decision was in error, when "the stakes
are large and the risk of a settlement or other disposition that does not reflect the merits ...is
substantial," if appellant demonstrates "that the ruling on class certification is questionable"
considering the deferential standard of review that applies, and when an interlocutory appeal
would facilitate development of the law on fundamental issues that otherwise would be likely
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also review trial court decisions in advance of final judgment when the higher
courts grant litigants' petitions for writs ofmandamus or similar extraordinary
relief under the All Writs Act."" On the other hand, on some occasions, Congress has specifically
denied appellate jurisdiction that the courts otherwise
1 62

would enjoy

The Supreme Court and several intermediate federal appellate courts
have held a few of the requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to be jurisdictional, so that the appeals courts lack authority to
act on the merits of cases in which those requirements have not been satisfied.
Most prominent among these requirements are Rule 3(a)'s requirement that
an appeal permitted as of right from a district court to a court of appeals be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4; Rule 3(c)'s requirements
that the notice of appeal (1) specify the parties taking the appeal by naming

each in the caption or body of the notice (subject to a liberalization for attorneys representing more than one party), (2) designate the judgment, order, or
part thereof being appealed, and (3) name the court to which the appeal is
to evade effective review at the end of the case. Id. The court noted that, in this last instance,
it is less important that the trial judge's decision be "shaky." Id. at 835. The court also
indicated that when class certification has induced judges to remake substantive doctrine in
order to render litigation manageable, that too justifies an interlocutory appeal of the certification decision. Id. at 834; see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288,294
(1 st Cir. 2000) (following Blairwith modification that third category be restricted to "instances
in which an appeal will permit the resolution of an unsettled legal issue... important to the
particular litigation as well as ... in itself"). See generally Michael E. Solimine & Christine
Oliver HinesDecidingto Decide: ClassAction Certificationand InterlocutoryReview by the
UnitedStatesCourtsofAppeals UnderRule 23(t),41 WNL &MARYL. REV. 1531 (2000).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994) provides: "Writs: (a) The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respectivejurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law, (b) An alternative writ
or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction." See, e.g.,
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (upholding grant of mandamus to determine
district court authority to order Rule 35 examinations of defendant). Although the request for
an extraordinary writ is an original application to the court of appeals, the grant of the writ to an
inferior court is an appellate power. See Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943)
(noting that Supreme Court has authority to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition to district
courts only insofar as such writs aid appellate jurisdiction).
162. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (stating that "[alan order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this
title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise"). Congress has denied this review notwithstanding that remand orders are final decisions because they effectively put litigants out of federal
court. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713-15 (1996); see also United States
v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that, because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(BX3XA)
is jurisdictional bar to district court's assertion of jurisdiction over successive habeas petitions
until appellate court has granted petitioner permission to file, appeals court lacked jurisdiction
to review denial of motion for appointment of counsel to file habeas petition).
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taken; and Rule 4(a)(1)'s requirements concerning the time for filing a notice

of appeal.163 Perhaps these Rules are regarded as jurisdictional while com163. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a),(c), 4(aXc). Cases holding the aforementioned Rules to be
jurisdictional include the following:
Rules 3(a), 4(a): See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,315 (1988) (holding both party specification provision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) and time
limits for filing appeal set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 to be jurisdictional).
"[A] litigant's failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be 'harmless' or waived by a
court." Id. at 317 n.3. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)
(per curiam) (observing that timely filing of notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional,
and concluding that premature notice of appeal was nullity under Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(aX4), as it was then framed); Browder v. Dir., Dept of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264
(1978) (stating that compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 is mandatory and
jurisdictional); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,224 (1960) (holding that late notice
of appeal under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not confer jurisdiction on appellate
court); United States v. FIrsch, 207 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing late-filed
appeal for lack ofjurisdiction despite contention that clerk failed to file notice on defendant's
behalf despite request to do so, but inviting defendant to claim inadequate assistance of counsel
entitling him to vacation of judgment and reimposition of sentence, permitting appeal); Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist, "184F.3d 439,446-47 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that, where
time to appeal had not been extended by motion for reconsideration, notice of appeal that was
filed late did not vest court of appeals with jurisdiction to review sanction); see also FED. R.
APP. P. 26(b) (disallowing courts from extending time to file notice of appeal or similar petition,
except as authorized in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4). But see Torres, 487 U.S. at
321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with interpretation of party-specification provision
as jurisdictional and characterizing Court as having held Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation
requirement not to bejurisdictional in Foman v. Davis,371 U.S. 178 (1962)).
Rule 3(c): See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-50 (1992) (stating that dictates of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 are jurisdictional and their satisfaction prerequisite to
appellate review, holding that appellant's brief may serve as notice of appeal that Rule 3
requires); Torres, 487 U.S. at 315, 316-18 (stating that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal specify parties taking appeal is jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review, although appeals court should find notice sufficient so long as it
provides functional equivalent of what Rule requires; holding that use of "ct al." in notice of
appeal was insufficient to notify appellees or appellate court that intervening plaintiff who, due
to clerical error, was not otherwise named in notice was appealing; hence, prior judgment of
dismissal was final as to him); United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750,
756-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, because notice of appeal referred only to summary judgment rulings, court lacked jurisdiction to consider issues raised by motion for reconsideration);
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F, Goodrich Co., 183 F3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal designate what is
appealed from is jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review, thus, holding that because order
granting preliminary injunction necessarily encompassed refusal to refer antitrust claim to
arbitration, identification of former order in notice of appeal sufficiently manifested intent to
appeal latter, but because injunctive order did not necessarily constitute refusal to stay, there
was no appellate jurisdiction over refusal); Burgess v. Suzuki Motor Co., 71 F.3d 304, 306-07
(8th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although court may construe Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
liberally in determining whether those Rules have been complied with, court may not waive
jurisdictional requirement that notice of appeal designate judgment, order or part thereof
appealed from). But see Osterberger v. Relocation Realty Sere.Corp., 921 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.
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parable Supreme Court Rules are not so regarded because, while the Court is
comfortable modifying its own rules where that seems appropriate, it believes
that it would be inappropriate for the lower federal courts to determine that
*theprocedures that the Court and Congress have promulgated to govern the
appellate courts"s should yield in particular cases. 6 5
Finally, some judge-made doctrines also are regarded as setting jurisdictional bounds upon appellate jurisdiction. In addition to the collateral order
doctrine and other doctrines defining "finality,"' an example is the precedent
holding that, unless a district court mistakenly believed that it lacked legal
authority to impose a sentence below the range established by the United
1991) (stating that, while portion of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requiring notice
of appeal to specify parties is jurisdictional, portion requiring notice of appeal to designate
proper judgment isrconstrued broadly).
Other requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are not jurisdictional.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(aX2) provides, "An appellant's failure to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeals does not affect the validity of the appeal," and
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(dX3) states, "[The district clerk's failure to serve notice
does not affect the validity of the appeal." See Smith, 502 U.S. at 249 (holding proper briefing
notto be jurisdictional requirement). As of this writing, the Court has granted certiorari on the
question whether a court of appeals must dismiss a prisoner's appeal in which a timely, but
unsigned, notice of appeal was filed. Becker v. Montgomery, 531 U.S. 1110 (2001).
But some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have an impact on appellate jurisdiction have been held to be jurisdictional for the appellate courts. For example, the time limits
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) have been held to be jurisdictional when applied in
connection with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) ("A
motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment"); EF Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.1 (3d Cir.) (stating that time
requirements in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) arejurisdictional); Fuente v. Central Elec. Coop., Inc., 703 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (stating that ten day period of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is jurisdictional);
see also Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corr., 434 U.S. 257,267,270-71 (1978) (holding appeal
jurisdictionally defective because untimely motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59
did not toll time for filing notice of appeal, and observing that time limits of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59 are mandatory and jurisdictional).
164. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074, Congress has the opportunity to reject or alter Rules
proposed by the Court. Section 2074 provides in pertinent part that, "(a) The Supreme Court
shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under
section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no
earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law."
165. See Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review) (in discussing
different meanings that "jurisdictional" has in different contexts, observing that "[s]ometimes... characterizing a provision as 'jurisdictional' implies that a court cannot temper the
application of the provision through otherwise available equitable doctrines").
166. See supranotes 64, 66,154-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the collateral
order doctrine. Regarding other doctrines defining finality, see generally 15A-B WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDEmALPRACTiCEAND PROCEDURE: JuRIsICIoN2D §§ 3095-3939.10 (1992 & Supp. 2000).
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States Sentencing Guidelines, a district court's refusal to depart downward is
not appealable. 67
B. Reconciling Steel Co. and Swint
There appears to be tension between the Court's denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction and its restriction of the scope of appellate jurisdiction on
interlocutory appeals. If a case is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the district court, an immediately appealable final judgment is
entered, and the appeals court reviews the dismissal. If a district court assumes or holds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction and adjudicates to final
judgment, if and when that final judgment is appealed, the appeals court can
review the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction; indeed, it is the appeals
court's duty to confirm the district court's jurisdiction if there is any question
about it.l6s If a district court assumes or holds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction and another of its orders is properly appealed before final judgment
(whether under the collateral order doctrine, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) or (b),
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(f) or 54(b), by grant of a
petition for writ of mandamus, or otherwise), the question may arise whether
the appeals court is free to review the district court's jurisdiction in the context of the interlocutory appeal, even though the district court's affirmation of
its own jurisdiction would not, in and of itself, be appealable before final
judgment. In Swint v. ChambersCounty Commission,69 the Supreme Court
strongly criticized the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, which the
Court described as the authority of "a court of appeals with jurisdiction over
one ruling to review, conjunctively, related rulings that are not themselves
independently appealable.' 170 Disavowing the thoroughgoing rejection that
its opinion otherwise might have implied, the Court cautioned:
We need not definitively or preemptively settle here whether or when it
may be proper for a court of appeals, with jurisdiction over one ruling, to
review, conjunctively, related rulings thatarenotthemselves independently
167. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 209 F.3d 614,617 (6th Cir. 2000) (taking position described in text); United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 352 (4th Cir. 2000) (same);
United States v. Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632,636 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
168. See Louisville &NashvilleR.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,150 (1908) (dismissing
case for lack of federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction, where Court raised issue); Local
1351 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., 214 F.3d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir.2000)
(confirming district court's jurisdiction).

169.

514 U.S. 35 (1995).

170. Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995). For a close examination of the opinion's criticism of pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine, see generally Joan
Steinman, The Scope ofAppellate Jurisdiction: PendentAppellate JurisdictionBefore and
After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1998).
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appealable .... The parties do not contend that the District Court's
decisionto denythe Chambers County Commission's summaryjudgment
motion was inextricably intertwined with that court's decision to denythe
individual defendants' qualified immunity motions, or that review of the
71
former decision was necessary to ensure meaningful review ofthe latter.'
The Court thus left the door open to approval ofpendent appellate jurisdiction
over rulings that fit the categories described by the court (that is, those inextricably intertwined with the immediately appealable orders or necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter) and perhaps even beyond those parameters.
Based upon Swint, it would be possible to argue that, despite the Court's
condemnation of hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel Co., when there is an interlocutory appeal, a court of appeals should address only the issues that are
immediately and independently appealable and those that are pendent to them,
as narrowly defined by the Court in Swint. On this view, there would be
tension between Steel Co. and Swint insofar as the former insists that district
court jurisdiction not be assumed, but examined by the court of appeals, and
the latter insists that courts of appeals hearing interlocutory appeals confine
themselves to immediately appealable orders and orders inextricably intertwined with them or necessary to ensure their meaningful review. Recent case
law has tended to determine whether to entertain issues as to Article III
requirements and as to subject-matter jurisdiction, on the occasion of interlocutory appeals, by reference to whether the issues fall within the categories
described by Swint. Some courts regard issues that go to justiciability and to
the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction as necessary to ensure meaningful review of the immediately appealable order.172 Others, rejecting that tack,
have declined to consider such issues when they were not "inextricably
intertwined" with the other issues presented. 1 3
171.
Swint, 514 U.S. at 50-51.
172. See Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 F.3d 263, 267-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (confirming appellate jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine and addressing district court's subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims that were basis of appeal in order to ensure meaningful review of order
denying qualified immunity). The court expressly stated that it did not run afoul of the boundaries on appellate jurisdiction articulated in Swint in determining whether the district court had
subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 268. It found such determination necessary to ensure meaningful review of the order denying qualified immunity because, without such jurisdiction, the
district court would have lacked power to issue the immunity rulings in question. Id. at 269;
see also Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240,245.46 (3d Cir. 1998), cert denied, Larsen v.
Afflerbach, 525 U.S. 1145 (1999) (reaching justiciability of plaintiff's claim under political
question doctrine, as necessary to decide § 1292(b)-cerified issues on appeal).
173. See Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F3d 1266, 1277-78 (1 th Cir. 2000)
(finding that, outside context of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) appeals, "issues of standing normally arc
not available for review on interlocutory appeal"); Summit Med. Assocs., PC. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d
1326,1335 & n.8 (11 th Cir. 1999) (followingMonizv. City ofFortLauderdale,145 F.3d 1278
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Jurisdictional rulings typically are not inextricably intertwined with the
immediately appealable issues,"' and it is debatable whether they ought to be
considered necessary to ensure meaningful review. On a previous occasion,
I nonetheless argued that, when there is an interlocutory appeal, 17 5 a court of
appeals may consider, and indeed should consider, whether the district court
had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.1 76 The court of appeals should
make this inquiry regardless of whether any ofthe parties moved, either in the
district court or on appeal, to have the case dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction 7 andregardless of whether there is any factual overlap (or
any overlap of legal issues) between the jurisdictional issue and the issues
raised by the order that is the occasion for the appeal. I adhere to that view.
It is the appellate court's duty to raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,
even sua sponte - whatever the occasion for a case being before the appellate
(1 lth Cir. 1998), in appeal from denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Moniz v. City of
Fort Lauderdale, 145 F3d 1278, 1281 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that appeals court did not
have pendent jurisdiction to review ruling that plaintiff had standing to assert claims in question
because standing issue was neither "inextricably intertwined with" nor "necessary to ensure
meaningful review of' qualified immunity ruling); see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Class
Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over propriety of district court's denial of permissive intervention, in conjunction with
interlocutory appeal from rejection of appellants' bid to intervene as of right).
174. But see Carter v. West Publ. Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
that upon interlocutory appeal of order granting class certification, court of appeals could review
determination that named plaintiffs had constitutional standing to bring class suit because
standing was properly part of class certification analysis).
175. When I speak of "interlocutory appeals," I intend to include all appeals before final
judgment, including appeals of orders that are considered "final decisions" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This usage is consistent with the Black's Dictionary of Law definitions
of "interlocutory" as "[s]omething intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy" and
of "interlocutory appeal" as "[a]n appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLAcK'S LAW DiCToNARY 815 (6th ed. 1990). A later edition of BLACK's LAW DICONARY defines "interlocutory"
as an "interim or temporary [order, judgment, appeal, etc.] not constituting a final resolution of
the whole controversy," and "interlocutory appeal" as "an appeal that occurs before the trial
court's final ruling on the entire case." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 819,94 (7th ed. 1999).
176. The Courttookthis approach inDeckertv. IndependenceShares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940) (considering issue of subject-matter jurisdiction of district court in action under Securities Act of 1933).
177. See Louisville & Nashville K.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (noting that
federal courts have duty to determine whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction and should
address that issue sua sponte if parties have not raised it); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency,
Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that even if defendant
challenged only sufficiency of complaint, court was "entitled at any time sua sponte to delve
into" factual basis for subject-matter jurisdiction); Cvelbar v. CBI IM., Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating court's "independent duty to assess sua sponte" questions of federal
jurisdiction).
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court - because judicial action beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of a
federal district court, as established by Congress, violates separation of
powers, affronts judicial federalism (the relationship between federal and state
courts), and may violate Article I11
of the Constitution.17 Moreover, because
the issue is before the appeals court whether or not the parties raised it, and
because the issue is properly addressed before the issues directly raised by the
immediately appealable order 9 and without regard to whether the jurisdictional and the merits issues share any factual nexus or any overlapping legal

issues, as a matter of linguistic usage, the jurisdictional issue should not be
regarded as being within the court's "pendent" appellate jurisdiction. 80 Once
that is recognized, the notion that an appeals court may explore the jurisdiction of the district court only if that issue falls within the exceptions noted in
Swint falls away.8
178. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,552-56 (1989) (finding lower court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which had not been explicitly authorized by Congress, to be
unconstitutional usurpation of power); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304
(1809) (striking down, as violative of Article Ia statute purporting to confer federal jurisdiction
over all suits involving aliens because Constitution extends judicial power of United States only
to cases between aliens and U.S. citizens); see generally 13 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEuRE: JURIsDICTON AND RELATED MATrERS 2D § 3522, at 60-62,66-69(1984 &
Supp. 2001) (emphasizing unconstitutionality of federal courts taking jurisdiction over cases
that they lack jurisdiction to hear under U.S. Constitution and Acts of Congress; restrictions on
jurisdiction of federal courts involve "delicate problems of federal-state relations").
179. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152 (raising issue of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte
and noting Court's responsibility to do so; not reaching merits of case once Court concluded
that federal courts lacked jurisdiction); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass'n of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d
290, 294 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that, despite limited scope of appeal from class certification orders, appeals court may consider plaintiffs' constitutional standing to sue, when reviewing grant or denial of class certification); Children's Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters,
92 F.3d 1412,1419 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., writing separately) (concluding that, on collateral order appeal, issue of plaintiff's standing also comes before appeals court); Avitts v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d 690, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1995) (upon appeal of grant of preliminary
injunction, court determined only that district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
action and remanded with instructions to district court to remand removed action to state court);
Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417,421 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing district court's subjectmatter jurisdiction before reviewing grant of preliminary injunction).
180. If the issue is raised by the appeals court sun sponte, lawyers probably do not consider
it a matter of pendent appellate jurisdiction. We might so regard it if a party seeks to have the
appellate court review the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction in conjunction with the § 1292(aX1) appeal. However, for the reasons stated above,
it seems more accurate to regard the court's jurisdiction to determine the district court's and its
own subject-matter jurisdiction as independent (rather than pendent), although admittedly the
occasion for immediate appellate consideration of the issue is created by the interlocutory appeal. But for that appeal the jurisdictional issue would be reviewable only after final judgment.
181. Much of the above discussion concerning pendent appellate jurisdiction is derived
from Steinman, supra note 170, at 1399-1401.
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In contrast to my view that matters of district court subject-matter jurisdiction should be
addressed on interlocutory appeals regardless of whether they fit within the Swint categories of
acceptable occasions for pendent appellate jurisdiction, it is my view that, even though personal
jurisdiction also is a prerequisite to the proper entry of judicial orders against parties, appellate
courts should consider the propriety of a district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
defendants, on the occasion of an interlocutory appeal, only when that issue properly can be
heard as matter of pendent appellate jurisdiction, or when the decision to exercise personal
jurisdiction was rendered in an order that was § 1292(b) certified or that entered or denied an
injunction and hence is part of an order that is immediately appealable in its entirety. (As
construed, §§ 1292(aX1) and 1292(b) directly confer jurisdiction over the entire such orders.
See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996) (stating that under §1292(b),
"appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified ... and is not tied to the particular question
formulated by the district court"); Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1897)
(finding §1292(aX1) intended to authorize appeal from whole interlocutory order or decree, not
from only that part which grants or continues injunction).) The jurisdiction would be pendent
because appellate courts do not consider issues of personal jurisdiction sua sponte and could
not consider such issues unless the defendants had timely objected to, or moved to dismiss for,
lack of personal jurisdiction in the district court and then appealed the denial of their motion
in conjunction with their interlocutory appeal. (Had the defendants failed o make timely
objection in the trial court, they would have waived their objections under the V~deral Rules of
Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(hXl).) Moreover, judicial action in the absence of personal jurisdiction over defendants violates only the due process liberty interests of the individuals involved; it is no longer viewed as an affront to another sovereign. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites des Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,703 n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state
sovereign power ... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause"). Consequently, no interests equivalent to those that
support appellate consideration of subject-matter jurisdiction at the first opportunity dictate
similarly prompt appellate consideration of personal jurisdiction. Thus, if the propriety of the
trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants can be heard on the occasion of
an interlocutory appeal, it can be heard only as pendent to that appeal or when the personal
jurisdiction ruling is part ofan immediately appealable order.
In the former instance, it should be so heard only if the issues raised by the interlocutory
appeal and by the controversy over personal jurisdiction share a common nucleus of operative
fact or overlapping legal issues, because only then may the economies gained by simultaneous
decisions outweigh the policies that normally would postpone review of personal jurisdiction
issues until after final judgment The system should work in this way even though personal
jurisdiction is a threshold issue that may be dispositive while the interlocutory appeal may not
have the potential to dispose of the case because, if it were otherwise, the mere fortuity of an
interlocutory appeal would overturn the policies that led Congress to conclude that there ordinarily should be no immediate appeal of denials of motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Limiting pendent appellate jurisdiction over personal jurisdiction issues also has the
virtue of sharply reducing the occasions on which litigants might be tempted to appeal an order
primarily as a vehicle to get an early appellate ruling on personal jurisdiction issues. While
allowing courts of appeals to address unrelated issues of personal jurisdiction on the occasion
of an interlocutory appeal would not interrupt otherwise uninterrupted trial court proceedings,
it would have other disadvantages: such a system would lessen district court control and
authority, might cause district courts to be less careful in making rulings that they foresaw
would soon be reviewed, would result in the consumption of appellate time and energy that
might never have had to be expended, and would delay the resolution of interlocutory appeals

58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 855 (2001)
Upon an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals also has to confirm
that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal at that time, under an exception to,

or an interpretation of,the final judgment rule.
C. Appellate Jurisdictionas a Prerequisiteto Appellate Action
on the Merits
Just as district courts must have subject-matter jurisdiction over actions
and personal jurisdiction over parties to render binding judgments on the
merits,182 so too appellate courts must have appellate jurisdiction over actions
and personal jurisdiction over parties to render binding judgments. The black
letter principles are well established. Speaking of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Court has said, "'On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of [the appellate] court, and then of
the court[s] from which the record comes,"'"8 3 regardless of whether the
by expanding their scope. This would create a less efficient system. See Steinman, supra note
170, at 1401-04 (arguing that appellate courts should hear questions of personal jurisdiction
along with § 1292(aX1) appeal only if controversy over personal jurisdiction shares facts or
legal issues with injunctive order that is occasion for appeal).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982) states that "[a] judgment may
properly be rendered against a party only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of
controversy involved in the action." Section 1 also makes subject-matter jurisdiction requisite
for entry of a valid judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982). Judgments
entered by district courts that lack personal or subject-matter jurisdiction are voidable, in
specified circumstances. Sections 12 and 69 declare the circumstances in which the parties may
challenge a court's subject-matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation when a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, while sections 65 and 66 provide the circumstances in
which a default judgment rendered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction may be
avoided. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 12,65,66,69 (1982) (noting requirements for challenging judgment of court without subject-matter jurisdiction). The Restatement
similarly makes personal jurisdiction a prerequisite to entry of a valid judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1-9 (1982) (explaining requirements for courts to have
personal jurisdiction). It also declares the methods by which parties may challenge a court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction for the purpose of invalidating its judgment. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10, 65, 66, 78-82 (1982) (describing process through which
judgments may be challenged for lack of personal jurisdiction).
183. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Great S. Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,453 (1900)); accordUnited States v. Brown, 218 F.3d
415, 420 (5th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S. 2001) (noting that "appellate
jurisdiction is not a matter of consent"); Nilssen v. Motorola Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that Federal Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction over state law claims that
remained after patent infringement claim had been dismissed without prejudice because case
no longer arose under patent laws); Brookes v. Comm'r, 163 F.3d 1124,1125-26,1128-29 (9th
Cir. 1998) (supporting dismissal of appeal for lack of jurisdiction for want of final order by
concluding that precedent that permitted appellate review of final decision of tax liability as to
separate tax years in multi-year claim, without certification as to finality of order under Rule
54(b), violated Steel Co.'s prohibition against exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction); Williamson

APPELLATE USE OFHYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION
parties raise the issue. When a lower court lacked jurisdiction, the appeals
court has jurisdiction, not to decide the merits, but to correct the error of the
lower court in entertaining the suit 8 4 Ifjurisdiction has ceased to exist in any
federal court, by virtue of a case having become moot for example,' an
appellate court's primary function is to announce that fact and dismiss the
case.18 6 If the lower court had original jurisdiction but the appeals court lacks
v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that appellate jurisdiction
always must be resolved before merits); United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.
1998) (addressing before merits whether appellant was sufficiently aggrieved to have standing
to appeal and whether her notice of appeal was defective).
184. United States v. Corsick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936); see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95
(explaining appellate courts' duty to correct lower courts' errors in exercising jurisdiction);
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F3d 335, 342 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000) (raising sua
sponte and deciding favorably to relators in qui tam action issue of relators' standing to sue);
Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Quiet Nacelle Corp., 206 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (1 Ith Cir. 2000) (reciting
principles that federal appellate court must satisfy itself of both its own jurisdiction and that of
lower courts and dismissing controversy without prejudice upon finding that district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction); United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.
2000) (invoking obligation to confirm appellate and district court jurisdiction as predicate for
examining ripeness of plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief); Harline v. DEA, 148 F.3d 1199,
1202-03, 1206 (10th Cir. 1998) (relying on this principle to vacate judgment and remand with
instructions to dismiss all claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due
to failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
185. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nathan R., 199 F.3d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (vacating
district court's judgment and remanding with instructions to dismiss aspects of case regarding
claim for special education services where merits became moot after district court issued its
opinion); Friends of the Earth, Inc v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303,306-07
(4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that action was moot where plaintiffs had not appealed denial of
only forms of relief that might be available to redress their injuries and therefore vacating district court's order and remanding with instructions to dismiss action), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 693, 700
(Jan. 12, 2000) (reversing on grounds that case had not become moot); Fidelity Partners, Inc.
v. First Trust Co. of N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1998) (viewing Steel Co. as requiring
court to address whether appeal had become moot, before addressing merits, and suggesting that
it otherwise would have invoked "hypothetical jurisdiction").
186. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (relying onExparteMcCardle,7 Wall. 506,514 (1868)).
An appeals court's power actually extends somewhat further. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,20-22 (1994) (concluding that even when requirements
of Article I are no longer met by piece of litigation, federal appellate courts may take some
actions, including vacating judgment rendered by lower court and remanding with directions
to dismiss, or deciding to let lower court judgment stand, or awarding costs); Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-39 (1992) (explaining that Article III court's order imposing sanctions
under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 is constitutionally permissible even if it is later determined that court
lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that no constitutional concern is implicated when order does not
address merits of underlying suit, but only collateral issues); United States v. Key, 205 F.3d
773, 775 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (ruling on motions to supplement and correct record and for leave
to file exhibits with appellate reply brief in case where appellate jurisdiction was lacking). The
Court in U.S. Bancorp affirmed the principle that, if a case becomes moot, while the Court may
not consider its merits, it may dispose of the case as justice requires and enter orders that are
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appellate jurisdiction, the latter must dismiss the appeal,"S although it may

impose sanctions and enter housekeeping orders, where appropriate.' 8
In a number of instances, the Supreme Court has taken a hard line on the
necessity for appellatejurisdiction. For example, in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,18 9 the Court held that, once the appeals court had concluded that
an appeal from a final judgment was untimely, it lacked discretion to make its
jurisdictional ruling prospective only and to consider the merits of the case. 19'

The Court so concluded even though the consequence was that the losing

party never could appeal.191 The Court reached the same conclusion where an
appeals court lacked jurisdiction for want of an immediately appealable final
decision under the collateral order doctrine," and where the Federal Circuit
lacked statutory authority to hear a case but had acted on the merits in the

interest ofjustice when the circuit court of appeals to which it had transferred
necessary and appropriate to final disposition. U.S. Bancorp,513 U.S. at 21-22. There is some
inconsistency in federal appeals court decisions as to whether a court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction can properly impose a sanction that terminates a case on the merits. Compare Ray
v. Eyster, 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (deciding that court without subject matterjurisdiction may not impose sanction that will terminate case on merits) with Allen v. Exxon Corp., 102
F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissals with prejudice, imposed as sanctions,
despite district court's lack of subject matterjurisdiction).
187. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 & n.1, 1067 (7th Cir. 1981)
(stating that court of appeals must dismiss on its own motion when appellate jurisdiction is
lacking, and doing so in this case); State Fire & Cas. Co. v. Red Top Supermarkets, Inc., 304
F2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating that court of appeals without jurisdiction must dismiss
appeal, and doing so here); Lockwcod v. Hercules Powder Co., 172 F.2d 775, 776-77 (8th Cir.
1949) (stating that if appealed orders are not appealable, court of appeals is without jurisdiction
and must dismiss appeal, and doing so here); see also cases cited supra note 185.
188. See Judd v. Univ. of NM., 204 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing
appeal for lack of jurisdiction to consider its merits and concluding that court had jurisdiction
to impose filing restrictions on appellant); supra note 186.
189. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
190. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (explaining
reasons for appeals court's lack ofjurisdiction). The plaintiff had not filed the notice of appeal
within the time limits set by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(aXl) and (aX4), having
erroneously believed that the time to appeal did not begin to run until entry of the trial court's
attorney's fee award. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 197-98 (stating cause for untimely appeal).
191. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 203 (noting that judgment on merits was final when entered
and appealable at that time). Petitioner's failure to file timely appeal foreclosed his chance to
appeal. Id.
192. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,375-77,379 (1981) (holding that where court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear appeal under collateral order
doctrine, it was without authority to decide merits and could not make its jurisdictional ruling
prospective). The FirestoneCourt also noted that, in light of its conclusion that the Eighth
Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court had no occasion to address the issue of the
petitioner's standing to attack the order from which appeal had been taken, an order allowing
respondent to continue to represent the plaintiffs. Id. at 379 n.14.
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the appeal had denied its own jurisdiction and transferred the case back.193
"Equitable considerations
are altogether irrelevant when a court lacks adjudi1 94
catory power."
These scrupulous observances of the limits upon federal appellate jurisdiction do not occupy the field and tell the whole story, however. For example, the Court has reversed appellate judgments without reaching challenges
to the appeals courts' jurisdiction, in part on the basis of the "traditional practice" of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record discloses
other grounds of decision, whether or not the latter were properly raised by the
parties. Thus, in Neese v. Southern Railway Co.,195 the Court chose not to
reach a Seventh-Amendment-based challenge to the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on alleged excessiveness ofthe verdict."s The Court concluded instead that, on the record, the

court of appeals had erred in finding an abuse of discretion by the district
court in its denial of the new trial motion, upon a remittitur of part of the verdict."9 One could view this as an instance in which the Court assumed argu193. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988)
(vacating judgment of Federal Circuit and remanding with instructions to transfer case to Seventh Circuit, where Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction and its only choices therefore were to
dismiss or transfer case to court of appeals that had jurisdiction).
194. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing appeal for
want of jurisdiction upon conclusions that nonparty shareholders were entitled to appeal
judgment in shareholders' derivative action and finding, on equitable grounds, that such holding
could not be made prospective only), aff'd by an equally diidedcourt, Cal. Pub. Employees'
Ret Sys., 525 U.S. 315 (1999); see also El Paso Natural Gas. Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473,
482 (1999) (observing that neither Rule 4 nor Rule 26(b) of Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and perhaps referring to that set of Rules generally, nor interests animating crossappeal requirement, offered any leeway for making exceptions to cross-appeal requirement);
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,274-75 (1994) (mentioning that statutes repealing
grants of jurisdiction operate on pending cases and explaining that Court regards parties as
having "diminished reliance interests" in matters of procedure); McLucas v. De Champlain, 421
U.S. 21, 28-32 (1975) (carefully reviewing Supreme Court's own jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1252-53).
195. 350 U.S. 77 (1955).
196. See Neese v. S.Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77, 77-78 (1955) (reversing court of appeals while
refusing to comment on constitutional question ofjurisdiction when other grounds for decision
were available). The argument was that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution denies
appellate power to judge excessiveness of a verdict The Amendment states in pertinent part
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VIL
197. Neese, 350 U.S. at 77-78; see also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156,158
(1968) (stating that Court "had no occasion" to consider argument that court of appeals exceeded its constitutional or statutory powers in reviewing denial of motion to set aside verdict
as excessive, where it assumed, without deciding, that appeals court was empowered to make
review, and concluded that it nonetheless had erred in disturbing district court's denial of said
motion). The "traditional practice" of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the
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endo that the appellate court had jurisdiction and decided the case in favor of
the party challenging appellate jurisdiction.s
As Neese illustrates, in the appellate context, decisions "on the merits"
often are framed in procedural terms."9 Because appeals prototypically assert
that the district court judge erred in one or more ways, the issues presented on
appeal often are framed in procedural terms: did the district court judge err
in granting or denying a motion, in admitting or refusing to admit evidence,
in giving or refusing particular jury instructions, and the like? These issues
constitute "the merits" of the appeal, although they generally are one or more
steps removed from substantive law or fact questions.
In Norton v. Mathewsec the Court declined to decide whether the action

properly had been brought in a three-judge district court and hence whether

it correctly was before the Supreme Court on a direct appeal. 2 1 This time, the
Court justified its bypass of the appellate jurisdictional question on the
grounds that, because the merits question was decided in a companion case, 2°
resolution of the jurisdictional question would have had no effect on the
outcome: if its jurisdiction had correctly been invoked, the Court would have
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, and if jurisdiction were lacking, the Court would have dismissed the appeal, vacated the judgment, and
remanded, but the identical outcome would have been foreordained in subsequent proceedings before a single federal judge.20 3

It seems to me that the Court also has taken the position that other values
sometimes can predominate over the need for "actual" appellate jurisdiction.
This position seems implicit in the Court's prescription that, under "law of the
record discloses other grounds of decision does not explain the Court's assumption in Grunenthal
of power to undertake the challenged review under the Federal Employers' LiabilityAct See id.
at 156-57 (noting Court's grant of certiorari to review of Federal Employers' LiabilityAct).
198.
The party challenging appellate jurisdiction had won in the trial court, and thus opposed review of the denial of a motion for a new trial. The effect of finding error in the appeals
court's reversal of the trial court was to affirm the trial court's judgment on the merits. Thus,
the same party prevailed in the case as would have prevailed had the intermediate court of
appeals been held to lack jurisdiction, as is typical of hypothetical jurisdiction situations. See
infra text accompanying note 230.
199. See Neese, 350 U.S. at 77 (noting that procedural decision that court of appeals
abused its discretion acts as decision based on merits of case).
200. 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
201. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1976) (refusing to address jurisdictional issues).
202. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497-503,516 (1976) (upholding denial of social
security benefits to illegitimate children of deceased parent on grounds that Congress's failure
to extend presumption of dependency to illegitimate children not living with their parent at time
of parent's death did not constitute illegal discrimination).
203. See Norton, 427 U.S. at 525, 528-32 (discussing ramifications of Court's decision to
invoke jurisdiction); supra note 29.
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case" principles, if a transferee appellate court can find the transfer decision
"plausible," its jurisdictional inquiry should end so that cases do not become
the ball in a game of "jurisdictional ping-pong." 2° Thus, because law of the
case is not itselfjurisdictional, 2 °5 an appeals court can assume, without deciding, that it has jurisdiction over an appeal (based on law of the case), and proceed to decide the merits. In my view, that is close to an example of hypothetical (or assumed) appellate jurisdiction, although it is distinguishable from
most instances in that some court has addressed and decided the issue.
These cases illustrate that, in the context of appellate jurisdiction (as in
the realm of district courtjurisdiction), the Court has rendered some decisions
that have diluted the purity of the principle that courts must not resolve
contested questions "on the merits" when their jurisdiction is in doubt.
D. HypotheticalAppellate Jurisdictionbefore Steel Co.

1. The Theory
The standard formulation of the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction was
essentially that, "when the merits of the case are clearly against the party
seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record make the
case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question, [a court] may rule
on the merits without reaching the jurisdictional contention. '12 06 The primary

rationales for hypothetical jurisdiction were judicial economy and judicial
restraint, although it also could serve other institutional values. 2 07 Federal
204. Christianson v. Colt. Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,818-19 (1988).
205. Law of the case does not limit a court's power but merely embodies a practice of
courts to refuse, in general, to reopen what has been decided. See United States v. GamaBastidas, 222 F3d 779, 784-85 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that "law of the case" is not jurisdictional, but discretionary). See generallyJoan Steinman, Law of the Case: A JudicialPuzzle in
Consolidatedand TransferredCases and in MultidisbictLitigation,135 U. PA. L. REv. 595,
597-613 (1987) (describing how "law of the ease" precludes relitigation of issues within single
case and establishes rules of sound practice that permit progress toward judgment without
disabling courts from altering interlocutory decisions when appropriate); Allan D. Vestal, Law
ofthe Case: Single-SuitPreclusion,12 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1967) (describing and evaluating
how "law of the case" operates).
206. House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996). Professor
Idleman characterizes this as the standard formulation. Idleman, supra note 4, at 245. The
Court in Steel Co. summarized the doctrine as making it proper for a court to proceed to the
merits when the merits question is more readily resolved than jurisdictional objections and the
prevailing party on the merits would be the same as he who would prevail were jurisdiction
denied. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998); see Idleman, supra
note 4, at 246-47 (describing other formulations).
207. See Idleman, supranote 4, at 247, 312-13 (discussing rationales for hypothetical jurisdiction); infra text accompanying notes 226-27 (discussing institutional values); see also Comment, supra note 34, at 713 (arguing that "the principled exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction
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courts believed it permissible to reap these benefits and to slight the ordinary
sequence of decision because, with the litigation's outcome remaining the
same, there was no unfairness to the parties.
How do the doctrine and these justifications apply to hypothetical appellate jurisdiction?
a. Application of the Doctrine
The doctrine can apply to appellate jurisdiction. Cases on appeal can
pose merits questions that are more readily resolved than objections to the
appellate court's jurisdiction, and the prevailing party on the merits can be the
person who would prevail if appellate jurisdiction were denied. Questions of
appellate jurisdiction can be difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies
in the record can make a case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional
question.
b. Justifications: JudicialEconomy, JudicialRestraint, Other
InstitutionalValues, andFairness
(1) JudicialEconomy
The doctrine's requirement-thatthe merits be easily, oratleastmore easily,
resolved than the jurisdictional issue is a critical underpinning of the judicial
economy argument. Without relative ease of resolution, the economies to be
gained would be small.2"' But, if the merits are substantially easier to resolve
than the issues of appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court saves substantial
resources in focusing only on the former. There is economy in appellate judges
sparing themselves "the time and energy [required for] puzzling over the correct
answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assuming an easy answer
2°9
on the substantive merits) the same party would win or lose regardless."
Moreover, as Professor Idleman has written, "a circuit court's use ofthe doctrine essentially precludes certiorari review of the jurisdictional ruling, and, to
the extent the jurisdictional issue might have been clarified by further factfinding or argument, obviates the need for either a remand or for supplemental
briefing.1210 Thus, appellate use ofhypotheticaljurisdictionmay save resources
ofthe United States Supreme Court, ofintermediate appellate courts, of district
courts, and of participants in their processes. While Professor Idleman may
can avoid unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions, conserve judicial resources,
and aid in the administration ofjustice").
208. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 252-53 (explaining that judicial economy is gained
when outcome is same regardless if based on lack ofjurisdiction or on lack of merits). If the
jurisdictional issue were easily resolved, there would be no reason to bypass it. Id. at 254.
209. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).
210. Idleman, supra note 4, at 247.
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have been thinking primarily about courts of appeals hypothetically assuming
the districtcourt's jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits, his explication of
judicial economies to be gained by a hypothetical assumption ofjurisdiction
applies equally to appellate jurisdiction.2 '
As indicated above, the condition of exercising hypothetical jurisdiction
used by some courts, that the record or briefing of the jurisdictional issue be
inadequate, also relates to judicial economy."
Hypothetical jurisdiction under such circumstances plainly saves the
parties andthe court the time and resources that further development ofthe
record [or further brief-writing] would inevitably entail. In particular, to
the extent thejurisdictional question is tied to... undetermined facts, this
requirement makes most sense at the appellate level, where there is little
capacity for fact-finding and resolution of the jurisdictional issue would
therefore require a remand.213
The quoted statement holds true whether the jurisdictional question as to which
the record is inadequate, or that has not been adequately briefed, involves
district court or appellate jurisdiction.
By allowing a court to reach the merits, the exercise of hypothetical
jurisdiction, if permissible, also would enable courts, especially courts of
appeals, to establish precedent on merits issues, reducing uncertainty in the
substantive law. Particularly when that precedent would eliminate nonmeritorious suits, substantial economies would result for both courts and parties.214
However, to the extent that hypothetical jurisdiction would be exercised in
situations that are easy to resolve on the merits precisely because precedent
already has been set on the issue presented, this argument loses much of its
punch.
Prior to Steel Co., the discretionary nature ofthe Supreme Court's jurisdiction," 5 the low probability that the Court would grant certiorari in any
211. Of course, as Idleman observes, the failure to confront a jurisdictional question can
be uneconomical insofar as it creates or perpetuates uncertainty and future litigation over the
same jurisdictional issue. Id. at 248, 255-56. Moreover, the assertion of hypothetical jurisdiction where jurisdiction, if examined, would be found not to exist, is uneconomical insofar as it
keeps courts engaged in adjudicating cases that they otherwise would have dismissed (in the
case of a district court) or remanded (in the case of an appellate court). See id. at 256 (noting
how judicial economy may be lost if courts utilize hypothetical jurisdiction to avoid deciding
jurisdictional issues).
212. Id. at257-58.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 310 (explaining attraction to courts of using hypothetical jurisdiction to
eliminate suits without merit).
215. Where a statute provides for "appeal" to the Supreme Court and appellate review is
requested, the Court is obligated to take and decide a case. However, under current statutes,
almost all cases go to the Court by writ of certiorari, and the Court has unfettered discretion as
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particular case,216 and the Supreme Court's apparent approval of hypothetical
appellate jurisdiction, gave courts of appeals minimal reason to fear a Supreme Court reversal founded upon their exercise of hypothetical appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, courts ofappeals could largely rest assured that their efforts
on the merits would not be wasted." 7 After Steel Co., the risk is far greater
that the Supreme Court will reverse, require attention to the issue of appellate
jurisdiction, and create the risk that the appellate court's decision on the
merits will have to be vacated.
(2) JudicialRestraint
As Professor Idleman has noted, "[I]t is rather ironic to depict the assumption of jurisdiction as an act of 'restraint' . .. when there may be no
jurisdiction at all."21 Nonetheless, the argument that exercise of hypothetical
jurisdiction is an exercise in judicial restraint has roots in the canon that a
court should not decide a constitutional question when it can decide a case on
to whether to grant the writ. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§10.3.2 (3d ed. 1999) (distinguishing between writs of certiorari and direct appeals). Rule 10
of the Supreme Court Rules states that "[a] petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only
for compelling reasons," and indicates that the reasons that the Court will consider include
whether a matter is an important federal question and is a subject on which federal courts of
appeals or such courts and state courts of last resort, or state courts of last resort among
themselves, are in conflict; whether an important question of federal law should be settled by
the Court; whether an important lower federal court decision conflicts with decisions of the
Court; and whether a decision has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial
proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court's supervisory power. SUP. CT. R. 10.
216. Data compiled by the Harvard Law Review for the 1996-99 Supreme Court Terms
(the last Terms for which the data has been published, at present) indicates that review was
granted in the following percentage of cases in which it was sought: 1996-97 Term: 3.6%;
1997-98 Term: 3.56%; 1998-99 Term: 3.5%. See TheSupreme Court 1998 Term-TheStatistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400,406-07 (1999) (discussing statistics of numbers of cases reaching
Supreme Court); The Supreme Cour4 1997 Term- The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 37273 (1998) (same); The Supreme Cour4 1996 Term - The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431-35
(1997) (same). The notes to the respective tables explain how the figures were derived.
For a combination of reasons, it also was unlikely that the issue of the propriety of hypothetical jurisdiction ever would have been squarely presented. Among other things, if the lower
court was correct on the merits, which it likely would be on a merits issue viewed as easily
resolved, the losing party would not likely seek appellate review because the alternative outcome of dismissal from federal court for lack ofjurisdiction, to be left to a state court proceeding that would likely reach the same result, would not be attractive. See Idleman, supra note
4, at 278, 305-08 (listing reasons why losing parties may choose not to appeal).
217. In the wake of Steel Co., the Supreme Court could grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and reverse for reconsideration in light of Steel Co., if the Court thought that a court of
appeals was guilty of impermissibly exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction.
218. Idleman, supra note 4, at 249. Idleman then argues that the actual applications of
hypothetical jurisdiction do not fit comfortably with the restraint rationale. Id. at 250-52.
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another basis.219 This rationale can apply in the context of appellate jurisdiction when the jurisdictional issues to be foregone are of constitutional stature,
as issues of mootness may be. The restraint argument also may be rooted in
an idea that courts should, if possible, avoid decisions ofjurisdictional questions that touch upon delicate matters of separation of powers, as issues of
justiciability may do." ° This rationale can apply in the context of appellate
jurisdiction, because issues ofjusticiability (including limitations on adjudication of "political questions") can be presented in the context of appellate jurisdiction. By contrast, the rationale that avoidance of ajurisdictional issue can
further the values of federalism by "minimiz[ing] the intrusion of the federal
judiciary into the business of the states" (for example, when the imunity of
states or state officials would be in question)"1 seems not to be as relevant
when intermediate appellate, rather than federal district court, jurisdiction is
the focus of attention. While district court jurisdiction typically has federalism implications because the litigation that the federal courts are not empowered to hear typically belongs to the state judiciaries, the division of authority
between federal trial and intermediate appellate courts is, for the most part, a
matter of federal concern only.2" The exercise of federal appellate jurisdic219. Id. at 248. The Supreme Court has counseled that federal courts should not decide
constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so; thus, a federal court should consider
whether there is a non-constitutional ground of decision, and, if there is, should decide the case
on that ground. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (implementing requirement that, prior to reaching constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for decision, by considering whether district courts have authority under Federal
Rules to impose sweeping limits on communications by named plaintiffs and their counsel to
prospective class members, and deciding case under Federal Rules, despite Court's grant of
certiorari to decide whether order so limiting such communications was constitutionally permissible); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (summarizing rules through which Court has avoided passing upon constitutional questions, including rule that Court will not pass upon properly presented constitutional question
if record presents some other ground on which case may be decided); Burton v. Unitcd States,
196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (noting that it is not "habit" of Court to decide constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary to decision of case). However, the canon permits courts to
avoid constitutional questions only "where the saving construction is not 'plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress,'" Miller v. French, 530 U.S.327, 341 (2000) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988)), and where the court is not pressing statutory construction "to the point of disingenuous
evasion." George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373,379 (1933).
220. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 248-49 (noting that political question doctrine implicates separation of powers concerns).
221.
Id. at 249.
222. Professor Rhonda Wasserman traced the bar of appellate review of remand orders in
an effort to relieve the Supreme Court of an overloaded docket in the days prior to the creation
of the intermediate federal appellate courts, a rationale that has long since lost its relevance. See
Rhonda Wasserman, RethinkingReview ofRemands: ProposedAmendments to the Federal
RemovalStatute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83,100-01 (1994) (explaining rationale behind bar of appellate
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tion can, however, continue an intrusion of the federal judiciary into the business ofthe states. Moreover, when the jurisdiction ofthe U.S. Supreme Court
to hear appeals from the highest court of a state is the focus, avoidance of a
jurisdictional issue can further the values of federalism by minimizing intrusion of the federal judiciary into the business of the states. For example,
intrusion might be avoided if the Court declined to question the clarity of a
declaration by the highest court of a state that its decision was supported by
an adequate and independent state ground.' Under current law, however, if
the adequacy and independence of the state ground is not sufficiently clear,
the Court will review the state court decision, rather than dismiss the case,
vacate for clarification, or take some other less intrusive tack.'
Insofar as courts, in deciding whether to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction, also looked to whether decision of the jurisdictional issues would have
far-reaching implications (seeking to avoid decision of such issues, as a matter
of self-restraint) and gave this prong of the test a meaning independent of
concerns about separation of powers or federalism,' the focus became
review of remand orders). However, the bar has both additional purposes and effects that relate
to federalism: it reduces disruption of state judicial proceedings with the concomitant delay and
possible harassment that appeal of a remand order might entail, but when the remand is erroneous, the bar has the effect of denying defendants the congressionally conferred right to litigate,
in a federal forum, claims within the district courts' jurisdiction. Id. at 108, 132; see Heaton v.
Monogram Credit Card Bank, 231 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that justification for rule of
non-review of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) remands is preventing delay in trial of remanded cases by
extended litigation over jurisdictional issues); Comment, Removal, Waiver, and the Myth of
UnreviewableRemand in the Fifth Circuit,45 BAYLORL.REV. 723,735, 748 (1993) (noting that
bar furthers state court's interest in speedy resolution of merits). For criticisms of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), see Michael E. Solomine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming FederalAppellate
Review, 58 Mo. L. REV.287,232-33 (1993) (arguing that § 1447(d) needs to be repealed or
modified); Joan Steinman, PostremovalChanges in the PartyStructure ofDiversity Cases: the
OidLaw, the New Law, andRule 19,38 KAN. L. REV. 863,951-54 (1990) (describing perverse
aspects of law governing reviewability of remands and dismissals); Joan Steinman, Removal,
Reman4 andReview in PendentClaim andPendentParyCases,41 VAND. L. REV. 923,1007
(1988) (arguing that Congress "should reconsider the statutory prohibition against appellate
review of remand orders").
223. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1041 (1983) (declaring that "[i]f the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is... based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we... will not undertake to review the decision").
224. See id.at 1038-39 (discussing various approaches Court historically had taken when
unsure whether state court decision was supported by adequate and independent state grounds).
Thus, one might conclude that the notion that avoidance of jurisdictional issues can further
federalism by minimizing intrusion into the business of the states now seems inapplicable in the
context of Supreme Court review of final decisions from the highest court of a state because it
is only by questioning its jurisdiction, on grounds such as the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine, that the Supreme Court can avoid intrusion upon state judiciaries.
225. Idleman indicates that some courts conflated these concerns. See Idleman, supra note
4, at 254-55 (stating that, if implications of jurisdictional determination were few, "restraintrelated concerns, such as the separation of powers and federalism, would likely be minimized").
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whether the jurisdictional decision would likely affect large numbers of litigants. In the context of appellate jurisdiction, this prong would "mean" that,
other things being equal, an appellate court would tend to hypothetically
assume (rather than decide an issue of) appellate jurisdiction if decision ofthe
issue would likely affect large numbers of appellants or appellees, more than
when the issue would likely affect few, if any, parties beyond those presently
before the court.
(3) OtherInstitutionalValues
Exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction may (a) contribute to reasoned
judgments as to the circumstances in which federal courts may reserve difficult questions ofjurisdiction in favor of deciding more easily resolved merits
issues; 6 (b) avoid disagreements with coordinate federal courts onjurisdictional issues, thereby avoiding inconsistency; (c) lead to the resolution of
substantive law issues; and (d) conserve federal judicial resources by dismiss-

ig claims on grounds that would prevent the parties from later re-asserting
those claims.'

7

These values can be served by hypothetical appellate jurisdic-

tion, as well as by hypothetical district court jurisdiction.
When it is unclear how a jurisdictional question should be resolved, an
error in concluding thatjurisdiction exists or an arguendo assumptionthatjurisdiction exists seems less serious than a clearly erroneous assertion ofjurisdic-

tion. For that reason, at least arguably, competing policies such as those favoring the avoidance of constitutional questions, conserving judicial energy, and
improving judicial administration in other respects, mightjustify the assertion

of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction in cases involving difficult jurisdictional
issues as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion."
226. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 110-11 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (opining that Court's opinion should not be read to exhaustively list circumstances
in which federal courts may exercise judgment in reserving difficult questions of jurisdiction
when case could be resolved on merits in favor of same party). See generally Idleman, supra
note 4, at 312-13 (noting that courts' use of hypothetical jurisdiction can preserve institutional
values of federal courts - "exercise of judgment, respect for coordinate federal courts, and
maintenance of the Article Ill judiciary as a forum for meritorious suits"); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: TheJusticesofRulesandStandards, 106 HARV.
L. REv.24, 79-80 n.395 (1992) (discussing reasoned judgment, described as capacity which,
by tradition, courts always have exercised, and reasoned elaboration, described as judicial
method that requires judges to investigate and to creatively extend purposes of legislature).
227.
These grounds would include failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted,
particular parties' lack of standing to sue, and the like. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 313
(noting that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Steel Co. sought to avoid limiting federal courts'
use ofreasoned judgment in reserving difficult issues ofjurisdiction).
228. See Comment,supra note 34, at 727,729-32 (listing advantages injudicial economies
gained by courts' use of hypothetical jurisdiction, especially in cases where jurisdictional issues
could go either way).
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It also may be that appellate courts, by virtue of their place in the judicial
system, should have greater discretion than district courts to exercise hypothet-

ical jurisdiction. Although intermediate courts of appeals (unlike the Supreme
Court) do not have predominantly discretionary dockets, it can be argued that
they too should have some ability to postpone decision of certain issues, while
those issues percolate through other courts or while other events transpire that
facilitate resolution. Exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction could be a useful

tool for allowing the resolution of jurisdictional issues to be postponed to a
time when a court can better resolve the issues,' a tool that augments the
jurisdictional discretion that appellate courts have under such statutes and rules
as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f), and onpetitions for extraordinary writs.
(4) Avoidance of Unfairness
The requirement that the merits be resolved against the party seeking
appellate jurisdiction also is essential to the exercise of hypothetical appellate

jurisdiction. If a court dismisses for lack of appellatejurisdiction, the decision
below stands. Thus, a court can assume hypothetical appellate jurisdiction
only if its decision on the merits has the same consequence as a dismissal for
lack of appellate jurisdiction would have; that is, only if its decision on the
merits goes againstthe appellant, who seeks appellate jurisdiction, and favors
the challenger of appellate jurisdiction, who would be the winner below and
the appellee. The effect of either a dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction

or a decision on the merits must be the equivalent of an afflrmance.

°

This "fits" with the theory that, since the litigation's outcome is the same
whether the route to it is jurisdictional or on the merits, there is no unfairness
to the parties in slighting the ordinary sequence of decision. In the context of
229. See also id. at 732,744 n.172 (arguing that "[c]onsiderations ofjudicial economy...
justify allowing the range of discretion to increase with the degree of authority attaching to the
court's judgment").
230. For example, assume that plaintiff P wins in the trial court, defendant D appeals, and
P challenges appellate jurisdiction. A successful challenge to jurisdiction would lead to dismissal of the appeal and maintenance ofP's win at trial. The appeals court can assume hypothetical appellate jurisdiction only if its decision on the merits is in favor of P and against
appellant D, who seeks appellate jurisdiction. Similarly, assume that defendant D wins in the
trial court, plaintiff P appeals, and D challenges appellate jurisdiction. A successful challenge
to jurisdiction would lead to dismissal of the appeal and maintenance of D's win at trial. The
appeals court can assume hypothetical appellate jurisdiction only if its decision on the merits
is in favor ofD and against appellant P,who seeks appellate jurisdiction.
As others have noted, by contrast, when one's focus is district court jurisdiction, it is not
true that the consequence is the same whether a court rules for a party on jurisdictional grounds
or on the merits, for res judicata effects will attach only to a decision on the merits. Moreover,
"[p]rivate agreements among the parties or between the parties and their attorneys or indemnitors may also be affected by the form of the court's decision." Clow v. United States Dep't
of Housing & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 627 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting).
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hypothetical district court jurisdiction, there may be unfairness if a party
suffers an adverse judgment on the merits - which presumptively will have res
judicata effect - when the judgment-rendering court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the judgment and when an appeals court that did not hypothetically
assume the district court's jurisdiction would have vacated the judgment and
simply dismissed the case without prejudice.3 1 This argument of unfairness
is inapplicable in the context of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction, however.
As long as the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and
personal jurisdiction over the parties, its final judgment on the merits, if any,
is valid, and is entitled to res judicata effects, regardless of whether the
appellate court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the appeal and affirmed the
judgment 2 It is not clear that the losing party is treated unfairly by the use
of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction except in the sense that one might
loosely say it is "unfair" for an appellate court to assert jurisdiction over an
appeal, and render a decision on the merits against a party, when it lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Other litigants, who find themselves faced with an
adverse precedent that the appeals court really did not have jurisdiction to
create, seem to have a stronger argument of "unfairness" than the losing party
in the case giving rise to the precedent.3
231.
See Idleman, supra note 4, at 253-54 (opining that adverse judgment, with prejudice,
is unjust when courts lack jurisdiction, and that similarly-situated litigants might receive
jurisdictional dismissal from different panel).
232. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22 (1994)
(implying binding effect ofjudgments that are not reviewed on appeal in explaining that vacatur
"clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties" (quoting United States
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,40 (1950))). See generally JACK I-. FRiEDENTHALET AL,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.7, at 666 (3d ed. 1999) (expounding upon requirements for application
of res judicata that there be valid, final, judgment on merits, and noting that "[miost courts treat
ajudgment as final.. . if it conclusively disposes of the lawsuit in the rendering court, notwithstanding that an appeal has been taken or the time to appeals has not expired."); supra note 230
(explaining assertion that appellate court would be affirming trial court's judgment).
233.
The litigants would not have any due process or similar argument because they would
be bound by the judgment of the trial court, which had jurisdiction, and there is no constitutional right to an appeal. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (observing in
felony case that there is no "constitutional right to appeal"); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 656 (1977) (stating that it is well established that there is no constitutional right to appeal
of conviction); Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520, 525 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
in federal courts there is no right to appeal save as it is granted by Congress or by rule of court
authorized by Congress); United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reiterating that there is no constitutional right to appeal, and that would-be appellant must find
right to appeal in applicable statute). If the appeals court truly lacked jurisdiction, however, its
decision on the merits might be subject to collateral attack. See Mark ALHall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 404 n.24 (1986) (arguing that if
untimeliness of appeal were truly jurisdictional defect, decision on merits of untimely appeal
would be forever subject to collateral attack). Ordinarily, a party that had an opportunity to
litigate subject matter jurisdiction may not reopen that issue in a collateral attack. See Ins. Corp.
of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (noting that
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2. The Practice
Although exercised far less often than hypothetical jurisdiction concerning matters going to district court jurisdiction, hypothetical appellatejurisdiction had been exercised by the intermediate federal appellate courts. They had
done all of the following:
- bypassed the jurisdictional question whether appellant had timely filed
its notice of appeal, because of a factual dispute as to when appellant's Rule

59(e) motion was served;

4

- assumed, without deciding, that a notice of appeal adequately named
the court to which the appeal was being taken, as required by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3(c); 5
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of a criminal sentence, assuming, without deciding, that a plea agreement did not bar
the defendant's appeal, where the agreement contained a waiver of the right
to appeal a sentence within an indicated range but the district court had told
the defendant that he could
appeal the sentence if he thought there was any6
thing illegal about it;2
asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over particular decisions
by the Interstate Commerce Commission where the decision of a segment of
a case as to which appellate jurisdiction was clear fully determined the outprinciples of res judicata apply to jurisdictional issues); see also Comment, HypotheticalJurisdictionandlnterjurisdictionalPreclusion:
A "Comity" ofErrors,28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 85, 99100 (2000) (urging that state courts should be free to relitigate non-merits issues that federal
courts have decided when exercising hypothetical jurisdiction).
234. Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1147 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). The
reference is to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Karacsonyi v.
United States, No. 97-1220, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15107, at *4 (2d Cir. June 10, 1998)
(concluding that court did not have to decide whether particular motion was civil or criminal
and how long appellant had to appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(aX1) and
(b), where appeal was meritless in any event); United States v. Sheckley, No. 96-1786, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 32024 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) (same); United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27,
29 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (questioning whether district court had jurisdiction to entertain motion
for reconsideration long after appeal period had expired, but foregoing issue where appeal was
easily resolved in favor of party challenging appellate jurisdiction).
235. See Brooks v. Toyotomi Co., Ltd, 86 F.3d 582, 583, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (accepting appeal and dismissing appeal on merits, thus allowing district court judgment to stand). The
Brooks court explicitly chose to pretermit the jurisdictional issue because it was strongly
inclined to hold that appellate jurisdiction existed - where defects in the notice of appeal did
not mislead or prejudice appellees and a proper notice would not have told them anything they
could not readily have inferred - but it was concerned that such a decision would conflict with
a holding of the Sixth Circuit sitting en bane. Id. Brooks's vitality, in light of Steel Co., was
subsequently questioned in United States v. Webb, 157 F.3d 451,453 (6th Cir. 1998). See also
Caribbean Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Autoridad de las Navieras, 901 F.2d 196, 197 (1st Cir. 1990)
(assuming that court had jurisdiction despite errors in notices of appeal and finding appellants'
arguments to be without merit).
236. United States v. Shepard, 207 F3d 455,456 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000).
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come of the segment (composed of other ICC decisions) as to which appellate
jurisdiction was disputed;"sl
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the grant of a motion
for summary judgment and indeed over an entire case, despite the lack of a
Rule 54(b) certification, where the claims that technically were not yet resolved would be governed by law ofthe case on pure questions of law;
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of an order
requiring a witness to appear in response to an IRS summons, where the
appellee conceded error as to the matter appealed; 9
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over orders ofthe Federal
Communications
Commission, while bypassing issues of prudential stand4
ing; O
asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over district court orders,
without resolving whether the rulings were immediately appealable under
the collateral order doctrine or otherwise as final decisions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291;241
237. Burlington N. R.R. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 592-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (invoking
hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine rather than resolving questions of appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1336(b) and 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d), where resolving merits-issues required no extra
expenditure of judicial resources because court had necessarily resolved those same issues in
portion of case over which court plainly had jurisdiction); see also Kaiser v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 513-14 (1st Cir. 1989) (assuming, without deciding, that court had
jurisdiction over plaintiffs whose names did not appear in notice of appeal where court held that
named appellant's action was time-barred and no argument was raised below that other plaintiffs' claims stood on any different footing with respect to statute of limitations); S. Pao. Transp.
Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976), (concluding that where finding that court
lacked jurisdiction would produce same result as decision on merits and merits already were
before court in other cases, court would not reach question whether order appealed from was
reviewable).
238. Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., 931 F.2d 599,601 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
240. Busse Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 1456, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The FCC
argued, inter alia, that the appellants lacked prudential standing to challenge its waiver of its
"duopoly rule." Id. at 1462. Although the court was unsure whether a situation had to meet all
the usual requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine before the court could bypass a
prudential standing issue, the court concluded that the case met all the usual criteria [of the
merits being clearly against the party seeking jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question being
exceptionally difficult and far-reaching, and inadequacies in the briefing making the case a poor
vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question]. Id. In addition, the parties who had lost below
had filed a notice of appeal under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) and a petition for review under 47
U.S.C. § 402(a). Id. at 1460. On the ground that its analysis would be the same either way, the
court also did not decide which provision governed. Id.
241. Crocoo v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998). The ruling in question
remanded a claim to an ERISA plan administrator. The circuits are split on whether such orders
are final appealable orders. See id. Compare Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive
Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 978-80 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding remands to ERISA
plan administrators to be final appealable decisions), and Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d
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asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction in the face of unresolved
questions of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as well as unresolved
questions concerning the standing to appeal of the appellants and concerning
whether some appellants had waived their right to appeal;24 2

327, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), with Petralia v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 114 F.3d
352, 354 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that remands to ERISA plan administrators are not "final
judgment[s]"), and Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 55 F.3d 561, 563-64 (lth Cir. 1995)
(holding that such remands are not final appealable decisions). The Second Circuit in Crocco
also reversed the district court's determination that Xerox, plaintiff's employer, was a proper
party, without discussion of whether the court had pendent appellate jurisdiction over that
ruling. Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109. The court noted that the remedy plaintiff sought, the award
of benefits, was available without Xerox's presence as a party. Id.; see also SEC v. Am. Capital
Inv., Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1136, 1139-42 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that where court had
jurisdiction over appeal of one order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(aXl), court properly exercised
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over appeals of additional orders whose status as final
appealable orders was unclear, appeal of which may have been rendered moot, and as to one of
which it was unclear whether appeal had been timely); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710,
715 (1st Cir. 1996) (asserting jurisdiction over appeal from denial of motion to dismiss counts
of indictment on double jeopardy/multiple punishment grounds where immediate appealability
of order was unclear but merits would be resolved in favor of party challenging jurisdiction);
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380, 382 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (addressing merits of interlocutory
appeal of denial of qualified immunity, despite contention that there were unresolved pendent
state claims, to serve judicial economy and because district court may have thought that its
ruling disposed of all claims); R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Howard Communications Corp.,
980 F.2d 823, 829 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that court did not need to resolve whether lower
court's finding of civil contempt was appealable because fine and sanctions were warranted);
FDIC v. Caledonia Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 380-81 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming on merits after
assuming that appellate jurisdiction would exist despite absence of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 54(b) certification where judgment was rendered that disposed of fewer than
all claims in consolidated action but all claims in component thereof); Locals 2222, 2320-2327,
]BEW v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 644, 646-47 (1st Cir. 1980) (assuming,
without deciding, that order remanding to arbitration was appealable where jurisdictional question was "close" and overlapped with central substantive issue on merits and where district
court's decision would be sustained whether appellate jurisdiction was exercised or not); Massachusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143, 145 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) (choosing not to resolve close issue of
appealability concerning whether interlocutory order in question arose in proceeding in bankruptcy or in controversy arising in bankruptcy proceeding where merits compelled affirmance
and court's views on merits might provide useful guidance in similar situations); Brick v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 547 F.2d 185,186-87 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming denial of class certification and
denial of re-transfer of case, based on arguendo assumption that appeal was allowable under
'death knell' doctrine).
242. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (7th Cir. 1996) (exercising hypothetical
appellate jurisdiction and affirming class action settlement in face of issues as to whether approval of settlement fell within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aXl), as to whether objectors lacked standing
to appeal because they had failed to intervene, had been denied intervention or for other
reasons, and as to whether some of objectors had waived their right to appeal); see also Markgraf v. Storage Tech. Corp., No. 97-1166, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1237, at *6-7 (10th Cir. Jan.
28, 1998) (assuming appellant's standing to appeal in favor of resolving merits, which were
much easier to resolve); New York by Vacco v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir.
1996) (concluding first that non-intervening beneficiaries of parens patriae suit had no standing
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-

asserted hypothetical jurisdiction rather than resolve whether an issue

could properly be heard under the doctrine ofpendent appellate jurisdiction;243
assumed jurisdiction arguendo where it had been argued that the
appeal should be dismissed as moot;2'
- declined to decide whether appellate jurisdiction was precluded by 28
U.S.C. §24
1447(d),
where the challenger ofjurisdiction easily prevailed on other
5
grounds;
asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction to review a final order
excluding an alien from the United States pursuant to the court's habeas jurisdiction, despite uncertainty as to whether § 440 (a) of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act affected that jurisdiction, when the court had
determined that petitioner was not entitled to relief in any event;246
asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a

judgment of conviction and sentence, despite the absence of a certificate of

appealability 47 and without addressing the appellate court's jurisdiction to

to appeal approval of settlement, then reviewing merits of their claims in view of circuit split
on standing to appeal of absent class members and citing other cases in which courts had
assumed standing arguendo or purported to make alternative holdings on merits); United States
v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767 n.6 (lst Cir. 1995) (entertaining criminal defendant's argument
that his trial and conviction transgressed principle of specialty, among other reasons because
it was easier to dismiss his arguments on merits than to resolve dispute over whether criminal
defendant has standing to raise such violation); In re Villa Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc., 984 F.2d
546, 548 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (bypassing question whether district court order was appealable
injunction, to resolve merits).
243. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 104-05 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding
that regardless of whether refusal to allow set-off was appealable in conjunction with appeal of
confirmation of arbitration award or otherwise, refusal was not legal error so jurisdictional issue
did not need to be decided).
244. See RNR Enters., Inc. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that
interests in judicial efficiency and restraint justified arguendo assumption of jurisdiction and
consideration of merits where jurisdictional issue as to mootness was not previously decided
and was difficult, issue was of constitutional stature, oral argument had indicated that further
evidence might be necessary, the legal argumentation provided was incomplete, issue was "farreaching" because it concerned investigative powers of administrative agency, and merits clearly
favored party challenging appellate jurisdiction).
245. Menorah Ins. Co. v. I Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218,223 n.9 (lst Cir. 1995).
246. Hemandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118 F.3d 1034,1045-47 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Wong v. Ilchert, 998 F.2d 661,662-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction
over appeal of order granting summary judgment against plaintiff in his action to enjoin INS and
others from deporting him, when that jurisdictional question was far more difficult than issue
on merits).
247. The certificate is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (1994), in some circumstances. See Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2000), cerL denied, 531 U.S. 1087
(2001) (stating that, when habeas petitioner seeks to appeal dismissal of his petition after effective date of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), right to appeal is governed by certificate of appealability requirements established by that statute). But see Walker
v. O'Brien, 216 F3d 626 (7th Cir.), cert denied, Hanks v. Pinfrock, 121 S. Ct.606 (2000)
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grant or deny such a certificate in the absence of a district court ruling on
whether to grant one; 248 and
- bypassed various other issues, characterized by the courts as jurisdictional, in favor of deciding cases more easily on merits grounds. 49
I will not undertake here to assess whether each one of these assertions of
hypothetical jurisdiction was justified under the specific, and somewhat
varying, conditions that the various courts of appeals had established as necessary for an exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction. I am not so much concerned
here with how well the courts respected the doctrinal requirements that they
themselves framed as I am with whether and when hypothetical jurisdiction is
theoretically defensible in the context of appellate jurisdiction and with how
much in tension the doctrine, in that context, is with the Supreme Court's
denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel Co. In a later Part, I will
indicate how I believe these exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction fare
against those standards. First, however, I want to explore what, if any, helpful
perspective can be shed by other doctrines concerning appellate jurisdiction.
(concluding that state prisoners' habeas petitions challenging constitutionality of prison disciplinary proceedings as to fact or duration of confinement are not subject to AEDPA's certificate
of appealability requirement).
248. United States v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 740-42 &n.4 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case,
decided after Steel Co., the court reasoned that, if it determined not to issue the certificate
because the appellant failed to demonstrate his entitlement to one, it would find that the court
lacked jurisdiction to proceed. Id. If it were to find itselfpowerless to issue the certificate, the
same consequence would follow. Id. It said, "In these circumstances,... Steel Co. does not
preclude us from treating Williams's notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability
and then denying it on the merits without first determining that Williams was not obliged initially
to apply to the district court." Id. at 742. While the court recognized that it might have been
appropriate to dismiss the appeal or remand to the district court for it to consider whether to grant
a certificate of appealability, it chose not to do so because appellant's attorney acted in good
faith, the result reached on the merits was straightforward, and the court did not want to protract
the proceedings. Id. at 742 n.4; see also United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470,474-75 (3d Cir.
1997) (bypassing problems with certificate of appealability that could be considered jurisdictional, on basis of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine, in part because order appealed from was
undoubtedly final and only statutory provisions relating to such certificates cast doubt on court's
jurisdiction)..
I intend the list in text, supra,at notes 234-49 to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
249. See United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 22 n3 (1st Cir. 1994) (bypassing question,
characterized by court as jurisdictional, whether criminal defendant's constitutional challenges
tojury composition are barred if not made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (1994), when
jurisdictional question was difficult, parties had not raised it, and appellant would lose argument
on merits); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (in action to enjoin
enforcement of state court judgment as violating plaintiff's First Amendment rights, declining
to consider whether plaintiff had alleged state action sufficient to establish federal claim, stating
that, to extent presence of state action is jurisdictional requirement, case was appropriate for
assuming jurisdiction arguendo because state action issue was highly complex, its resolution
posed high risk of being constitutionally erroneous, and judgment could be affirmed under wellsettled principles ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel).
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3. The Perspective Shed by Other Doctrines Concerning
Appellate Jurisdiction
In the cases described above, the courts acted upon assumed or hypothesized appellate jurisdiction. In other cases, appellate courts found other ways
to justify their exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
a. CharacterizingPotentialBarriersas Non-Jurisdictional
Appellate courts sometimes have found that they had authority to address

merits issues after characterizing as non-jurisdictional matters that otherwise
would have precluded the courts' consideration of those issues or cases." 0
For example, courts of appeals generally hold that they have jurisdiction to

reach the merits of issues and of arguments not considered by the district court
and first raised on appeal. Generally, they will not reach such matters, but the
courts categorize the governing principle as a rule of practice that is subject
to exceptions and leaves them discretion."' The Supreme Court has done
250. See Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 865 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (indicating that
district court certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(aX3) that appeal could not be taken in
good faith is not jurisdictional bar to appeal); United States v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d
1034, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (determining that failure to advise appellant of his right, under
treaty, to contact his consul was not jurisdictional defect and was therefore foreclosed by his
plea of guilty to being alien found in United States after deportation).
251. See Singletonv. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,120-21 (1976) (stating that what questions may
be addressed for first time on appeal is.left primarily to discretion of courts of appeals and
recognizing that there are circumstances in which federal appellate court is justified in resolving
issue not passed upon below, such as when proper resolution is beyond doubt or where injustice
otherwise might result); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-59 (1941) (stating that rule
that appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues not raised below is essential so that
litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision of issues upon which they had no
opportunity to present evidence or legal argument, but adding that "[a] rigid and undeviating...
practice under which courts of review would invariably... decline to consider all questions
which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with... the rules
of fundamental justice"); United States v. Torres-Rosa, 209 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating
that, "'absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the
lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal,"' and that this principle applies with
undiluted force in criminal cases (quoting Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp.
Co., 953 F.2d 17,21 (1st Cir. 1992)); Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stating principles recited in text); Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000)
(applying principle that appellate courts are free to decline consideration of arguments made for
first time on appeal); Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.5 (1 lth Cir. 1998)
(exercising discretion to reach theories to support district court's jurisdiction, argued and
supported by evidence but not decided below, where record was more than adequate, and
judicial economy and fairness favored disposition of all asserted grounds); Ochran v. United
States, 117 F.3d 495, 502-03 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating these principlef, noting underlying
policies, including that of avoiding prejudice to parties and serving judicial economy, and that
little gain in judicial economy is achieved by refusing to consider pure legal arguments, as to
which review is de novo; observing that court is justified in exercising its discretion to hear
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something similar in repeatedly declining to decide whether the "not pressed
or passed upon below" rule 2 is jurisdictional or merely pmdential." The
Court usually says that it need not decide the character of the rule because,
even assuming that the rule is merely prudential, the circumstances presented
justify no exception. 4 By leaving the issue unresolved, however, the Court
has left the door open to characterizing the rule as non-jurisdictional and
entertaining unpressed, unaddressed issues if and when appropriate circumstances are presented z 55
A second example: Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)(3) provides
for the filing of a cross-appeal within fourteen days after the date when the
first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by
Rule 4(a), whichever ends later.' Courts of appeals permit appellees who
newly raised argument where interest of substantial justice is at stake; and reaching issue presented for first time on appeal where proper resolution was beyond doubt). See generally Note,
PushingAside the GeneralRule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985,
1005-13 (1989) (examining general rule and principal exceptions, and proposing rule stating
circumstances under which new issue should be heard on appeal).
252. This rule is that a federal claim must have been addressed by, or at least properly
presented to, a state court before the Supreme Court will entertain it
253. See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 90 (1997) (concluding as described in
text at notes 249-50); Yee v. City ofEscondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992) (same); Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79 (1988) (same; noting that "[e]arly opinions seemed
to treat the requirement as jurisdictional, whereas more recent cases clearly view the rule as
merely a prudential restriction"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,217-24 (1983) (discussing "not
pressed or passed upon below" rule); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (1997)
(describing Court as having found itself without jurisdiction to decide issue in Sochor v.
Florida,504 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1992), because defendant had failed to preserve his objection
in state courts, and his failure was adequate and independent ground for state court's ruling).
The Court has concluded that in cases arising in federal courts the "not pressed or passed
upon below" rule is only prudential. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n,2 (1980) (stating
that, while Court normally does not decide issues that were not presented below, it may do so).
The Court chose to entertain such a question when respondent did not object, the issue was
squarely presented and fully briefed, and was an important, recurring issue, so that interests of
judicial administration would be served by addressing it Id.
254. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83,90-92 (1997); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519, 533 (1992); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1988); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,221-24 (1983).
255.
So long as the Court is declining to hear issues, it is not exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over them. If and when it should desire to hear an unpressed, unaddressed
issue, it would seem under Steel Co. that the Court would have to address whether it has jurisdiction to do so. Of course, if it then were to decide that the practice of eschewing such issues
is merely prudential, it could hear the issue without violating Steel Co. Only if the Court were
to assume without deciding that it had jurisdiction to hear an unpressed, unaddressed issue and
did so, would it be exercising hypothetical appellatejurisdiction. But the point in the text is that
courts have many ways of getting to the merits, one of which is to characterize as non-jurisdictional a matter that otherwise would preclude their consideration of an issue or case.
256. FED.R.APP.P. 4(aX3).
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have not cross-appealed to advance alternative grounds to affirm the judgment
below; to that end, the courts often say that appellees may support the judgment through any matter appearing in the record, and may attack the lower
court's reasoning or emphasize matters overlooked by the trial court.7 By
contrast, the courts generally declare that "[ain appellee who fails to file a
cross-appeal cannot attack ajudgment with a view towards enlarging his own
rights" and receiving more extensive relief than he received from the trial
court." However, several courts of appeals have held that the filing of a
notice of cross-appeal is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and, in certain
circumstances, may be waived by the court of appeals so as to enable it to
reach issues, raised by the appellee, that otherwise would be beyond the scope
257. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473,479 (1999) (stating this principle as law and citing both UnitedStates v. American RailwayExpress Co., 265 U.S. 425,435
(1924), and Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107,111 (1922), as authorityfor it); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 205 F.3d 615, 635 (3d Cir. 2000) (reciting principles stated
in text); see also Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[n]o crossappeal is necessary unless the appellee wants the court of appeals to alter the judgment, not just
the reasoning, of the district court"); McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 F.3d 1168,1172 (10th
Cir. 2000) (explaining that court of appeals may affirm. on any ground supported by record).
258. Spudock v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 1995); see Dodd v. Hood River
County, 59 F.3d 852, 864 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating similarly that such appellee may not obtain
from appellate court relief more extensive than it received from district court); see also El Paso
NaturalGas Co., 526 U.S. at 479 (stating this principle as law, and citing as authority for it
Morley ConstructionCo.v. MarylandCasualtyCo., 300 U.S. 185,191 (1937);Am. Ry.Express
Co., 265 U.S. at 435; Union Tool Co., 259 U.S. at 111; andM'Donough v. Dannery,3 U.S. (3
DalI.) 188, 198 (1796)).
A number of courts of appeals hold that the filing of a cross-appeal is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the court's entertainment of arguments that seek enlargement of appellee's rights
or remedies. See, e.g., Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559, 102 F.3d 21, 28-9 (1st Cir. 1996)
(dismissing late-filed cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction after implying from broad language
in Torres v. OaklandScavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988), concerning mandatory nature of
timing rules in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, that cross-appeal time limit in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(aX3) is mandatory and jurisdictional); EF Operating
Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence as "seriously undermin[ing] the notion that the filing of a cross-appeal is
a rule of practice," and concluding that court had no jurisdiction to review denial of motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, absent cross-appeal, when appellant had appealed grant
of summary judgment to appellee); Francis v. Clark Equip. Co., 993 F.2d 545, 552-53 (6th Cir.
1993) (dismissing contentions that district court erred in denying motion for JNOV, based on
principle that filing of notice of cross-appeal is jurisdictional when appellee wishes to attack
part of final judgment to enlarge his rights or reduce those of his adversary); Rollins v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to consider, for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, appellee's attack on imposition of constructive trust, but in dicta clearly indicating
its view that district court did not err); Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc., 737 F.2d 887, 889
(10th Cir. 1984) (holding that filing of timely cross-appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, and
dismissing late-filed cross appeal); see also Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531,538 (1931) (stating
in dicta that Court's decisions do not deny power of Court to review objections by respondent,
although he has not applied for certiorari, if Court finds good reason to do so).
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of the court's jurisdiction. 9 As explained by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, "The rationale... lies in the notion that the filing of the initial
notice of appeal invokes the court's jurisdiction over the parties and the case
and that, once this jurisdiction has been invoked, the court has the authority
to fully adjudicate the appeal.1'26° In deciding whether to allow a cross-appeal,
notice of which has not been properly filed, courts consider factors such as
the interrelatedness of the issues on appeal and cross-appeal (particularly
whether they involve the sameparties), whether anotice of cross-appeal was
merely late or not filed at all, whether the ...
district court opinion should
have put the appellee on notice ofthe need to file a cross-appeal, the extent
of any prejudice to the appellant caused by the absence of notice ... in a
case involving the certification of an interlocutory appeal - whether the
scope ofthe issues that could be considered on appeal was clearL]'I
any prejudice to the parties if the court refuses to entertain the matters raised
without formal cross-appeal, and the interest in judicial efficiency.
The Supreme Court in 1999 avoided deciding the status ofthe prohibition
on modifying judgments in favor of a non-appealing party as either an unqualified limit on the power of appellate courts or a rule of practice subject to exceptions. It said that, even ifthat prohibition is not strictly jurisdictional, the
comity considerations that had been invoked by the court of appeals as reasons
to make an exception to the rule were inadequate to defeat the institutional
interests in fair notice and repose that the rule advances. 62 While explicitly
declining to decide whether the rule is jurisdictional and acknowledging Court
statements that might be taken to suggest the possibility of exceptions, the
Court intimated that it would decide that the prohibition was absolute, if forced
to a decision. It did this by characterizing the prohibition as "firmly entrenched," and by observing that, "in more than two centuries of repeatedly
259. Accord Texport Oil Co. v. M/VAmolyntos, 11 F.3d 361,366 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
principle recited in text and exercising discretion to disregard lateness of cross-appeal's filing
where appeal and cross-appeal were closely interrelated, involved same parties, notice was late
by only one business day, and cross-appellee was neither surprised nor prejudiced); Spann v.
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24,33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that omission of cross-appeal can
be excused when circumstances warrant that because cross-appeal is not jurisdictional requirement, and entertaining cross-appellant's arguments regarding personal jurisdiction where uncertainty generated by absence of judgment conforming to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58's
separate document requirement explained and excused failure); see Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.
Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283,1298 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that filing of notice of crossappeal is required as rule of practice, which court can waive; it is not non-waivable jurisdictional requirement); see also Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing
modification of decision so as to benefit non-cross-appealing party).
260. Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1298.
261. Id. at 1299.
262. See El PasoNaturalGas Co., 526 U.S. at 480.
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endorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of our holdings has
ever recognized an exception to the rule."263 The Court noted that it had
"repeatedly expressed the rule in emphatic terms,"2" although normally with
reference to certiorari jurisdiction, rather than to the jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals. Justice Souter commented in his opinion for the Court that the
Court had made clear that it was a mistake to read one of its cases as counte-

nancing exceptions to the cross-petition requirement, although dicta in that
opinion sometimes had been otherwise construed. He also emphasized the
institutional policies that underlie the cross-appeal requirement: the interests
in "putting opposing parties and the appellate courts on notice of the issues to

be litigated and encouraging repose ofthose that are not." 265

A third example: In a 1999 case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the question whether parties and trial courts may manufacture
appeals through the voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of claims that

remain after other claims have been dismissed with prejudice is not jurisdic-

tional.266 Although concluding that the grant of voluntary dismissal constituted a clear abuse of discretion which ordinarily would warrant reversal and
remand for completion ofthe case, in the unique posture of this case, the court
concluded that fairness to the certified plaintiff class justified reaching the
merits.267 Courts also conclude that some time limits are not jurisdictional.2"
263. Id. at 480.
264. Id. at 481 n3.
265. Id. at 482.
266. Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that district court judgment was nonetheless "final decision" within meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1993)). Butsee Chappelle v. Beacon Communications Corp., 84 F.3d 652,654
(2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction upon concluding that voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is not final judgment because dismissed claims can be revived);
Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 21-22 (1lth Cir. 1995) (same); Cook v. Rocky Mountain
Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Cheng v. Comm'r, 878 F.2d 306,
309-11 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 303 (5th
Cir. 1978) (same).
267. Great RAVers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1999). The
unique circumstances included the parties and district court having gone to great lengths to create
a final order, including giving notice to the plaintiff class, and the parties having fully briefed and
argued the merits ofthe partial summaryjudgment orders that had been entered. Id.
268. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 533-34 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that time limits for invoking Court's certiorari jurisdiction in criminal cases emanating from
state courts are non-jurisdictional); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 316 n.1 (1969)
(concluding that 30 days allowed by Supreme Court Rule 22(2) to file petition for certiorari is
not jurisdictional). Taglianetti was followed in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1970) (noting that "procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its
business are notjurisdictional"). See also United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443,
448 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Federal Rule Qf Civil Procedure 58's separate document
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b. LiberallyInterpretingorExcusing JurisdictionalRequirements,
TreatingNotices ofAppeal as Petitionsfor Writs ofMandamus, and
Offering Dictaor Alternative Rulings on MattersFound to Be
Beyond the Courts' Jurisdiction
In still other cases (that is, where courts do not avoid an obstacle to a
decision on the merits by deeming the obstacle non-jurisdictional), courts
reach the merits after liberally interpreting jurisdictional requirements in order
to hold that the parties or lower courts complied with them,269 excusing
requirement for judgments is not prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction); Quinn v. Haynes, 234
F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming that appellate court has jurisdiction to hear appeal
despite non-compliance with Rule 58's separate document requirement, when three-factor test
is met); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449,459 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)'s time limit is not jurisdictional, and "courts may, in their
discretion, consider untimely objections" to taxation of costs); Soberay Mach. & Equip. Co. v.
MRF Ltd., 181 F.3d 759, 770 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that untimely motion to review
taxation of costs may properly be entertained because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)'s
time limit is not jurisdictional); Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that computational limits addressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 are not
jurisdictional); Wujik v. Dale & Dale, 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that time limit
for removal of case is not jurisdictional and may be waived); White v. Bentsen, 31 F.3d 474,
475 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining 21-day limit imposed by EEOC regulation for seeking review
of administrative decision on Title VII claim not to be jurisdictional); Hunger v. Leininger, 15
F. 3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding failure to meet statutory deadline for submitting
objections to magistrate judge's recommended decision not to be jurisdictional); Wood-Ivey
Sys. Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961,962-64 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (indicating that Claims Court
Rule 6(a), which is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and provides method for
computation of time prescribed or allowed, should be construed liberally and leniently, and is
notjurisdictional).
269. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (holding that appellants had complied
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal "designate
the judgment, order or part thereof being appealed," despite ineptness of notice); Weiss v.
Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding notice of appeal, filed after grant of summary
judgment to one defendant, to be adequate to confer appellate jurisdiction over entire matter
including earlier dismissal of claims against other defendants, who never had been formally
served); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (liberally construing Rule 54(b)
to allow court to exercise jurisdiction over cross-appeal from partial final judgment dismissing
claim against some defendants, where entire case was before court of appeals through interlocutory appeal by other defendants); Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 86-87 n.21 (3d Cir.
1999) (concluding that dismissal of severed claims was not appealable until district court had
finally disposed of all claims made by all parties to action in its pre-severance posture, with
consequence that appellants' notice of appeal was timely); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 183 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that notice of appeal gave adequate notice
of intent to appeal trial court's refusal to refer antitrust claim to arbitration where preliminary
injunction from which appeal was explicitly taken necessarily encompassed aforementioned
refusal; stating that, in Seventh Circuit, "'an error designating the judgment or a part thereof will
not result in a loss of appeal if the intent to appeal... may be inferred from the notice and if
the appellee has not been mislead by the defect,'" (quoting Cardoza v. Commodities Futures

APPELLATE USE OFHYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION
jurisdictional requirements in "unique circumstances,"" or avoiding possible
Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1546 (7th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d
74, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing principle that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed, taking
into account parties' intentions, in holding notice of appeal sufficient to allow review of
dismissal of defendant's counterclaims); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 104 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that premature notice of appeal ripens upon entry of proper certification
pursuant to Rule 54(b) regardless of whether certification is entered nunc pro tune); Martinez
v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 865 F.2d 160,161-62 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that subsequent Rule
54(b) certification validated otherwise premature notice of appeal in absence of prejudice to
nonappealing party, citing cases reflecting division of federal courts of appeals on this issue);
Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (assuming appellate
jurisdiction over merits where portion of case remaining in district court at time of appeal had
subsequently been decided); see also Marrese v. Am. Aad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373,378-79 (1985) (stating that appellate court had jurisdiction to review district court's denial
of motion to dismiss complaint as barred by res judiata where district court certified its denial
pursuant to § 1292(b) only after defendant appealed order holding it in criminal contempt for
refusing to comply with discovery order); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 161-62 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (viewing as "jurisdictional" question whether 10day limit for filing petition to appeal certified interlocutory order, imposed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a), can be circumvented by re-entry of
interlocutory order, and concurring in majority's holding that there is jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal taken in such circumstances).
One also could put into this category the pragmatism that the Court has brought to making
the determinations that decisions are "final" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the determinations regarding what constitutes the grant or denial of an injunction within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1292. See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (allowing appeal from
order refusing to enter proposed consent decree to settle class action on terms that would have
encompassed immediate injunctive relief for plaintiff class); Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964) (discussing "pragmatic finality" doctrine); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430,433 (1932) (upholding appeal of dismissal for want
ofjurisdiction of counterclaim in which defendants sought injunction against plaintiff's alleged
infringement of patent); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203-06 (1848) (allowing
appeal from order that provided for immediate execution of command that property be delivered
for sale to assignee in bankruptcy where all matters in controversy, except for accounting, had
been completed); supra notes 64, 66, 154-55 (concerning Supreme Court decisions pursuant
to collateral order doctrine). See generally 15AWRIGHTETAL., supranote 66, § 3903 (Leading
Finality Decisions); § 3911 (Collateral Orders); § 3913 (Pragmatic Finality) (noting that
requirement of finality should be construed practically rather than technically); 16 WRIGHT ET
AL,FEDERALPRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JUsDICinoN2D §§ 3921,3924(1996 & Supp. 2000)
(discussing injunctions and appeals of grants of interlocutory injunctions).
In theory, as a matter of philosophy in construing jurisdictional provisions, at least some
courts are of the view that, "[b]ecause the Constitution gives Congress discretion to confer
jurisdictional power on the federal courts of appeal, 'federal courts should proceed with caution
in construing constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with [their] jurisdiction.'" Rembert
v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
168 F.3d 405,409 (1 th Cir. 1999)).
270. See, e.g., Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, 191 F.3d 1324, 1326-29 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding habeas corpus petitioner's failure to file timely notice of appeal excused due to unique
circumstances and further holding that appeals court had jurisdiction where belated filing
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jurisdictional bars by treating notices of appeal as petitions for writs of mandamus.Y Sometimes courts offer dicta or alternative rulings on the matters
that they concluded they lacked jurisdiction to hear. 2
derived from counsel's reasonable and good faith reliance on district court's electronic docket
sheet - constituting specific assurance by judicial officer - which failed to show that final order
had been entered, thereby lulling petitioner into inactivity); Schwartz v. Pridy, 94 F.3d 453,
455-56 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that technically untimely notice of appeal vested appellate
jurisdiction in court where party relied in good faith on court clerk's erroneous refusal to accept
his timely notice of appeal and erroneous representation that his premature notice of appeal was
sufficient); Prudential-Bache Sees., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981,984-86 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
appeal timely filed under unique circumstances doctrine where appellant reasonably relied upon
clerk's inaccurate notification of date on which district court's order was entered). But see
Moore v. S.C. Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (limiting unique circumstances
doctrine to reliance upon written court orders or oral rulings made during hearing, and rejecting
its use where relied upon statements were made by clerk's office staff); United States v. Holler,
957 F.2d 26,29-32 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that, under Supreme Court precedent, unique
circumstances doctrine may apply only when judicial officers upon whose acts parties rely are
judges, not when they are clerk's office employees); see also Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837,
843 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that time to appeal had not begun to run, and appeal consequently
was not untimely, where district court had failed to comply with separate document requirement
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58); Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172,
177-78 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000) (concluding that retransfer motion, made
in transferee district court, should be required to preserve opportunity for review of transfer
order in transferee circuit, because court of appeals normally has no jurisdiction to review
decision of district court in another circuit, but excusing absence of such motion because this
Circuit had not imposed that requirement in past and Estate did not contend that lack of
retransfer motion forfeited opportunity for review).
271. See, e.g., Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52,57 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that court could treat notice of appeal as petition for mandamus, but declining to consider that
option here); Morris v. West,232 F3d 906, No. 00-7032, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5095, at *2
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (treating appeal as petition for writ of mandamus); Phinney v. Wentworth
Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that if court lacked appellate jurisdiction
over magistrate's order requiring party to pay sanctions for discovery violations because settlement may have rendered issue moot, court would treat notice of appeals as request for writ of
mandamus, and grant that request); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 & n.1 (10th
Cir. 1998) (construing intervenor's appeal and defendants' cross-appeals as petitions for writs
of mandamus and noting that writ of mandamus is appropriate vehicle for reviewing orders
sealing or redacting court documents in criminal proceedings); Parretti v. United States, No. 9655371, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33294, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1996) (treating appeal from
order denying motion to disqualify U.S. Attorney as petition for mandamus, but denying
petition); Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1453 (4th Cir. 1996) (treating notice
of appeal of remand order as petition for writ of mandamus); Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969,
971 (8th Cir. 1973) (treating appeal of transfer order as petition for mandamus).
272. See Horton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 202 F3d 1297, 1299-1302 (1lth Cir. 2000)
(concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) deprived court ofjurisdiction to review remand order that
court found to be based on exhaustion or ripeness grounds, but explaining in extended dicta
why district court erred in remanding); United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d
750, 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider issues
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The Supreme Court itself has approved and utilized a number of these
practices.27 3 In Torres v. OaklandScavenger Co.,2 74 for example, the Court
stated that, although the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(c) [(l)(B)] 75 are jurisdictional and their satisfaction a prerequisite to
appellate review, "mere technicalities" should not stand in the way of consideration of the merits, and courts should find a notice of appeal sufficient so
long as it is the functional equivalent of what the Rule requiresY 6 In Smith
v. Barry,2" invoking these principles, the Court reversed an appellate court's
conclusion that a brief never could be considered a notice of appeal and
remanded for the appeals court to determine whether appellant's brief contained the information required to function as a notice of appeal.27 The Court
raised in motion for reconsideration, including malfeasance of appellants' original trial counsel
and -whether individual could be personally subject to injunction, but addressing those very
issues, prefacing its remarks with, "[i]n so far as we would be required to consider [the merits
of the issues] as properly appealed").
273. InMayacamasCorp. v. GulfstreamAerospaceCorp., 806 F.2d 928, 930-31 (9th Cir.
1987), the court of appeals declined to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for mandamus
where the party seeking review had not shown that serious hardship or prejudice would result
from a refusal of its request. On the appeal of the ease, the Supreme Court volunteered that it
took no position on whether the court of appeals had acted appropriately in declining to treat
petitioner's notice of appeal as an application for writ of mandamus. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,289 n.14 (1988). I found no other opinion in which
the Court discussed treating a notice of appeal as a petition for writ ofmandamus.
274. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
275. See supra note 163.
276. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,316-17 (1988) (concluding that
failure to name party in notice of appeal is more than excusable informality and constitutes
jurisdictional failure which court of appeals cannot waive). Unfortunately for Torres, the Court
found a failure to comply with the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, even liberally construed. Id. at 317. Due to a clerical error, the name of
Torres, one of several intervening plaintiffs, was omitted from the notice of appeal filed with
the Ninth Circuit, in a case in which that court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. Partial summary judgment was then granted against
Torres on the ground that the prior judgment of dismissal was final as to him, given his failure
to appeal it. Id. at 313-14. The Supreme Court, holding to be jurisdictional both the requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) that the notice of appeal specify the parties
taking the appeal and the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 setting time
limits for filing of a notice of appeal, held on these facts that the court of appeals was correct
that it never had jurisdiction over an appeal by Torres. Id. at 317-18. It therefore affirmed the
judgment against Torres. Id. at 318.
277. 502 U.S. 244 (1992).
278. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244,245 (1992) ("hold[ing] that a document intended
to serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by [Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure] 3"). Smith had filed a notice of appeal that was invalid and ineffective
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(aX4) becausepremature, having been filed before
the trial court's disposition of a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict Id. at
246. He then filed an "informal brief," within the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Id.
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also has approved some belated filings of notices of appeal under a "unique
circumstances" doctrine. 9 And, in some very important cases, it has offered
dicta on issues it found to be beyond its jurisdiction." °
While one certainly can distinguish the latter types of cases"s from exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction, they lie along a spectrum of devices that
appellate courts have used, and continue to use, to reach the merits of cases.
Understanding this context may be important in determining how broadly and
stringently (or, conversely, how narrowly and unrigorously) condemnations of
hypothetical jurisdiction should be interpreted and applied in the context of
appellate jurisdiction.2s 2 For example, this survey might lead one to conclude
Smith held that a document intended to serve as an appellate brief also can qualify as the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 245. It
reasoned, inter alia, that because the purpose of a notice of appeal is to provide notice to other
parties and the court, "the notice afforded by a document, not the litigant's motivation in filing
it, determines the document's sufficiency as a notice of appeal." Id. at 248. Furthermore, the
Rules' contemplation of a brief that is distinct from the notice of appeal did not preclude a court
from treating a brief as a notice of appeal. Id. at 249. "Proper briefing is not... ajurisdictional
requirement" under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. Indeed, "failure [of an appellant] to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity
of the appeal .... " FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).
279. See Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 370-72 (4th Cir. 2001) (questioning
continuing validity of unique circumstances doctrine, in light of more recent Supreme Court
decisions); Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384,386-87 (1964) (approving some belated filings of
notices of appeal under "unique circumstances" doctrine (quoting Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215,217 (1962))). But see Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney,
489 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1989) (declining to apply rationale of Thompson to facts of case at bar).
280. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28-29
(1994) (in case involving motion to vacate judgment of court of appeals by reason of settlement,
explaining relevance of Courtts holding to motions, in courts of appeals, to vacate district court
judgments); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452, 454 (1857) (holding that
slaves were not citizens and thus could not invoke diversity jurisdiction, but nonetheless
rejecting Scott's claim on merits that his residence in Illinois made him free and declared Missouri Compromise unconstitutional); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137,167-68,17880 (1803) (holding that Court could not constitutionally hear, as matter of original jurisdiction,
Marbury's petition for writ of mandamus to compel Secretary of State to deliver particular
commission for offices, but nonetheless addressing merits issues including whether commission
had vested).
281.
I refer to those cases holding threshold matters that are being assumed to be non-jurisdictional, those cases holding jurisdiction to exist upon a liberal interpretation of jurisdictional
requirements, and those cases excusing jurisdictional requirements in unique circumstances.
282. Just as exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction at the district court level have been argued
to be supported by analogy to other doctrines and policies that undermine the absolute purity of
the "jurisdictional axiom" that "courts are powerless to act without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and that any order or judgment issued by a court without such jurisdiction is void and
unenforceable," Comment, supra note 34, at 714, so exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction may be supported by doctrines and policies that moderate the hard edges of the requirement
that appellate courts decide cases only when they have jurisdiction over them.
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that our courts have found so many ways to finesse jurisdictional problems that
having one more, hypothetical appellate jurisdiction, can not much matter.
Alternatively, one might conclude that if nothing in the existing arsenal of
jurisdiction-finessers suffices to give an appellate court jurisdiction over a case
or issue, that court ought to enforce the Steel Co. rule against allowing the
courts to assume their jurisdiction hypothetically and reach the merits.
E. The Implications of Steel Co.for HypotheticalAppellate Jurisdiction
In theory, federal courts could disregard Steel Co.'s repudiation ofhypothetical jurisdiction, on the grounds that it was mere dictum, but the courts'
practice is to give such "considered dicta" great weight, both out ofrespect for
the Court and because that dicta is likely to foreshadow how the Court would
decide an issue if that issue were squarely presented for decision.s Assuming then that the courts will take the denunciation seriously, what might this
mean in the context of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction?
1. A BroadReading
A broad reading of Steel Co.'s denunciation of hypothetical jurisdictione 4 would disapprove all instances in which federal appellate courts avoid
questions concerning their appellate jurisdiction and reach the merits of cases
when and because the merits are more readily resolved and the prevailing
party below would prevail regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction were
exercised. At a minimum, a broad reading would disapprove all exercises of
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction that were not harmless error. Presumably,
the error would be harmless when proper examination of the jurisdictional
issue would have led to the conclusion that appellate jurisdiction existed. On
this "strongest" view, it would make no difference if the jurisdictional issue
being bypassed were of constitutional dimension, statute-based, rule-based,
or a function ofjudicial glosses on jurisdictional texts for, ifthe denunciation
is grounded upon the need to keep courts within the bounds of authorized
judicial action and thereby preserve fundamental principles of separation of
powers, any assumption of appellate jurisdiction that would exceed that which
has been authorized would violate the Court's objectives."s
283. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. NRC., 216 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(quoting earlier cases for proposition that carefully considered language of Court, even if dicta,
generally must be treated as authoritative, and relying upon such language of Court in D.C.
Circuit's decision); Idleman, supra note 4, at 316-17 (noting that "considered dicta" of Supreme
Court commands obedience by lower courts). But see supra text accompanying note 74 (questioning applicability of this norm when less than majority of Court subscribes to dicta).
284. SeesupraPartL
285. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (declining to
endorse doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction as doctrine exceeds "authorized judicial action");
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In its strongest form, this interpretation would entail viewing even the
merely statutory and rule-based elements of jurisdiction (which carry Congress's imprimatur) as important components of separation of powers, with
the legislature "restraining the [appellate] courts from acting at certain times,
and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects."n2 6 The Court's reference in Steel Co. to jurisdictional elements that
restrain the courts from acting at certain times easily can be understood to
apply to statutory requirements for interlocutory appeals.' On this view, it
would be inappropriate for courts to engage in ad hoc weighing of the concers for efficiency that underlie appellate jurisdictional rules (such as the
final judgment rule) against the like-kind concerns that underlie the doctrine
ofhypotheticaljurisdiction. One would conclude that implicitly Congress and
the Court, as rule promulgator, have decided that the need for statute-or-rulebased jurisdiction that a court has found to exist, rather than assumed arguendo, prevails over any competing policies. Indeed, this view is most consistent with the common law requirement that appellate courts confirm their
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. To the extent that appeals courts
can merely assume their jurisdiction hypothetically, the requirement that jurisdiction be confirmed becomes illusory.'
This "strong" position also comports entirely with the long-standing admonitions against federal courts' acting
where they cannot because action is beyond the bounds of authorized judicial
activity and hence ultra vires.
While this understanding of Steel Co. might imply that all the examples
listed above of courts exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction were
wrong, I believe that, when one considers the Court's own qualifications of
its denunciation and other factors, that inference would be unjustified.
2. NarrowerReadings
Narrower readings of Steel Co. of course have different implications:
see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (observing that power to
judicially create non-constitutional rules of procedure for federal courts exists only in absence
of relevant Act of Congress, and that "Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set
aside any judicially created rules of ... procedure that are not required by the Constitution").
286. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
287.
The same may be true of the reference to jurisdictional elements that restrain the
courts from acting even permanently regarding certain subjects, see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101

(noting restrictions on courts' authority to entertain certain subjects), if one interprets the allusion to "any subjects" as applicable to subjects as to which losing litigants have failed to perfect
an appeal.
288.
On this broadest reading ofSteel Co., the position sketched above would govern even
if the "merits" issue partook to some degree of ajurisdictional nature or the "jurisdictional" issue
partook to some degree ofnon-jurisdictional qualities.
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a. Reading Steel Co. to preclude advisory opinions and opinions as to
disputes thatdo notconstituteArticle1I7cases or controversies.To the degree
the Steel Co. Court was concerned that hypothetical jurisdiction produces only
hypothetical judgments, that is, advisory opinions of the sort that the Court
has disapproved from very early on," its concerns would seem to be satisfied
so long as an Article 1I case or controversy is presented. The concerns underlying the prohibition against advisory opinions relate to constitutional matters:
to keeping the courts out of matters that belong in the legislative sphere for
lack of an actual dispute between adverse litigants or because the courts are
not in a position to have an effect.' As the Court stated in Flastv. Cohen,
rTlhe implicit policies embodied in Article H, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions. [The rule] implements the separation of powers... [and] also recognizes that such suits often "are not
pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed and necessaryfor decisionfrom a clash
of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests.'m
If the Court's intent was solely to deter federal courts from reaching
merits questions without first determining that an Article 111 case or controversy is present,' federal appellate courts' hypothetical assumption that the
merely statutory, rule-based or common law requirements of their own jurisdiction are satisfied, in order to reach more easily resolved merits issues,
289. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (finding nonjusticiable suit
authorized by Congress to test constitutionality of particular law, when interests of plaintiffs and
defendant government were not at all adverse and, in Court's view, courts were being asked to
issue advisory opinion on constitutionality of statute), noted in Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792) (concluding that federal courts could not express
nonbinding opinions on amount of benefits owed to Revolutionary War veterans, and stating
that making mere recommendations regarding pensions was "not of ajudicial nature").
290. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14
(1948) (concluding that federal courts could not review Civil Aeronautics Board decisions that
President could disregard or modify, because judicial decisions would then be mere recommendations that would amount to advisory opinions); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305
(1943) (declining to hear collusively brought suit, for lack of genuine adversary issue); Muskat,
219 U.S. at 361-62, supra note 289. See generally ERWJ CHEMRMNSKY, FEDERAL JURIDIC1ION §2.2, at 56 (3d ed. 1999) (observing that "the other justiciability doctrines [concerning
standing, ripeness and mootness] exist largely to ensure that federal courts will not issue
advisory opinions").
291. 392 U.S. 83 (1968):
292. Id. at 96-97 (quoting in part United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146,157 (1961)).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. "Narrowly viewed, the basic principle of
Steel Co. is that an Article III court cannot decide the merits of a dispute without first verifying
that the Article M11
case-or-controversy requirements have been satisfied." Idleman, supra note
4,at318.
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would not run afoul of Steel Co. Thus, for example, while avoidance of the
questions whether a case had become moot and whether the appellant had
Article Im standing to appeal would be impermissible, 4 avoidance of issues
concerning merely prudential or statute-based standing, and assumption,
without decision, that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or § 1292 (or
other jurisdictional statutes) are satisfied, or that the requirements of Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or of Rules 3 and 4 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (or other 'Jurisdictional" Rules) are
satisfied, would not run afoul of Steel Co. The vast majority of the pre-Steel
Co. exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction were of this variety.'
They bypassed rule-based jurisdictional questions concerning the timeliness
of appeals and the adequacy of notices of appeal designating the court of
appeals orthe appellants, andtheybypassed statute-based jurisdictional questions concerning the finality of lower tribunal decisions or the decisions' satisfaction of the requirements for interlocutory appeal or miscellaneous other
statutory requirements that the courts had found to be 'jurisdictional." Sometimes the exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction bypassed issues of
statutory or prudential standing.' Questions such as which federal appel294. Possible examples of such impermissible exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction would
be the cases cited supra at note 242, in which the courts bypassed issues concerning parties'
standing to appeal, although the cases are not always clear as to whether their concern was constitutional standing or merely statutory or prudential standing requirements, and the cases cited
supra at note 244, in which the court bypassed a constitutional issue as to whether an appeal
was moot
295. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35,237-38,240-43, and 245-49. Professor
Idleman notes that Steel Co.
does not necessarily prohibit.. . courts from deciding merits issues where nonArticle I jurisdictional requirements are not verified, as long as the Article IT
requirements are met ....This would encompass not only statutory or judge-made
requirements, including the prudential aspects of standing, ripeness, and mootness
as well as the complete diversity requirement, but possibly also various non-Article
III constitutional requirements such as those arising from the Eleventh Amendment
or the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It may even include the political question
doctrine insofar as [it] may not be a genuine case-or-controversy component of
Article Il....
Idleman, supra note 4, at 319.
296. The courts sometimes have bypassed questions as to whether litigants had waived
their right to appeal. See United States v. Shepard, 207 F.3d 455, 456 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000)
(asserting hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over appeal of criminal sentence by assuming, and
not deciding, that plea agreement did not bar defendant's appeal); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191,
1195-97 (7th Cir. 1996) (exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction and affirming class
action settlement in face of issues as to whether approval of settlement fell within 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(aX1), as to whether objectors lacked standing to appeal because they had failed to intervene, been denied intervention, or for other reasons, and as to whether some objectors had
waived their right to appeal). Insofar as the courts' jurisdiction turned on a common law
doctrine of waiver, the courts' exercise of power seems generally acceptable because the courts
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late court has jurisdiction to hear a case, at what point in a case's progress
toward final judgment an appellate court may address the issues the case
raises, and which issues may be reviewed on an interlocutory appeal or after
final judgment, are simply not of constitutional stature. Article Ell requires
only a case arising under the laws ofthe United States (including the Constitution and Treaties) and certain other specified cases, or a controversy between
specified persons and entities.' Moreover, constitutionally-grounded federalism concerns rarely play a part in matters of intermediate federal appellate

jurisdiction, although they arguably have a role in the prohibition on federal
court review of remand orders predicated on lack of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction7m
In some of the cases in which hypothetical appellate jurisdiction was
utilized, none of the still narrower exceptions designated b-e, below, seems
applicable. Those cases would remain good law, however, if Steel Co. precludes appeals courts from addressing merits issues only when those courts
have not addressed jurisdictional issues of constitutional magnitude, as well
as on some other possible views of Steel Co.'s proper scope.
b. Reading Steel Co. to permit onejurisdictionalquestion to be avoided
or assumed infavor of deciding anothersuch question. If Steel Co. permits
one jurisdictional question to be avoided or particular aspects of jurisdiction
to be assumed in favor of deciding another such question, as it generally is
understood to do,' then exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction with respect to
some aspects of appellate jurisdiction are permissible when the court is
addressing other aspects of appellate jurisdiction or perhaps is addressing
aspects of the district court's jurisdiction over the case. 3"
c. Reading Steel Co. to permit proceduralissues to be addressedin
advance ofjurisdictionalissues. If Steel Co. permits atleast some procedural
issues to be addressed in advance of jurisdictional issues,,"' then exercises of
have the discretion to hold that the appellants had not waived their right to appeal. This would
seem to be, if anything, more acceptable than courts' assuming arguendo the satisfaction of
basic, statutory, jurisdictional requirements and doctrines interpreting those requirements.
297. The aspects of an Article IIl case or controversy, that is, constitutional justiciability
(standing, ripeness, non-mootaess, and exclusion of political questions) would not be properly
assumed.
298. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
300. See United States v. Hurd, No. 98-7129, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8715, at n.1 (10th

Cir. May 7, 1999) (concluding that despite serious question as to whether Hurd had filed timely
notice of appeal, court did not need to remand for specific findings upon which that issue would
turn when court was remanding for entry of order dismissing appellant's post-judgment "motion
to dismiss" for lack of district court jurisdiction to consider that motion).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
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hypothetical appellate jurisdiction while the court decides non-jurisdictional
issues of appellate procedure also may be permissible.3°
d. Reading Steel Co. to permit hypotheticaljurisdictionwhen a merits
determinationdoes not requireaprecedentialholding. If Steel Co., by virtue
of the earlier Supreme Court cases that it embraces, permits hypothetical jurisdiction when a merits determination does not require a precedential holding, 03
then several exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction cited above are
pennissible.3 °
e. Reading Steel Co. to permit courts to speak to merits issues in dicta.
If Steel Co. permits courts to speak to merits issues in dicta, then exercises of
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction followed by non-merits (for example, procedural) holdings and by opinions in which the court speaks to merits issues
in dicta also appear to remain legitimate, so far as Steel Co. is concerned. 0 5
Such dicta might, however, test other constraints upon judicial behavior.
3. My Own View ofthe Implications of Steel Co.for Hypothetical
Appellate Jurisdiction
My view is that Steel Co.'s denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction
should not be given its broadest possible reading, nor its narrowest reading,
as described above. I believe that courts and commentators properly understand it to permit (1) one appellate jurisdictional question to be avoided or
assumed in favor of deciding another such question, and issues of appellate
procedure to be addressed in advance of appellate jurisdictional issues; and
(2) courts of appeals to speak to merits issues in dicta, insofar as that is
proper, independent of matters of hypothetical jurisdiction. It also may be
proper, or at least harmless, for courts of appeals to exercise hypothetical
appellate jurisdiction when its merits determination will not constitute a
precedential holding. Because the effect of its decision will be an affirmance
of the decision below,"ce the court's decision will not alter the rights of the
parties, and if its merits determination will not constitute a precedential holdmng, its decision will not affect others.
302. This limitation of Steel Co. would not, however, allow an appellate court to decide
non-jurisdictional issues of district court procedure in advance of issues of appellate jurisdiction
because the former would be part of the merits ofthe appeal. See supra text accompanying note
199 (discussing how merits of appeals tend to be procedural).
303. See supratext accompanying notes 35-36.
304.

See, e.g., the cases cited supraat notes 237-39.

305. Accord Idleman, supra note 4, at 333 (explaining that courts could "comment[ ] on
the merits in the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction").
306.

See supra text accompanying note 230.
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Beyond these deductions, I have concluded that Steel Co. should be read
to preclude exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction in which a court of appeals
otherwise might assume arguendo that the case before it satisfies Article Hm
requirements or the jurisdictional requirements of congressional statutes such
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, and 1295, as interpreted bythe courts (including
the scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction), but that Steel Co. should be read
to permit courts of appeals to assume arguendo that the cases before them
satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. More accurately, for reasons that appear
below, I believe that neither the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction nor its
denunciation should have any bearing upon the appellate courts' application
of the Federal Rules. However, even if or to the extent that the Court insists
that those rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of the doctrine, then
Steel Co. should be read to permit courts of appeals to assume arguendo that
the cases before them satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as cases arise
that meet the requirements ofthe hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine. When the
requirements of the doctrine are not met, federal appeals courts should read
and apply the Rules liberally, in some respects more liberally than they have
done to date.
The conclusion that Steel Co. should be read to preclude exercises of
hypothetical jurisdiction in which a court of appeals assumes arguendo that
the case before it satisfies Article Ill requirements is inescapable. This is the
bare minimum that the case represents, for a federal court acts outside the
broadest possible scope of its jurisdiction if it acts on a case that does not fal
within the judicial power as defined in Article i.
The jurisdictional requirements imposed by congressional statutes such
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, and 1295, are of sufficient stature, by virtue of
their source, and of sufficient importance as a matter of policy, that they too
should not be subject to judicial circumvention through exercises ofhypothetical appellate jurisdiction.3" Over the years, commentators sometimes have
criticized Congress for making the requirements of these statutes 'jurisdictional,"" and it may well be that our system would work better if the final
307. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 441 (1956) (Frankfinter, J.,
concurring) (stating that "§ 1291 is not a technical rule in a game. It expresses not only a deeply

rooted but a wisely sanctioned principle against piecemeal appeals governing litigation in the
federal courts.").
308. See Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civ'l Interlocutory AppealsAct, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 170 (Summer 1984) (proposing that defects of appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq. or under rules of court be waivable and appellate jurisdiction
conferred by consent of parties). Carrington argues that law treating untimeliness as jurisdictional in the sense that it cannot be waived and must be raised by the court sua sponte is "a
fetish which serves no significant systemic interest" Id. He would fix time limits for the raising
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decision "rule" and the other prerequisites to appellate attention, mandated by
these statutes, were not "jurisdictional" and therefore deemed to be unwaivable and subject to appellate policing even when the parties fail to object to
defects in compliance. However, in light of the fact that, under the Constitution, federal appellate courts possess only those powers of review that are

granted by acts of Congress,

9 those

courts are duty-bound to review only

those matters that Congress has in fact, at any given time, authorized them to

hear. As long as the statutes set the scope and the boundaries of appellate
jurisdiction, and Congress does not "demote" matters such as the existence of
a "final decision" to something other than jurisdictional criteria, the federal
of such issues, to discourage dilatoriness and to avoid inefficiency. Id.; see Edward H. Cooper,
Timing asJurisdiction: FederalCivilAppeals in Context,47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 157,
157-63 (Summer 1984) (arguing for movement toward more flexibility and discretion in timing
of appeals). Cooper's arguments imply the desirability of movement away from rigid jurisdictional rules governing the timing of appeals. Id. at 157-58. He also writes,
It is ... important to avoid foolish forfeitures. Once a case has been submitted to
an appellate court, the court should not refuse to decide simply on the ground that
some mistake of timing has deprived it of "jurisdiction." Decision may be refused,
but only if that course protects a proper relationship between courts for the particular case.
Id. at 163; see Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the FederalFinality-AppealabilityProblem, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171,178 (Summer 1984) (arguing against appealability requirements
being "jurisdictional"). Rosenberg writes,
The issues of appealability of a decision . . . and of the timeliness of an appeal
ought not to be treated as going to the power of an appellate court to act any more
than the untimeliness of starting an action, making a motion, or serving a responsive pleading utterly divest the district court of power to deal with the case. All
these questions should be treated as procedural rules - very important rules, to be
sure, and subject to serious consequences if violated - but violation should be
treated as a procedural failure, not as competence-destroying.
Id.
309. The Supreme Court frequently has asserted that the U.S. Constitution does not confer
a right to appellate review and that the federal courts have only such appellate jurisdiction as
Congress has conferred. See Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250,254 (1866) (stating that
"an act of Congress must supply the requisite authority.... [The appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court] is wholly the creature oflegislation."); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321,
327 (1796) (stating that "[i]f Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we
cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it").
See generally FederalCivilAppellate Jurisdiction:An InterlocutoryRestatement,47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13,91-92, § 12 cmt c (Spring 1984) (describing current law as follows:
Federal appellate courts possess only those powers of review granted by acts of
Congress, and thus the issue as to whether a given appeal is authorized by any such
statute is jurisdictional. A court has no discretion to hear an appeal without jurisdiction; and... lack of appealability cannot be waived, nor may appellate jurisdiction be conferred by agreement of the parties. When a question exists on the
record, a court has a duty to raise the issue of appealability on its own motion.
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
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appellate courts must confine their decisionmaking on merits issues to the
appeals that meet those jurisdictional requirements. An unexamined assumption ofjurisdiction would contravene an appellate court's duty to confirm its

own jurisdiction.
Although the line between "mere" common law and statutory interpretation sometimes is fuzzy,31 ° courts should give equal respect to judicial interpretations of those jurisdictional statutory requirements. Statutes' meanings
are inextricably intertwined withtheir interpretation by the courts, so it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for courts to give due deference to statutory

jurisdictional requirements if the courts were free to give significantly less
deference to judicial constructions ofthose statutes. For example, because the

collateral order doctrine is now regarded as interpretation ofthe final decision
rule,"' if appeals courts may not hypothetically assume that a final decision
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is presented, it follows that they
equally may not hypothetically assume that the order from which an appeal
has been taken falls within the collateral order doctrine. I believe that the

scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction upon interlocutory appeals also is a
matter of interpretation of the statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals. If
that view is correct, appeals courts also may not hypothetically assume that
the non-discretionary requirements for exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction have been satisfied, and move to the merits of the pendent issues.
If one were similarly to treat Rule 54(b)'s allowance of an immediate
appeal when a district court reaches a final decision as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims in a multi-claim or multi-party case as an interpretation of § 1291's final decision requirement- substituting the claim, for the
civil action, as the unit as to which final decision must have been reached, the satisfaction
of that requirement also would not be subject to hypothetical
31 3
assumption.
310. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of CivilProcedure,44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039,1095 (1993) (stating that, "[i]n both the statu-

tory and Rules arenas, there is a continuum between the interpretation of a text and the development of federal common law").
311. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (describing
Court as having interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to permit jurisdiction over appeals that meet conditions of collateral order doctrine); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911,915 & n.3 (1997) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as authorizing immediate appeal of rejection of qualified immunity
defense, which court construes as final decision); United States v. Tsosie, 966 F2d 1357, 1359
(10th Cir. 1992) (characterizing collateral order doctrine as interpretative rule for courts to
construe statutory jurisdictional requirements).
312. See Steinman,.supra note 170, at 1375-88,1393-99,1429-43.
313. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433-35 (1956) (describing Rule
54(b), as amended, as providing practical means of permitting appeal from final decisions on
individual claims in multi-claim actions without waiting for final decisions on all claims in case,
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By contrast to the foregoing treatment of statute-based and statute-derived
jurisdictional requirements, I believe that neither the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction nor its denunciation should have any bearing upon the appellate
courts' application ofthe Federal Rules. However, even if or to the extent that

the Court insists that those Rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of the
doctrine, Steel Co. should be read topermitcourts of appeals to assume arguendo that the cases before them satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as
cases arise that meet the requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine.
As described earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the federal appeals
courts, have characterized a few ofthe mandates ofthese Rules to be jurisdictional. 4 " But, despite these judicial pronouncements, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly declare that those Rules "shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction" of the district courts,315 and the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure explicitly declare that those Rules "do not extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. '316 The fact that, by their own
terms, the Rules do not, and cannot properly be construed to, extend or limit

the jurisdiction of the appeals courts supports the argument that they are not
jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.'s prohibition of hypothetical
jurisdiction.1 7 Indeed, it has been argued that a delegation of rulemaking
relaxing former general practice that all claims had to be finally decided before appeal could be
entertained from final decision upon any of them). The Sears Court also held Rule 54(b) to be
a valid exercise of the Court's rulemaking authority which does not supercede any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction, and which scrupulously recognizes the statutory requirement of
a final decision. Id. at 438. It stated that the Rule "merely administers that requirement in a
practical manner." Id. at 438; see also Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co.,
351 U.S. 445,453 (1956) (holding that Rule 54(b), as amended, does not impair statutory coneept of finality embraced in § 1291, and is within Court's rulemaking power).
On the other hand, the Rule's requirement of "despatch" by the district court, to the
appeals court, goes beyond anything in § 1291. For reasons elaborated below in the discussion
of Federal Rules generally, I would treat that aspect as being subject to hypothetical assumption.
314. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
315. FED. R. CIV.P. 82.
316. FED.R.APP.P. l(b).
317. See Center for Nuclear Responsibility v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
781 F.2d 935, 941 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that time limits established by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4 are not truly jurisdictional (citing 9 J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
204.02[2] at 4-16 (2d ed. 1983))); Haney v. Mizell Mem'l Hosp., 744 F.d 1467, 1472 n.3
(1 th Cir. 1984) (indicating that failure to comply with Rule 4(a) does not affect subject-matter
jurisdiction of appellate court; "[riather, a timely notice of appeal is better understood as a
'mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction"' (quoting United States v.
Ward, 696 F.2d 1315,1317 (1lth Cir. 1983))); Sanchez v. Bd. of Regents, 625 F.2d 521, 522
n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a) "cannot... affect the
subject-matter jurisdiction and is rather a mandatory precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction"); see also9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 204.02[2] (2d ed. 1996) (stating that require-
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authority to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district or federal
appellate courts, within the limits ofArticle El, § 2, would be unconstitutional
because it would violate Article Ill's grant of that power to Congress alone. 1
While only Congress may confer jurisdiction on the federal courts of
appeals, it is well-established that Congress may delegate to the courts the
power to regulate their own practice, 319 and it is similarly well-established that
the courts have some inherent authority to regulate their procedures and the
practices ofthose who appear before them.320 More specifically, it is clear that
Congress has delegated to the Court some power to regulate the timing of
appeals. These delegations need not violate Congress's own authority to determine the subject-matter jurisdiction ofthe courts of appeals, and all the courts
that have considered the issues to date have concluded that these delegations
do not do so. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), authorizing the Court to prescribe
rules to provide for appeal of interlocutory decisions not otherwise provided
for under § 1292,321 and Rule 23(f), promulgated pursuant thereto, Rule 54(b)
ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 3 and 4 ofthe Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, all of which govern the timing of appeals, all have
ment that notice of appeal be timely-filed "is not jurisdictional in the sense of subject matter
jurisdiction, since both the time limits and the circumstances in which they may be extended are
fixed by the rules;" indicating that time limit is instead "[m]andatory precondition to the exercise
of jurisdiction;" and citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Mafiis, 435 U.S. 381,387 (1978), for proposition that Supreme Court in past years showed its awareness of distinction by placing quotation
marks around term "jurisdictional" when speaking of filing of notice of appeal); 16A WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIsDIcTION3D § 3947.1 (1999) (assertingthat
statutes giving Court power to make rules of appellate procedure do not give Court authority to
diminish or enlarge jurisdiction of courts of appeals, and that jurisdictional statutes are "totally
unaffected in scope or interpretation or application by promulgation ofAppellate Rules").
318. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (observing that there are limitations on authority to prescribe rules that were not mentioned in Rules Enabling Act, including
"the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by statute");
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WB1TrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 457 (2d ed. 2000) (implying that
both text and history of Article IMIindicate that determination of inferior federal courts' jurisdiction cannot be delegated).
319. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding Congress's
delegation of authority to United States Sentencing Commission of judicial branch to promulgate federal criminal sentencing guidelines); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 (finding that Congress
has ability to delegate to federal courts Congress's power to regulate practice and procedure of
federal courts by making rules not inconsistent with statutes or Constitution of United States);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that
Congress may delegate powers that it may rightfully exercise itself).
320. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35, 43-51 (1991) (discussing federal
courts' inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control conduct of those who
appear before them, in such ways as fashioning appropriate sanctions for misconduct).
321. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1994) (authorizing Court, by rule, to define when district court ruling is final for purposes of appeal under § 1291).
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been upheld against challenge.322 Additionally, the courts, through case law,
have long fashioned doctrines governing the timing of appeals. 3 As the Fifth
Circuit recently commented, all ofthese affect when the courts of appeals may
hear appeals, but not the matters reviewable; the timing is "an issue apart from
the right to confer ... jurisdiction. 324 This again suggests that the Rules are
not truly jurisdictional or jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.'s
prohibition on the exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction.
Moreover, (with the possible exception of the final decision aspect of
Rule 54(b) discussed above), I do not believe that the Rules are of sufficient
importance, as a matter of policy, that the federal appellate courts should lack
power to liberally construe them or even to hypothetically assume the Rules'
satisfaction and reach the merits. The other aspects of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have been
characterized as jurisdictional are essentially procedural rules, adopted to
facilitate orderly transaction ofthe appellate courts' business. They prescn1oe
the details ofthe methods by which parties can invoke the jurisdiction granted
to those courts by Congress. Appeal periods "involve primarily the interests
of the immediate parties, not fundamental societal interests." 3" "There is no
question of the courts' basic capacity or competency to exercise judicial
authority. There is also no question of... political sensitivity vis-a-vis
another forum or sovereign."1 6 As a result, the interests in assuring accurately described and timely filed appeals are substantially accomplished by the
vigilant application of Rules 3 and 4, when they are raised by the parties."
Moreover, even if one posited that there are efficiency values served by Rules
3 and 4 which are not subject to waiver by the parties, that would not respond
322. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956) (upholding Rule
54(b)); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 453 (1956)
(upholding Rule 54(b)); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 973-74 (5th Cir. 2000)
(upholding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) against challenge
that § 1292(e)'s grant of authority constitutes impermissible delegation of power to confer
jurisdiction, and holding that "the Supreme Court may address the timing of appeals as interstitial rulemaking without affecting Congress's authority to determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts" (emphasis in original)). But see TEPLY & WHIITEN, supra note
318, at 461-62 (seeing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) as extension of appellate jurisdiction and thus questioning its constitutionality, although acknowledging that limitedness of
extension might save validity of Rule by rendering it regulation of mere procedural detail which
is within judicial rulemaking power).
323. See supratext accompanying notes 154-56.
324. Bolin,231 F.3d at 974.
325. Hall, supra note 233, at 400; see supratext accompanying note 308 (discussing finality requirement).
326. Hall, supra note 233, at 420.
327. Accord id. at 424 (advocating mandatory application of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a) when it is raised by parties).
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to the argument that courts should be free to forego those efficiencies when
they believe that other efficiencies can be gained, and the interests of justice
served, by doing so - as was the situation when appellate courts exercised
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction through an assumption that the Rules'
requirements had been satisfied.
What should we make of the Court's holdings that certain requirements
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are jurisdictional? We have to
see these declarations as among the profligate uses of the term and "translate"
these declarations to discern their precise meaning. As then-Judge Ginsburg
once noted,
When we employ the word to mean many things-from the absence of a
constitutional grant of judicial power to a statutory limit on time to
appeal-we ought to bear firmly in mind that "the tendencyto assume that
a word which appears ... in connection with more than one purpose...
has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all
through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against."'
If, or to the extent that, notwithstanding all of the above, the Court were
to insist that the Rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.'s
prohibition on hypothetical jurisdiction, I would argue that Steel Co. nonetheless should be read to permit courts of appeals to assume arguendo that the
cases before them satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as cases meet the
requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine.
In support of that conclusion, I offer the following: First, the Rules
(obviously) are not congressional statutes. Although they do bear Congress's
imprimatur, in the sense that they exist by the grace of Congress, which has
the power to veto them and chose not to do so,3 as the Court's creation, the
Rules should be subject to judicial relaxation. This is true in part because the
separation of powers issues that arise if federal courts disregard or circumvent
congressional legislation concerning appellate jurisdiction are not so acute if
328. Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
781 F.2d 935, 945 nA (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Ginsburg, 3., dissenting) (quoting Walter Wheeler
Cook, "Substance"and "Procedure"in the Conflict ofLaws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)).
329. As previously noted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2074 (1994), Congress has the opportunity to reject or alter Rules proposed by the Court. Section 2074 provides in pertinent part that,
"(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 ofthe year in which
a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such
rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted
unless otherwise provided by law." The absence of adverse action by Congress is taken to
indicate that Congress found "no transgression of legislative policy." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941).
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federal courts take some liberties with Federal Rules.33 As Justice Harlan
wrote, concurring ina 1970 case,
As amatter ofstatutoryinterpretation, the Court has notpresumedthe right
to extend time limits specified in statutes where there is no indication of a
congressional purpose to authorize the Court to do so. Because we cannot
"waive" congressional enactments, the statutory time limits are treated as
jurisdictional. Onthe other hand, for the time requirement of [aparticular
Supreme Court Rule], established under a broad statutory delegation, it is
appropriate to apply the "general principle" that "'[ilt is always within the
discretion of a court... to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for
the orderly transaction ofbusiness
before it whenl,] in a given caseL,] the
33
ends of justice require it.' 1
The same principle that the Court applied to Supreme Court Rules in the case
quoted above should govern the rules governing the courts of appeals, and
those courts, unless prohibited by holdings of the Supreme Court, should be
able, in the interests of justice, to exercise discretion to relax the procedural
rules adopted for the orderly transaction of their business or, when the requisites of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine have been met, to assume that the
requirements of those rules have been satisfied.
The Rules' time limits for filing an appeal and concerning the naming of
parties, identification of the judgment or order from which appeal is taken,
and identification of the court to which it is being taken, may be "mandatory"
requirements, 3 2 but these Rules "merely prescribe the method by which the
jurisdiction granted the courts by Congress is to be exercised. 3 33 The requirement that appellants identify the court, the appellants, and the matters from
330. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970) (rejecting argument that S. Ct.
Rule 22(2) was jurisdictional and could not be waived by Court). The Court noted that the

Rule contained no language that called for so harsh a result, and that the Rule was not enacted
by Congress but promulgated by the Court under authorization by Congress to prescribe rules
concerning the time limitations for taking appeals and applying for certiorari in criminal cases.
Id. The Court further commented that the "procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly
transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise
of its discretion when the ends ofjustice so require." Id.
331. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball, 397 U.S.
532, 539 (1970) (in turn, quoting NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir.
1953))).

332. Hall, supra note 233, argues that the Rules' timing requirements, although mandatory
in the sense that courts have no authority to excuse untimely appeals when parties have raised
the defect, should be waivable by the parties, and that the courts need not raise such issues sua
sponte. The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction over the parties in a civil action,
too, could be viewed as mandatory, while also waivable by the parties and a matter that courts
do not raise sua sponte.
333. 12 CHARL.S ALAN WRIGHr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CrVIL2D

§ 3141 (1997) (speaking in connection with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82, but inlanguage
that is equally applicable to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
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which appeal is taken, provide notice to the appeals court and to the other
parties ofthe subjects and place of the appeal.3 34 In serving this function, they
are analogous to a summons and complaint. But, just as defects in trial court
venue are waivable and correctable by transfer to a court in which the action
could have been brought,33 just as complaints can be amended to add plaintiffs (as well as defendants) until the statute of limitations has run and, in

instances when "relation back" ofthe amendment is appropriate, even thereaf-

ter, 36 and just as complaints are charitably construed and liberally amendable
so long as adversaries are not prejudiced,337 an error in the identification ofthe
court to which appeal is taken should simply be corrected by transmission or
transfer ofthe appeal to the proper court of appeals. 3 ' Moreover, broad construction, or even timely amendment, of the specification of the orders being
appealed and of the parties who are appealing should be permissible, in the
discretion of the court of appeals and in the interests of justice.339 As the

334. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,318 (1988) (noting that purpose
of specificity requirement concerning appellants' identity is to provide notice to opposition and
to court); Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that
"[c]entral to the specificity requirements of Rule 3(c) is the principle of fair notice to the opposing party and to the court").
335. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(hXl) (stating circumstances in which defense of improper
venue is waived); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2001) (providing for transfer of cases laying venue in
wrong division or district).
336. See Slaughter v. S. Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that
amendment of products liability complaint to add wrongful death claims and to substitute
widows for allegedly injured deceased husbands related back to filing date of original complaint,
and thus were not time-barred, where claims arose out of same injury as originally pleaded,
defendants had notice of amendment within limitations period and, by amendment, widows
sought to recover, as representatives of estates, for injury originally alleged and also as individuals injured in their own right); Neufield v. Neufield, 910 F. Supp. 977,985-86 (S.D. N.Y. 1996)
(stating that claims of plaintiff who was added in amended complaint related back to original
filing date where substance of plaintiff's claims was fully set forth in original complaint).
337. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f) states that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed
as to do substantial justice," and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to
amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
338. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994) authorizes transfer from one federal court of appeals to
another "in which the... appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed," in order to
cure the filing of an appeal in the incorrect court. See also Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704,70607 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing docketing statement to cure defects in notice of appeal, which had
not named court to which appeal was taken); Ortiz v. John 0. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1125
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding it sufficient that intent to appeal to Seventh Circuit appeared from fact
that that was only court to which appeal could have been taken and appellees were not misled);
Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (forgiving appellant's
naming of wrong appellate court in his notice of appeal where it was obvious in which court
appeal properly lay, for there was only one court to which he could properly appeal).
339. See generally 16AWRIGHTET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D § 3949.4 (1999) (stating that "[a]mendment of the notice... may be allowed, particu-
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citations in the margin indicate, courts frequently do follow these norms. By
the same token, the appeals limitation period set in Rule 4 would better be
viewed as analogous to a statute of limitations (rather than as a jurisdictional
limit), setting a definite time when litigation shall be at an end, but waivable
by the parties and not to be raised by a court sua sponte.m'
Nothing inthe view that these requirements are mandatory is inconsistent
with the idea that appeals courts should, in some circumstances, be able to
assume the requirements to be met. Requirements can be mandatory upon the
partiesand something that the courts must enforce upon a complaint of noncompliance registered by other litigants, while still being matters that a court
can assume to have been satisfied, in the absence of any party complaint of
and ifthe circumstances otherwise make such an assumption
non-compliance,
41
3

appropriate.

It is the Court's conclusion that intermediate appellate courts have a duty
to raise sua sponte a failure to comply with certain requirements, including
especially the requirement of timely filing of the notice of appeal, that seems
most inconsistent with my position that federal appeals courts should be
recognized to have power, at least in some circumstances, to assume compliance and proceed to the merits. As to this, I say that the Court should either
(1) abandon this position altogether, recognizing that, in imposing a duty to
raise such matters sua sponte, ithas gone too far intreating certain ofthe Rules'
larly if the amendment is made within the time allowed for initial filing," id. at 60-61). Notices
are to be given a liberal interpretation. Id. at 61-65. "[A] notice of appeal that names the final
judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment"
Id. at 72-73. Some postjudgment orders may be so inseparable from the judgment as to be
encompassed by a notice of appeal filed before entry of those orders. Id. at 73. The Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(c), which,
in several respects liberalized the requirements for specifying appellants, made clear the
Committee's intent that an appeal not be dismissed when it is clear from the notice that a party
intended to appeal. The Notes declare, "If a court determines [that] it is objectively clear that
a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns nor fairness concerns that
should prevent the appeal from going forward." FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) Advisory Committee Note.
340. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (making statutes of limitations waivable affirmative defenses);
Hall, supra note 233, at 414-15 (citing Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,
264 (1978) (finding that purpose of appeal limitations periods is to set definite time when litigation shall end unless, within time prescribed, application to appeal has been made and, if it has
not, to advise prospective appellees that they are free of their adversary's demands)).
341. See Hall, supra note 233, at 411-18 (arguing that federal courts have "confused two
distinct questions: the authority to excuse untimely appeals once raised and the authority to
notice untimely appeals sun sponte"). Writing in 1986, Hall observed, "[l]n each instance where
the Supreme Court has referred to the thirty-day appeal period [set by Rule 4(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure] as 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' ... the only issue was whether
the court of appeals had authority to relax the exact requirements of Rule 4(a). In none of these
cases did the Supreme Court or the court of appeals notice a timing defect on its own." Id. at
410 (footnotes omitted). The observation appears still to be accurate at this writing, in 2001.
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requirements as ifthey were truly jurisdictional, or (2) recognize exceptions to
this duty, including one for situations in which specifiable requisites for the
exercise ofhypothetical "jurisdiction" have been satisfied. 42 Itmaybethatthe
cases will be rare that satisfy the requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction in
the context of Rules-based issues. That is, it may be rare that the 'jurisdictional" question posed by a Federal Rule will be especially difficult while the
merits of a case are clearly against the appellant. Rarity is not a compelling
reason to deny the courts power to assume satisfaction of the 'jurisdictional"
Rules' requirements, however. In the many cases where the requirements of
hypothetical jurisdiction are not met, federal appeals courts should read and
apply the Rules liberally. In light of what I hope will be increasing realization
that the Rules are not truly jurisdictional, the courts should read and applythem
in some respects more liberally than they have done.
IV Observationson the Effects of the DenunciationofHypothetical
Jurisdictionand Conclusion
The denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction, when it precludes the
exercise of such jurisdiction, has the virtue of compelling resolution ofjurisdictional issues, thereby reducing procrastination, postponement and uncertainty as to those matters.343 Insofar as Steel Co. precludes district courts from
indulging in exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction, appellate courts have to
review jurisdictional determinations that otherwise would have been finessed,
undertaking that review either early in litigation (if the district court dismisses
for lack ofjurisdiction), after final judgment (if the district court holds that it
does have jurisdiction and adjudicates the case to final judgment), or in
conjunction with authorized interlocutory appeals.
At the same time, precluding the appellate courts' exercise ofhypothetical
jurisdiction, concerning either their own or district court jurisdiction, eliminates or at least postpones appellate decision ofmerits issues that parties seek
to have resolved. Appellate courts may find themselves making law on fewer
substantive law issues, both because district courts will not reach those issues
when they dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and because appeals courts will not
342. To the degree that Steel Co. leaves the door open to exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction (i.e., to the extent that there is power to act) when only statutory, rule-based,
common law or prudential jurisdictional "requirements" are implicated, one should still ask
when, as a matter of policy and discretion, the power should be exercised. The courts of
appeals' efforts to articulate those considerations was ongoing at the time that the Court excoriated hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel Co., which stopped the development of that body of
doctrine in its tracks. Insofar as the courts find that they continue to have latitude to develop
the doctrine - in the context of either appellate jurisdiction or original, typically district court,
jurisdiction - they can pick up where they left off.
343. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 283-84 (explaining that hypothetical jurisdiction perpetuated itsel causing courts to defer decisions on jurisdictional matters, leading to uncertainty).
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reach substantive law issues on the merits when they vacate judgments and
dismiss cases for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction or lack of appellate
jurisdiction. This consequence may not be bad; it may even be good, if the
courts do not have jurisdiction to decide those issues. However, when appellate courts do not answer substantive law questions, society loses something
of value. Even when merits issues are relatively "easy," the lack of answers
leaves uncertainty that has real and sometimes great effects in society. The
guidance to primary conduct that appellate courts can give is lost, at least for
a time, with consequences for how time, energy, and other resources are
expended in the world, and with consequences for future litigation that will
likely be necessary to authoritatively answer the questions left unresolved.
Whenthe potential obstacleto appellate decisionis posed onlyby Federal
Rules,' not by legislation nor by the Constitution, the harm attendant upon
delay of the merits decision may far exceed that attendant upon relaxation of
the Rules. For the several reasons discussed above, appellate courts should
enjoy freedomto relaxtheir application ofthe Rules, in view ofthe fact that the
Rules' requirements are not truly jurisdictional mandates. Given the Rules'
promulgation by the Court and the weakness of the systemic interests that they
further, even ifthe Supreme Court insists that certain Rules' requirements are
"jurisdictional," the appeals courts should be recognized to have power to
assume that the rule-imposed appellate 'jurisdictional" requirements have been
satisfied, and to reach the merits, in the exercise of their sound discretion,
under a doctrine of hypothetical appellatejurisdiction. The courts
of appeals
345
should have at least that much ability to control their agenda.

344. Again excepting the final decision aspect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
which is derived from § 1291.
345. It is a familiar adage that "[hie who controls the agenda controls the outcome."
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-59 and 1291, 1292 and 1295 (1999) provide as follows:
§ 1251. Original jurisdiction
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State
or against aliens.
[§ 1252-repealed]
§ 1253. Direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required
by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court ofthree
judges.
§ 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; certified questions
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition ofjudgment or decree;
(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law
in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon
such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require
the entire record to be sent up for decision ofthe entire matter in controversy.
[§§ 1255-56-repealed]
§ 1257. State courts; certiorari
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in
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question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of,
or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term "highest court of a State" includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
§ 1258. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico; certiorari
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn
in question or where the validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege,
or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the
treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under,
the United States.
§ 1259. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; certiorari
Decisions ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the following cases:
(1) Cases reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces under
section 867(a)(1) oftitle 10.
(2) Cases certified to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Judge
Advocate General under section 867(a)(2) of title 10.
(3) Cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted a
petition for review under section 867(a)(3) of title 10.
(4) Cases, other than those described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this
subsection, in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted
relief.
§ 1291. Final decisions of district courts
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District ofthe Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court
ofthe Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court. The jurisdiction ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and
(d) and 1295 of this title.
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§ 1292. Interlocutory decisions
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the
courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,
or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind
up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as
directing sales or other disposals of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction
of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after
the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."
(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in
subsection (a) or (b) of this section in any case over which the court would
have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of this title; and
(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement
which Would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting.
(d)(1) When the chiefjudge of the Court of International Trade issues an
order under the provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when any judge
of the Court of International Trade, in issuing any other interlocutory order,
includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved
with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
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such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry
of such order.
(2) When the chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims
issues an order under section 798(b) of this title, or when any judge of the
United States Court of Federal Claims, in issuing an interlocutory order,
includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved
with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry
of such order.
(3) Neither the application for nor the granting of an appeal under this
subsection shall stay proceedings in the Court of International Trade or in the
Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, unless a stay is ordered by a
judge ofthe Court of International Trade or ofthe Court of Federal Claims or
bythe United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or ajudge ofthat
court.
(4)(A) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of a
district court of the United States, the District Court of Guam, the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands, granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action
to the United States Court of Federal Claims under section 1631 of this title.
(B) When a motion to transfer an action to the Court of Federal Claims
is filed in a district court, no further proceedings shall be taken in the district
court until 60 days after the court has ruled upon the motion. If an appeal is
taken from the district court's grant or denial ofthe motion, proceedings shall
be further stayed until the appeal has been decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. The stay of proceedings in the district court shall not
bar the granting of preliminary or injunctive relief, where appropriate and
where expedition.is reasonably necessary. However, during the period in
which proceedings are stayed as provided in this subparagraph, no transfer to
the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the motion shall be carried out.
(e) The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section
2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the
courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b),

(c), or (d).
[§ 1293 is repealed; § 1294 concerns appellate venue.]
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§ 1295 Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District ofthe Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District
Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, if the jurisdiction of that court was
based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title, except that a case
involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights,
exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no other claims under
section 1338(a) shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this
title;
(2) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District of Guam, the District Court ofthe Virgin Islands, or the District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands, ifthe jurisdiction of that court was based,
in whole or in part, on section 1346 of this title, except that jurisdiction of an
appeal in a case brought in a district court under section 1346(a)(1), 1346(b),
1346(e), or 1346(f) of this title or under section 1346(a)(2) when the claim is
founded upon an Act of Congress or a regulation of an executive department
providing for internal revenue shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and
1294 of this title;
(3) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of
Federal Claims;
(4) of an appeal from a decision of(A) the Board of Patent Appeals and interferences of the Patent and
Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the
instance of an applicant for a patent or any party to a patent interference, and
any such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant or party to proceed
under section 145 or 146 of title 35;
(B) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
with respect to applications for registration ofmarks and other proceedings as
provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1071); or
(C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145
or 146 or 154(b)of title 35;
(5) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of
International Trade;
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(6) to review the final determinations of the United States International
Trade Commission relating to unfair practices in import trade, made under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337);
(7) to review, by appeal on questions of law only, findings of the Secretary of Commerce under U.S. note 6 to subchapter X of chapter 98 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to importation of
instruments or apparatus);
(8) of an appeal under section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act (7
U.S.C. 2461);
(9) of an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of title 5;
(10) of an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of contract
appeals pursuant to section 8(g)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41
U.S.C. 607 (g)(1)); and
(11) of an appeal under section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970;
(12) of an appeal under section 5 of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973;
(13) of an appeal under section 506(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978; and
(14) of an appeal under section 523 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
(b) The head of any executive department or agency may, with the
approval ofthe Attorney General, refer to the Court ofAppeals for the Federal
Circuit for judicial review any final decision rendered by a board of contract
appeals pursuant to the terms of any contract with the United States awarded
by that department or agency which the head of such department or agency
has concluded is not entitled to finality pursuant to the review standards
specified in section 10(b) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C.
609(b)). The head of each executive department or agency shall make any
referral under this section within one hundred and twenty days after the
receipt of a copy of the final appeal decision.
(c) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the matter
referred in accordance with the standards specified in section 10(b) of the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978. The court shall proceed with judicial review
on the administrative record made before the board of contract appeals on
matters so referred as in other cases pending in such court, shall determine the
issue of finality of the appeal decision, and shall, if appropriate, render judgment thereon, or remand the matter to any administrative or executive body
or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just.
[§ 1296 - repealed]

